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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Roman democracy is in fashion.  In particular, the publication of Fergus 
Millar’s The Crowd in the Late Republic (1998) has stimulated debate on the 
democratic elements in Roman government during this period. 
 
In this thesis I examine the nature of popular participation in the late Roman 
Republic.  I focus on the decision-making power of the populus Romanus and 
popular pressure to effect reform in the favour of citizens outside the 
senatorial and equestrian orders.  My findings are based on analysis of 
ancient literary and epigraphic sources, along with a critique of modern 
research on the topic.   
 
The first chapter introduces the subject with a survey of current scholarly 
opinion and discussion of key concepts and terms.  Chapter Two 
investigates how power was shared between senatus populusque Romanus 
and the distribution of power in the assemblies, concluding that 
participation was widespread as a result of the changing circumstances in 
the late Republic.  As farmers and veterans moved to Rome, and slaves were 
freed and granted citizenship and the right to vote, the balance was tipped 
ii 
in the favour of the non-elite voter.  Each class of the populus Romanus could 
participate in Roman politics, and certainly members of each did.   
 
Having concluded my analysis of the formal avenues of participation, I 
move onto the informal.  Chapter Three is the first of three chapters of case 
studies focusing on demonstrations and collective action which form the 
heart of this work.  The first set of studies cover secession, mutiny and 
refusal of the draft.  Chapter Four continues with studies of popular 
pressure to gain reforms to improve the food supply, restore tribunician 
power, obtain relief from crippling debt and land shortage.  The final 
chapter of analysis, Chapter Five, investigates collective action at contiones, 
legislative assemblies, trials, ludi et gladiatores, triumphs, funerals, and 
elections.   
 
The findings of these three chapters bring me to the conclusion that Rome 
was a democracy, if of a particular type.  The nature of popular political 
participation in the late Republic resembled that of an emerging democracy 
with the non-elite gaining an increasing role in the decision-making process, 
albeit without constitutional definition.  The citizens’ right to participate in 
the formal assemblies was augmented by their ability to take part in less 
formal ways also.  These informal methods ranged from popular 
involvement in contiones through to the application of pressure on senators 
iii 
through the threat of secession and mutiny.  Only the rise of the principate, 
with formalised roles for the various sectors in society under one leader, 
brought these developments to an end. 
iv 
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INTRODUCTION: SOME KIND OF DEMOCRACY? 
 
 
Popular political participation in the late Roman Republic took many forms.  
The people voted in tribes to pass laws.  Citizens gathered in centuries to 
elect consuls.  The plebs refused the levy to secure new laws for debt relief.  
It is the purpose of this thesis to examine these formal practices and 
informal incidents in order to evaluate the nature of the democratic 
elements during this period.  In this introduction, I will include a 
preliminary survey of political power in Rome, which will be continued in 
Chapter Two; a review of the latest scholarly opinions on the topic of the 
people’s role in Roman politics; some reflections on the state of democracy 
today; and finally definitions of democracy and the people involved in the 
late Republican context. 
 
The Roman people shared power with the senate.  The Greek historian 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus expresses the fundamentals of this power-
sharing arrangement:  
 
We have had a law so long as we have inhabited this city by which the 
Senate is invested with sovereign power in everything except the 
appointing of magistrates, the enacting of laws, and the declaration or 
termination of wars; and the power of determining these three matters 
rests with the people, by their votes. (6.66.3) 
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As Dionysius points out, Roman citizens decided who was invested with 
magisterial power, which bills became law and whether to begin or end 
conflict.  These were the formal powers of the Roman people.  I propose to 
assess the degree to which the people (populus Romanus) acted as the 
sovereign body of the late Roman Republic (ca. 133-50 BC), but will include 
episodes outside this period when they shed light on my analysis.1  The 
focus of my thesis will be on the level and effect of popular participation in 
both the formal side of the political process (especially elections and 
legislation) and the informal influence of the people on decision-making via 
demonstrations at public events and the contiones that preceded leglislative 
assemblies.   
 
There is currently no agreement on the arena in which the people exercised 
more power.  Jeff Tatum, for instance, holds that “the people exercised its 
powers only when it was articulated into one of the city’s voting 
assemblies” for this was the only occasion in which they acted officially,2 
while Moses Finley suggests that popular power was expressed through 
                                                 
1 Analysis is best limited to this period because more sources from antiquity survive that 
were recorded during or shortly after the last 100 years of the Republic.  See discussion 
below. 
 
2 Tatum (2009: 4ff.). He finds the democratic element in the legislative assemblies but not 
the centuriate, whereas Yakobson (1999) argues that popular participation in electoral 
assemblies was significant and often decided the successful candidates.  Based on the 
evidence of candidates’ focus on winning over the wider popular strata and analysis of 
property classes, Yakobson concludes that the votes of the many did count. 
 
3 
demonstrations and not assemblies, because magistrates dominated these 
and formal devices left little scope for popular participation.3  Much will 
turn on the way we choose to define “the people” and “democracy” (along 
with its cognates). 
 
Millar’s The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic constitutes a preliminary 
study of the role of the people; my thesis will respond to Millar’s 
conclusions which, among other things, equate public performance of 
politics with the existence of democracy.4  I am inclined to agree with Mary 
Beard and Michael Crawford who question Millar’s findings on two 
accounts.  First, they point out that public action does not necessarily mean 
democratic action.5  For this reason the following chapters include case 
studies of public action to assess its democratic elements.  They also suggest 
that Millar broach the topic of population numbers, as we need to know 
how many participated before we can call a system participatory.6  While 
they make a valid point, recent efforts have revealed that it is nigh on 
impossible to make any progress on the hoary old subject of population 
                                                 
3 Finley (1983: 86f., 91). 
 
4 Millar (1998). 
 
5 Similarly Mouritsen (2001: 46): “The fact than political proceedings are public does not in 
itself make them ‘democratic’.  That depends entirely on who attends them and …. on the 
relationship between the meetings and the political decision-making.” 
 
6 Beard and Crawford (1999: 90 f.). Cf. Millar (1998: 225). 
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numbers, so this topic, although discussed in my thesis, is not a focus of my 
work. 
 
I expect to find that popular opinion and pressure had a greater influence at 
the decision-making level of Roman government than previously supposed; 
there were democratic aspects in the late Republic.  Popular power to 
influence decision-making increases in proportion to the limits placed on 
magisterial power. 
 
Recent research has suggested that we reconsider the power dynamic of 
Roman politics.7  The unwritten Roman constitution, a combination of leges 
and iura tempered by mos and consuetudo (Cic. Leg. Man. 60), dictated that 
power was shared between the senate and people of Rome.  Yet for a period 
classicists held that the elite controlled the state through clientela,8 so that 
power lay in the hands of the senate.  Similarly, Claude Nicolet has argued 
that the strict hierarchy based upon property prevented the civic mass (as 
opposed to the “political class” or the timocratic oligarchy) from playing a 
direct role in politics.9  In response to such theories of senatorial dominance, 
                                                 
7 See especially Lintott (1999b: chh. 10 and 11). 
 
8 A proponent of this view was Gelzer in his prosopographical The Roman Nobility, first 
published in 1912.  The people and senate did, of course, have different spheres of 
influence, which will be a focal point of my analysis. 
 
9 Nicolet (1980). 
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Fergus Millar has put the case for the sovereign power of the people, 
ultimately finding significant democratic aspects in the activities which took 
place in the Forum.10  His conclusions, however, require investigation: 
democracy does not necessarily result from popular sovereignty.  In theory, 
citizens were meant to receive equal treatment before the law and equal 
political and civil rights.  Yet, while some members of the Roman people 
were able to participate in the assemblies and meetings, the majority faced 
considerable hurdles.  All citizens were permitted to take part in assemblies 
(with the exception of patrician exclusion from the concilium plebis), but 
factors such as failure to conduct a census and so enrol new citizens 
following the Social War, mobilisation of voters and distance from Rome 
affected the likelihood of participation.   
 
The lower orders are often considered the victims of inequality in the late 
Republic – after all, it was they who struggled to survive, living hand to 
mouth.  But the Roman judicial system disadvantaged the equestrian and 
senatorial orders more than the plebs.  The very public trials of the elite 
exposed these members of the aristocracy to judgments based on political 
rhetoric.  Many were condemned as a result of such unfair partisan practice.  
Also, when it came to capital punishment, political rights could be 
                                                                                                                                         
 
10 Millar (1998). 
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suspended if one was deemed a hostis; as we shall see, such treatment was 
applied to members of the elite as readily as to those more humble citizens. 
 
Scholars have overemphasised the influence of the senate and patronage 
due to the elite bias of ancient (and more recent) sources.  The elite body of 
the senate had undergone fragmentation in the 100 years preceding the 
demise of the Republic so that it no longer presented a cohesive body.  The 
popular assemblies gained power as a result of competition between 
factions.  Laws were no longer formulated by the senate as a whole, but by 
groups and even individuals, who used tribunician powers to secure the 
popular support necessary to pass their bills into law.  Some were motivated 
by personal gain, such as material enrichment and political domination, 
while other groups and individuals had a popular political agenda, one that 
sought to benefit the people of Rome, the populus Romanus.11 
 
 
POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY 
 
“Democracy” and “democratic” are slippery terms, used by different people 
to describe very different regimes and phenomena.  Some political theorists 
                                                 
11 For the existence of political ideology at Rome, see Chapter Three below. 
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consider democracy an “essentially contested concept” in that further 
specificity in definition rarely advances the topic.12  But I am skeptical of 
such cynicism.  It will prove fruitful to investigate some concepts of 
democracy to advance an idea of popular participation and see where Rome 
of the late Republic fits in the spectrum.  Will it be a different kind of 
democracy?   
 
We are all familiar with the problems with today’s deliberative 
democracies.13 Despite these shortcoming, some still measure the Roman 
system by modern standards, such as Morstein-Marx.  He turns to 
Habermas to show how the Roman Republic fails to meet the standards of 
modern deliberative democracy because there was no equal access to 
decision-making and agenda-setting.14 
 
Tatum evaluates the claim of Millar, Lintott and Yakobson that the Roman 
constitution contained democratic elements, or, as Lintott put it, was “some 
kind of democracy.”15  The Roman people had power in practice.  It is not 
                                                 
12 Gallie (1964). 
 
13 On which see, for example, Talisse (2005). 
 
14 Morstein-Marx (2004: 22). 
 
15 Lintott (1999b: 199-208) points out the obvious, viz. that Rome was nothing like 
democratic Athens, which he incidentally describes inaccurately as a world in which every 
male citizen enjoyed political equality and freedom of speech.  It is clear that wealth and 
prestige counted in Athens as in Rome. 
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enough for a state to possess the formal elements of democracy.  After all, 
even totalitarian regimes have elections.  Tatum refines his point:  
 
the question is not whether republican Rome, either in theory or in 
practice, attained to contemporary standards of democracy (whatever 
they turn out to be), but rather, how, within the actualities of Roman 
society and the regular conduct of Roman political institutions, the people 
mattered to the actions of the governing class and to the decisions taken 
by the state. 16 
 
 
It is this decision-making power that I will focus on.  The Roman people had 
several means of influencing the way Rome was governed and the choices 
that were made.  Popular pressure was ubiquitous.  Robert Dahl has a 
definition of democracy that fits the context of the late Roman Republic: “a 
unique process for making collective and binding decisions”.17  
 
A good example of the semantic difficulties surrounding the term 
“democracy” can be seen in the work of the insightful ancient historian 
Moses Finley.  In his examination of ancient and modern democracy, in 
which he compares the Athenian experience with that of the United States, 
he is critical of Rome in a footnote: what Romans had to say on democracy 
was derived from books and of little interest, since “Rome itself was never a 
democracy by any acceptable definition of that term, though popular 
                                                                                                                                         
 
16 Tatum (2009: 14). 
 
17 Dahl (1989: 5). 
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institutions were incorporated into the oligarchical governmental system of 
the Roman Republic.”18  Yet he later notes that the Founding Fathers set the 
US up as a republic, only to have it called a democracy by de Tocqueville 
and then the name to stick despite significant institutional changes.19 
 
Majid Tehranian has provided an exhaustive list of elements fundamental to 
democracy, based on Lincoln’s ideal of democracy as expressed in the 
Gettysburg Address (“government of the people, by the people, for the 
people”).  Clearly the following summary is a wishlist seldom if ever 
achieved in sophisticated contemporary democracies let alone experimental 
early democracies such as those of classical Athens and Rome in the final 
generations of the Republic.  Nonetheless, the following principles of 
political, economic, social and cultural democracy provide interesting 
criteria against which to measure the degree to which states promote and 
protect popular sovereignty and related rights and freedoms: 
 
–political democracy: popular sovereignty; universal suffrage; 
protection of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness; majority rule, 
minority rights; fair representation and periodic elections; peaceful 
succession; direct voting such as referenda on critical issues; rule of 
law, habeas corpus, bill of rights; and responsibilities of citizenship;  –
economic democracy: protection of property; free markets; free 
competition; government regulation of trade and investment to ensure 
the absence of monopolies and fair standards in trade, exchange, 
                                                 
18 Finley (1985: 14). 
 
19 Finley (1985: 33). 
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competition, health, and environment;  –social democracy: social 
security for the unemployed, the retired, pregnant women, and 
children; the provision of public health, education and welfare;  –
cultural democracy: universal education; access to means of 
communication; freedom of identity, including speech, assembly, 
religion, language, privacy, and lifestyle.20 
 
Some theorists hold that democracy is a form of elitism: “the democratic 
method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people’s vote.”21   This definition of the democratic method 
could be applied to Rome in the late Republic with interesting results: 
candidates for office competed for the vote in popular assemblies and, once 
elected, gained decision-making powers.  But it is not a snug fit, for the 
popular power to legislate reduced magistrates’ power as only the people 
could enact laws.  In Rome,  elected magistrates introduced bills, but did not 
vote on them except as members of a tribe, along with all other citizens.  
This is in contrast to contemporary deliberative democracies in which 
elected representatives vote bills into law.  There is in addition a problem 
with the theory that elite politicians exercise overweening power when 
applied to contemporary democracies: it ignores the influence of the many 
between elections, including citizens approaching electorate representatives 
with problems, submissions and referenda.  Ministers of Parliament do not 
                                                 
20 Saikal and Schnabel (2003: 84 f.). 
 
21 Schumpeter (1954: 269). 
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isolate themselves from their electorate once elected.  They must act 
responsibly and respond to requests and pressure from the citizens, or else 
face the consequences (e.g. Taito Phillip Field resigned from the Labour 
party after moves were made to expel him following allegations of improper 
use of his position and the resulting public outcry).22  Roman magistrates 
did not have to behave as well as this.  Many examples exist of officials 
flouting their powers, but so too do instances of popular reaction to such 
bad behaviour.  Consider the fate of Verres: his reputation was ruined once 
Cicero made public his allegation that Verres had executed a Roman citizen 
without trial.  Also, the elitism theory relies on a coherent elite, whereas in 
reality competition within a fractured elite results in policy shaped by 
popular pressure, both in contemporary societies and in the late Roman 
Republic. 
 
Another theory, espoused by Richard Mulgan, posits two sorts of 
democracy: restricted and unrestricted.  The first is characterised by the 
existence of free elections and as such is too narrow and focused on 
representative democracy to be useful for our purposes: it leaves too little 
scope for citizen participation in decision-making which as we shall see was 
a fundamental facet of popular politics in the late republic.  Unrestricted 
                                                 
22 NZ Herald Feb. 16, 2007. 
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democracy, on the other hand, allows all citizens to have a say in the 
decision-making process.23  This unrestricted definition works when applied 
to New Zealand as, while the country is not a direct democracy – the people 
do not make decisions directly in a citizen assembly – there are nonetheless 
mechanisms through which public opinion can be accessed such as 
referenda and submissions.24  Indeed, the internet has promoted increased 
participation through web-based submissions.  Mulgan notes the problems 
with this unrestricted definition also: government by the people, where all 
citizens have equal power, is an unachievable ideal.  In the end, he chooses 
the following flexible definition: democracy is “the exercise of political 
power by the people,” where “power” refers to all the ways in which one 
person may influence the behaviour of others.25  Majority rule is inevitable, 
although this does not promise the majority unrestricted rights; the primary 
aim ought to be consensus.  Provided everyone is free to express their 
opinion and so has an equal say prior to the decision-making, that is 
democracy according to its own rules.  Democracy also entails certain rights 
and freedoms: of speech and association, to vote and to information, but not 
limitless rights as may be promoted by certain liberal principles as these can 
                                                 
23 Mulgan (1989: 16ff.). 
 
24 Though note that popular influence has its limits: the interest group with the most 
financial backing can use advertising campaigns to hijack referenda. 
 
25 Mulgan (1989: 18). 
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end up impinging upon more fundamental rights.26  Oddly, Henrik 
Mouritsen suggests there can be no truly democratic state as it is impossible 
to be fair to every citizen.27  Such a utopian state, I agree, has never existed 
and never will.  There will always be clashes of interests.  One person will 
feel disadvantaged because another has benefitted at their cost.  Therefore 
this thesis will not be dealing with that sort of unattainable democracy. 
 
In New Zealand, democracy is party-based, which brings its own problems.  
Disparity between parties, for instance, results at election time in 
substantially more funding going to established parties, thus 
disadvantaging the smaller and newer ones so that they find it difficult to 
publicise their policies.  As a result these minor parties often rely on 
publicity via the major parties, as was the case when Jeanette Fitzsimons 
capitalised on Jenny Shipley’s attempt to undermine her campaign in the 
Coromandel in 1999.  In Rome, such inequalities did not exist. 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 
 
                                                 
 
26 Mulgan (1989: 20ff.). 
 
27 Mouritsen (2001: 7). 
 
14 
In a democracy, legal authority to make decisions lies with the people.  Was 
this the case in Rome?  A good place to start is Polybius, the Greek aristocrat 
from Achaea who was taken to Rome as a hostage.  There he wrote an 
analysis of the Roman constitution, based on his experiences as a member of 
Scipio’s inner circle.  Polybius (6.11.11ff.) maintained that the Roman 
Republic in his day had a mixed constitution, made up of monarchic, 
aristocratic and democratic elements.28  The consuls symbolised the first, 
monarchic, aspect, with their power tempered only by the annual tenure 
and collegiality of the office.  The second, aristocratic, element is provided 
by the senate which contained many of Rome’s elite.  The people of Rome, 
the populus Romanus, rounds off the three as the democratic part.  Polybius 
emphasises that the people alone had the power to legislate (6.14.10).  His 
analysis comes close to the Roman ideal of the senate and people governing 
the state together, only he extracts consuls from the senate and treats them 
as a separate category. Lintott suggests that Polybius believed Rome’s mixed 
constitution was a good idea in principle, but in reality it was about to suffer 
at the hands of the aristocrats, who at the time had more influence than the 
                                                 
28 Recent commentaries criticise Polybius for omissions and misconceptions.  See Walbank 
(1957) for an explanation of how Polybius’ account coheres with others.  Walbank (1972: 155 
f.) is more critical; Nippel (1980: 142-53) is also critical.  Not surprisingly, Millar (1984) is 
less so. 
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people, and were in the process of corrupting the people so that the populus 
would want “more than their equal part in the system”.29 
 
The separation of powers in Rome between magistrates, senate and people 
finds some parallels today in parliamentary democracies like New Zealand.  
The executive consists of the prime minister and his most senior ministers 
sitting in cabinet with its advisory role similar to that of the consuls and 
senior statesmen of the senate.  The legislature is made up of the people’s 
elected representatives sitting in parliament, and with the same legislative 
role as the tribal assembly in Rome.  The judiciary finds it parallel in the 
praetors and juries of senators, equestrians and tribuni aerarii in the Roman 
context.  In New Zealand, as in Rome, the separation of power is only 
theoretical.  In practice MPs participate as both executive and legislators, 
just as in Rome there is a cross-over in the senators’ roles as jurors and 
proposers of laws.   
 
Polybius has a concept of the mixed constitution as founded upon the same 
principle as the separation of powers: by creating tension between different 
bodies they keep one another in check (6.18).30  Competition creates balance 
so that no one institution can act without the co-operation of the others, and 
                                                 
29 Lintott (1999b: 23). 
 
30 Lintott (1999b: 24). 
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so none comes to predominate.  The same effect is achieved by the checks 
and balances present in both the Roman and New Zealand systems.  For 
instance, the New Zealand public can call the government to account since 
elections are held relatively frequently: once every three years the people 
can elect a new government if they are unhappy with the performance of the 
old one.  There were, of course, no political parties in Rome, yet the people 
could nonetheless punish a Roman magistrate who performed badly. He 
could find himself impeached at the end of his year in office31 and, if the 
people’s memory was long enough, or hostile propaganda sufficiently 
thorough, his political career could be over.32 
 
Popular authority to make decisions can take one of several forms.  In Rome, 
we see citizens directly involved in politics, voting on laws without the 
intercession of any representative.  In New Zealand, citizens elect 
representatives then sit back and, for the most part, let them make decisions 
on their behalf.33  If we call the latter a representative democracy, what 
might we call the Roman system?  Jeff Tatum has suggested that Rome’s 
was a “delegative democracy”:  
                                                 
31 For more on trials see Chapter Five below. 
 
32 Compare the career-ending indiscretion of Graham Capill, founder of the Christian 
Heritage Party, found guilty in 2005 of sex charges. 
 
33 See below on the apathy of the contemporary New Zealand voting public. 
 
17 
 
the political importance of the people, although significant, was clearly 
constrained.  If, then, we must include the Romans’ political system 
within the set of all democracies, we may prefer the denomination 
‘delegative democracy’, in which system there is electoral 
competitiveness as well as civil and political freedom, all of which 
obtained in the Roman republic, but very little in the way of 
responsiveness to the preferences of the public on the part of elected 
magistrates, whose authority suffers few practical limitations. 34  
 
 
Tatum’s emphasis on the lack of response on the part of magistrates to the 
opinions of those who elected them will be investigated in the case studies 
in the following chapters.  Magistrates represented the interests of the 
people who elected them; consider the advice to Cicero that he appeal to the 
different interests of the different orders as consular candidate in the 
electioneering pamphlet Commentariolum Petitionis.  And of course the 
tribunes of the plebs were known to act as representatives of the popular 
interest, as we shall see.  
 
Popular power may seem reduced in a representative democracy when 
citizens concede their right to make decisions to office holders.  Does 
democracy require equality of participation?  New Zealand has a 
representative democracy, whereby the citizens exercise their sovereign 
power through elected representatives.  This does not, however, necessarily 
entail a loss of power.  The elected representatives and permanent 
                                                 
34 Tatum (2009: 19). 
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government officials have the ability and resources to govern.  This in itself 
may reflect some inequality of opportunity and the need for a redistribution 
of resources, but still the state needs those experienced in government to run 
the ship of state.  This need not result in usurpation of popular power.  
People can still have equal political power even if less politically active than 
an MP or lobbyist.  There are several means of exercising power through 
influencing representatives at national and local levels.  For instance, 
citizens may communicate with parliament, the house of representatives, 
directly in the form of written submissions or by arranging to meet with 
MPs in person.  The threat of withholding the vote at election time can also 
encourage MPs to adapt government policy following pressure from interest 
groups in particular.   
 
The greatest challenge to the democratic spirit in New Zealand is not loss of 
political power to representatives but voter apathy.  79.46% of enrolled 
electors turned out to vote in the 2008 elections.35  Participation rates at 
general elections are relatively high, but at local body level fewer cast their 
vote.  In 2001 only 45% of eligible voters took part in election of city 
councils.36  Some pundits have viewed abstention from politics as an 
                                                 
35 http://www.elections.org.nz/news/2008-election-official-results.html accessed 11 July, 
2009. 
 
36 Local Authority Election Statistics 2001, Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington 2003, p. 
7. 
19 
expression of tacit approval of the status quo.  This theory, however, 
overlooks the possibility that some citizens do not participate because they 
lack the resources or ability to do so.  Nonetheless equal political power is 
more important than equal political activity.  As long as the opportunity 
exists for the less politically active citizen to take action in the political arena 
if the need is felt (eg. by taking part in a peace rally), then the decision-
makers remain vigilant and act in accordance with such anticipated 
reactions.37 
 
At the same time, there exists a balance between rights and duties.  You 
cannot demand rights without also performing duties for the state.  There 
must also be a limit on individual rights to prevent one citizen from 
infringing upon the rights of another.  In order for decision-makers to 
respond in a democracy with less active participants, citizens must be aware 
of their duties, which are necessary in order for decision-makers to respond 
appropriately.  The people are sovereign and free but are obliged to fulfil 
their duties in return for this freedom.38 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 
37 Mulgan (1989: 43). 
 
38 Barber (1996: 285): “Civil society grounds democracy as a form of government in which 
not politicians and bureaucrats but an empowered people use legitimate force to put flesh 
on the bones of their liberties; and in which liberty carries with it the obligations of social 
responsibility and citizenship as well as the rights of legal persons.” 
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WHO WERE THE PEOPLE?  
 
In order to discuss popular political participation in the late Roman 
Republic, we need first to define “the people”.  The populus Romanus 
“signifies the collective people, including, therefore, the senate”,39 unless the 
formulation is senatus populusque Romanus in which case the people includes 
everyone except senators.40  In other words, the populus was the equites and 
plebs; citizens of the equestrian order, that is those who belonged to the top 
property classis, and the rest, the plebs, who were registered in the remaining 
four classes.41   
 
The term “populus” encompasses every adult male citizen.  Women and non-
citizens might form part of the informal crowd, but nowhere are they 
explicitly included in the populus.  The Roman cives were a diverse bunch in 
the late Republic owing to a generous policy of enfranchisement of both ex-
slaves and subjugated neighbours.42  Following the Social War, all those 
                                                 
39 Lewis and Short “plebs” I. 
 
40 Lewis and Short “populus” I. B. 1.   
 
41 On property qualifications and classes see Livy 1.43.1-8; Dion. Hal. 4.16-17, 4.20.3-5, 7.59.2-
8; Cic. Rep. 2.39-40. 
 
42 On citizenship see Sherwin-White (1973: 322-334). 
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inhabiting the Italian peninsula south of the rivers Arno and Rubicon were 
enfranchised.  These men made up the populus Romanus. 
 
The plebs were all those citizens outside the senatorial and equestrian 
census-categories.  Those who dwelled in the country were called “plebs 
rustica”, while those in the city were termed “plebs urbana”.  Some were 
wealthy, others dirt poor. 
 
These definitions of populus and plebs are not controversial, but when we try 
to further refine the definition of “people” we encounter problems, due in 
most part to the rhetorical nature of one of our main sources, Cicero.  In his 
speeches, the meaning of populus Romanus changes to suit his purpose.  In 
the first speech he delivered against Rullus’ land bill in 63 BC, Cicero was 
directing his words to the senate and so characterised the populus as those 
who valued pax, concordia and otium (Leg. Agr. 1.23).  These priorities of 
peace and harmony echo those of the equestrians as described in the 
Commentariolum Petitionis (53), which suggests that men from an equestrian 
background may have formed the core of his supporters in the senate, 
although it must be admitted that by the year of this speech, there was 
enough tension in the air that an appeal to pax, concordia and otium no doubt 
had universal appeal.  The second speech he delivered against Rullus was in 
the forum before a contio, not in the senate house.  This time though his 
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audience were not senators but whoever was present in the forum, whether 
by chance or by conscious effort.   
 
This was Cicero’s first contio as consul, hence his show of gratitude to the 
people for supporting his candidature (2.1-4).  But this also gives us reason 
to suspect that his audience was predominantly one of loyal supporters,43 
notified of the event in advance.  They were those who would vote on the 
bill, so in this speech we find the populus taking on a “tribal” sense, defined 
in terms of rural and urban tribes (2.79).  In another speech, this time in 
defence of Rabirius, he includes in the united front that defended Rome 
against Saturninus every type of citizen in order to give a sense of unity, 
although he does not use the Latin populus: senators, equites, tribuni aerarii 
and “ceterorumque ordinum omnium homines” (Rab. perd. 27). 
 
In another example, Cicero distinguishes populus from plebs as a rhetorical 
flourish in the speech he composed in defence of Murena in 63 BC.  He 
hoped his defence would turn out gloriously both for himself and his office, 
and for plebs and populus (Cic. Mur. 1.1).44  Cicero did not usually 
                                                 
43 Thus Mouritsen (2001: 55). 
 
44 Lewis and Short “populus” I. B. 2: Livy 2.56; Cic. Mur. 1.1; Leg. Agr. 2.27.  See Nicolet 
(1980: 225, 304). 
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differentiate between the two, so we should not read too much into this 
distinction.   
 
The sources may also complicate our analysis by vague references to those 
whom they are discussing.  Livy for instance sometimes uses the term 
“plebs” indiscriminately, even when the context suggests that he is referring 
to the wider populus, that is all men of both humble and more than moderate 
means.  He uses the term plebs generically.  The trick is to refine the identity 
of his subject from the context.  For instance, when he discusses the levy, we 
should expect the plebs in this case to refer to males of military age. 
 
Ancient authors’ choice of terms to describe a section of the population was 
based not on objective criteria, but was more a reflection of style and 
individual moral standpoint.  Hence some might seek to avoid repetition, 
while others expressed their attitude towards different sections of society.  
Analysis of terms in the context in which they are used is thus crucial.45    
 
                                                 
45 As pointed out by Yavetz (1969: 7).  Many terms occur in connection with the participants 
in demonstrations and other collective action, such as: plebs, multitudo, populus Romanus, 
equites, hippeis, ochlos, plethos, demos, politai, homilos, polloi, libertinorum et servorum manus, 
gladiatores, fugitivii, cives imperiti, cheirotechnai, falcarii, tabernarii, opifices, servitia, xenoi, 
monomachoi, therapontes, improbi, homines, milites, stratiotai, hopla, liberi, servi, egentes, tota Italia 
and omnes ordines. 
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The term “crowd” has negative connotations of which we need to be aware.  
And yet the crowd (variously termed turba, multitudo, vulgus) that 
frequented the forum and so too contiones need not necessarily have 
excluded members of the first property class.  These men had time on their 
hands, and likely had the political nous to take an interest in proceedings.  
The Commentariolum Petitionis (37-38) provides further evidence on the 
constitution of the multitudo: the writer emphasises his concern that the 
candidate have a multitudo about him, and this is no humble crowd, but one 
consisting of those he had successfully defended, namely men of property 
and reputation worth saving.46 
 
What follows is an examination of collective action and the practice of 
assemblies and magistrates.  I will analyse ancient literary sources, namely 
histories, biographies, speeches delivered before the people in the Forum 
and the senate in the curia, as well as letters and inscriptions for evidence of 
elite attitudes toward the people and popular attitudes to political 
participation.  Developments from early Rome will be traced using Livy and 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus.  Evidence from the principate can also be used 
with care.  One characteristic of ancient literary sources often interpreted as 
problematic can, in fact, help us reconstruct the past.  Historians, especially 
                                                 
46 Morstein-Marx (1998: 260f.) has successfully defended the reliability of the Comm. Pet. 
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Livy, have been criticised for unconscious retrojection of their own 
contemporary realities, which means that despite having lost his books 
covering the late Republic, we can glean evidence of this period from his 
work on earlier times.  Along with this examination of ancient material, I 
will analyse recent political analysis of the late Republic.   
 
Chapter Two investigates the balance of power between senate and people, 
along with the distribution of power in the popular assemblies.  Chapter 
Three is the first of three chapters containing the case studies on 
demonstrations and collective action that form the heart of this work.  The 
first set of studies are on secession, mutiny and refusal of the draft.  Chapter 
Four continues with studies on popular pressure to gain reforms to improve 
the food supply, restore tribunician power, obtain relief from crippling debt 
and land shortage.  The final chapter of analysis, Chapter Five, investigates 
collective action at contiones, legislative assemblies, trials, ludi et gladiatores, 
triumphs, funerals, and elections. 
CHAPTER 2: SENATUS POPULUSQUE ROMANUS 
 
Popular participation was fundamental to the workings of the Roman 
Republic.  State institutions incorporated and relied upon the people’s 
involvement and the voting of the legislative assemblies and election of 
magistrates were both based on the ethos of the sovereignty of the Roman 
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people.  The citizens reigned supreme in these arenas.  The populus Romanus 
in the broadest sense, including citizens from every strata of society, had an 
integral role in decision-making to the extent that the people’s sanction was 
needed before a bill passed into law.  The success of a candidate for the 
honour of office-holding depended on his winning the support of those 
citizens who could afford the time and expense to attend the elections held 
in Rome annually.  When it came to elections, it was up to the candidate to 
utilise his networks to make himself more appealing than his competition.  
In the case of legislative assemblies, mobilisation of the voting populace 
depended on rousing their interest in the issue being put to the vote. 
 
Despite claims to the contrary,47 Romans had plenty of opportunity to 
participate and so exercise political power in the formal mechanisms of 
government, that is the voting and elective assemblies, as we will see in this 
chapter.  The people also exercised power through demonstrations, 
secessions, and riots, the subject of my next three chapters. 
 
The citizens of Rome shared the power to make decisions with the senate.  
The abbreviation SPQR expresses the principle of joint rule.48  The Roman 
                                                 
47 Finley (1983: 91 f.), for example, believes most never had the chance to vote.  
 
48  The acronym stands for “senatus populusque Romanus” (Cic. Planc. 37.90) or “Romani” 
(Cic. Phil. 6.2.4).  Inscriptions preserve the formulae “senatus populusque Romanus” (ILS 
72, 81, 83, 112, 216, 24411, 264, 265, 294, 302, 314, 729, 772, 794, 1243, 3090, 3326, 3780, 5386, 
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constitution, that is the rules of political operation based on law and 
tradition, dictated that the senate and people of Rome were together 
sovereign.  They ruled Rome together.  The ideal relied on compromise as a 
means of preventing conflict between senate, people, and factions consisting 
of elements of the two groups.  Sallust expresses the ideal, although not the 
reality, when he tells us that  
 
before the destruction of Carthage the people and senate of Rome together 
governed the republic peacefully and with moderation.  There was no 
strife among the citizens either for glory or for power; fear of the enemy 
preserved the good morals of the state. (BJ 41.2) 
 
Livy portrays more realistically the tension between those who had the 
loudest voice in the senate and the opinion of those who spoke for the tribal 
assembly:  
 
When four tribunes of the plebs vetoed this bill [which gave citizenship 
with the right to vote to the inhabitants of Formiae, Fundi and Arpinum] 
on the ground that it was not proposed with the sanction of the senate, 
they were informed that it was the prerogative of the assembly, not the 
senate, to bestow franchise. (38.36.8-9)49   
 
                                                                                                                                         
8744a5), “senatus p. q. R.” (ILS 296, 298); “senatus p. R.” (ILS 342), “s. p. q. R.” (ILS 82, 255, 
274, 292, 309, 341, 374, 425, 694, 698, 769, 797, 798, 799, 1707, 3174, 3781, 3802), “[se]natus et 
populus Romanus” (ILS 136), “senatus ac populus Rom.” (ILS 771) and “senatus 
amplissimus populusq. Romanus” (ILS 809).  Sallust reverses the order, putting the people 
first: “populus et senatus Romanus” (BJ 41.2), as does Livy: “populi Romani senatusque 
verbis” (7.31.10; 24.37.7) and ILS 15: “populus senatusque Romanus”. 
 
49 For more on the popular erosion of senatorial authority following the precedent of the 
Gracchi see Brunt (1988: 32-35). 
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This passage illustrates the battle for power between the two public bodies 
in 188 BC.  Here the senate, as represented by pro-senatorial tribunes, and a 
popular tribune disagree over the correct political process.  At the very heart 
of the debate in 188 was the issue of respecting senatorial auctoritas – the 
body ought to be consulted before a bill was presented to the assembly out 
of respect for the prestige of the senators.  This conflict between senatorial 
auctoritas and popular libertas is a continuing theme of the late Republic 
 
Before we can examine further the people’s share of decision-making power, 
we need to first consider who were are talking about.  The senate and 
people were by no means homogenous groups, despite the impression given 
by Sallust in his famous statement regarding the decline of good relations 
between senate and people after the fall of Carthage: “The nobilitas began to 
abuse their dignitas and the populus their libertas… Thus the community was 
split into two parties (partes), and between these the state was torn to pieces” 
(BJ 41.5).  The senate was indeed composed of factions, but these continually 
shifted as men changed alliances to suit their latest need.  The career of C. 
Marius most clearly illustrates this tradition. 
 
Sallust’s nobilitas was not only composed of factions, but also consisted of 
men from diverse backgrounds.  The oligarchy was made up of the senate 
and magistrates, that is those of at least equestrian ranked families who 
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chose a political career, a career in public office.  Curule magistrates were 
elected by the centuriate assembly, the rest by the tribal assembly.  After the 
reforms of Sulla, quaestors gained entry to the senate and stayed there 
unless they fell victim to the censors’ quinquennial revision of the senate.  
Freedmen were eligible for equestrian rank if their property qualification 
was sufficient, so sons of such wealthy freedmen were able to stand for 
office, although there existed a ban on freedmen themselves canvassing for 
office.50 
 
Non-senatorial aristocracy, that is members of the equestrian order who had 
not entered the senate, also enjoyed political influence through their 
connections with magistrates and senators and were for this reason 
considered part of that ruling elite, or oligarchy.  One of the most influential 
equites was Cicero’s friend Atticus, to whom Cicero wrote regularly seeking 
advice.  This was one of the traditional relationships between senator and 
equestrian.  Other members of the equestrian order, such as publicani, might 
turn to a senatorial friend for help with the completion of public contracts, 
as Crassus’ clients did in 60-59 BC.  In the late Republic, however, some 
equites became more active in the service of both plebs and senate, as we 
shall see. 
                                                 
50 Treggiari (1969: 64 ff.), with the caveat that the elevation in status occurred only rarely. 
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Popular influence differed from that of the oligarchy as it was not so easily 
concentrated in factions.  Sallust attributed the people’s failure to take on the 
senate to the plebs’ lack of unity:  “The nobilitas had the more powerful 
factio, while the vis plebis was less effective because it was dispersed and 
divided among many” (BJ 41.6).  The historian is right to emphasise the lack 
of concentration of vis in the hands of one sector of the populus.  Unlike 
senatorial authority, where one or two powerful cliques might sometimes 
have dominated senatorial decision-making, this would never be the case 
with the people.  The populus Romanus in the late Republic included citizens 
from every section of society except senators: equites, farmers, craftsmen, 
day labourers, soldiers, senators and newly enfranchised freedmen and 
inhabitants from throughout the Italian peninsula all contributed to the 
citizen body, the populus Romanus.  It was not possible to organise so many 
disparate groups into factions along the lines of those of the senate, a far 
smaller body, although some tried.51 
 
This chapter tests the truth of the theory that the people and senate together 
made the decisions which affected Rome and her land empire.  Central to 
the following chapters is an analysis of this decision-making power in the 
                                                 
51 At times it seemed like the entire peninsula was divided along factional lines, e.g. during 
the tension between Marius and Sulla, Catiline and Cicero, and Pompey and Caesaer. 
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form of a comparison of the motives, interests and aims of the varied groups 
of citizens plus the techniques the groups used to achieve their goals. 
 
 
POWER 
 
Power is the ability to affect decisions and can be divided into influence and 
authority.  Influence comes with the threat of sanctions, used in such a way 
that men follow the suggestion of the influential because of their auctoritas 
or prestige gained from all areas of their life.  Authority, on the other hand, 
means commands are obeyed because the individual or group has the sort 
of respect that demands obedience, as is the case when governments follow 
the dictates of public opinion. Another form of power exists when people 
adapt their actions based upon anticipated reactions.  Thus, in 
contemporary democracies like New Zealand, the people exercise power 
without realising their sovereignty, because Members of Parliament (MPs) 
and government officials moderate their actions in accordance with what 
they perceive the desires of the constituency to be.  In this sense, then, 
people need not participate in politics in order for their needs and desires to 
be fulfilled, although such passivity only works if their representatives 
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understand fully the people’s needs and desires.  Anticipated reactions can 
have negative results.52 
 
As we have seen, the power to make decisions was shared by both the 
senate and people of Rome.  But the amount of power possessed by each, 
and the nature of that power, varied.53  The exclusion of some citizens from 
membership in rural tribes, in particular recently enfranchised free and 
freedmen, made the voting clout of citizens with rural registrations stronger 
than those crammed into the four urban tribes.  This is just one of the limits 
placed on the power of some citizens.54  Different sectors of society had 
different spheres of influence.  The question of who had the power is also 
complicated by the fact that the theory as espoused by ancient writers is 
often contradicted by the reality found in the case studies to follow. 
 
So who had what power in the late Roman Republic?  Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus has consuls explain the division of areas of responsibility 
between senate and people in the fifth century BC:  
 
                                                 
52 Mulgan (1989: 33 f.) gives the example of some capitalists unfairly influencing 
government decisions, potentially with neither government nor capitalist aware. 
 
53 The reasons for the fluctuating strength of popular power are examined in the chapters 
that follow. 
 
54 See Brunt (1988: 23-27) on the limits placed on popular power.  
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We have had a law so long as we have inhabited this city by which the 
senate is invested with sovereign power in everything except the 
appointing of magistrates, the enacting of laws, and the declaration or 
termination of wars; and the power of determining these three matters 
rests with the people, by their votes. (6.66.3; cf. 7.56; 9.37.2) 
 
Although his account is slightly anachronistic in its attribution to the people 
of the power to enact laws (plebiscites did not gain the force of law until 287 
BC), the popular power to elect magistrates and decide to go to war 
persisted into the late Republic.  The senate, meanwhile, made rulings on 
everything else, namely foreign affairs and treasury matters. 
 
Sallust, on the other hand, downplayed the people’s role and instead 
claimed that the Republic was oligarchic with a few men responsible for 
decision-making, the people too disorganised to have any real effect: 
“Affairs at home and in the field were managed according to the will of a 
few men, in whose hands were the treasury, the provinces, public offices, 
glory and triumphs.  The people were burdened with military service and 
poverty” (BJ 41.7-8; cf. Cic. Sest. 137).  So too he might have believed modern 
representative democracies to be oligarchic for the same reasons, especially 
if we use Athens in the time of Pericles as a model for democracy.  The 
citizens of today’s democracies do not participate directly in politics.  
Instead, twenty-first century democracies have constructed vast 
bureaucracies staffed by non-elected public servants to allow their citizens 
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time free from politics; they have heads of state, presidents and prime 
ministers to guide policy and make the ultimate decisions, whereas Athens 
was acephalous. An oligarchy is visible in the executive branch of 
parliament in contemporary New Zealand.  It is inevitable that a few office 
holders (and indeed non-elected officials in government departments) make 
the decisions, and so, in this sense, democracies are oligarchic.   
 
Further comparison with Athens highlights how democracy has evolved.  
Today officers of state are elected, whereas Athens used a lottery system 
(except for the appointment of strategoi); the franchise is now shared (though 
with degrees of liberality), while in Athens citizenship was closely guarded, 
restricted to a male birth elite.  In New Zealand, Sallust might struggle to 
recognise the government as democratic: the ideal of the active, public-
spirited citizen present in classical Athens has all but vanished, kept alive by 
only a handful of politically active “trouble-makers.”55 
 
The Roman constitution had a mixture of monarchic, oligarchic and 
democratic elements which saw power shared amongst three groups: 
                                                 
55 Recent protests at the closure of the pay and employment equity unit at the Labour 
Department attracted a small crowd of two hundred participants at parliament on June 30, 
2009 (http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/politics/2553043/Pay-equity-protest-
at-Parliament, accessed 2 July, 2009). 
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consuls, senate and people.56  As Polybius noted (6.12.1-8), there were 
monarchic aspects to the consular imperium.  Today there is disagreement 
over the degree to which the consuls’ imperium was all-powerful.57  They 
certainly summoned the comitia centuriata and senate, controlled the 
approach of embassies, set the agenda for senate meetings and performed its 
decrees.  But their imperium was limited by annual tenure and collegiality, to 
prevent the domination of any one man.  Polybius tends to exaggerate the 
influence of consuls, ignoring praetors’ powers to run Rome’s senate and 
assemblies in the consuls’ absence.  Such delegation of duties detracted from 
the consuls’ power.  In addition, praetors had their own sphere of 
responsibility in the courts, where they were responsible to no consul yet 
wielded impressive juridical powers.58  Similarly, aediles had their own area 
focused on the supervision of Rome’s roads, marketplaces, and so on.  
Certainly, a consul as commander of an army had the power to execute his 
soldiers without a trial.  But he still had to answer to the senate; again 
Polybius exaggerates, this time regarding the consuls’ control of finance, 
giving the impression that he could draw money at will when in fact the 
senate controlled the supply.  
                                                 
56 Brunt  (1988: 13-23) evaluates the relative powers of senate, magistrates and the people. 
 
57 Brunt (1988: 15-18) and Lintott (1999: 17f.), for instance, disagree with Polybius over the 
extent of consular powers and note their limits. 
 
58 On praetors, see Brennan (2000). 
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The senate’s powers extended to control of the treasury, authority in Italy 
over crimes of treachery, conspiracy, poisoning, and assassination, and the 
right to send and receive embassies (Polyb. 6.13).  In this way, the senate 
possessed executive power beyond that of a mere advisory body.  And yet, 
senatorial power was limited in several ways.  For instance, magistrates 
could limit the power of colleagues and lesser magistrates with their veto.   
 
Lily Ross Taylor is one modern scholar who has argued for oligarchic 
hegemony.  She claimed that magistrates had the power handed down by 
tradition to influence elections, legislation and the selection of juries.  In 
both centuriate and tribal assemblies the presiding magistrate  
 
could report omens and dissolve the assembly when he did not like the 
way things were going, could refuse to accept candidates for office (a 
power better attested for the centuries than for the tribes), could put men 
of his choice in empty tribes, and could influence the vote through the 
custodes he appointed.59   
 
These magisterial powers not withstanding, the strength of the populus 
Romanus to get their man elected is illustrated in their choice of office 
holders.  In times of popular discontent, the people would elect men ready 
to defy the senate, such as Clodius.  The people also secured commands via 
                                                 
59 Taylor (1966: 83). 
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legislation for their favourites, such as Scipio Aemilianus and Marius, thus 
stealing the prerogative for allocation of provinces from the senate.  
 
Another hold the people had over the senators was institutionalised bribery: 
competition at elections was so fierce that candidates had long been 
compelled to gift money to electors, originally to members of their own 
tribe, but ultimately to all and sundry.  The donations did not, however, 
usually buy an election victory: the practice was so widespread that all 
candidates were expected to participate.  Q. Aurelius Symmachus, a senator 
during the 4th century AD, reflects upon the improved situation in the 
Empire:  
 
To challenge the present, let antiquity produce the tribes smeared with 
freedmen and the plebeian scum; we call upon the patricians.  Let it 
conjure up the distributors of electoral bribes; we call upon the 
emperors.  We understand very well the blessings of our age: the 
hideous voting tablet, the crooked distribution of the seating places in 
the theatre among the clients, the venal urn, all of these are no more!  
The elections are transacted between the senate and the emperors: 
equals elect equals, and the final decision rests with the superiors (Or. 
4.7).60 
 
Similarly Cicero believed senators were buffeted about by the random 
favour of the people.  He complains that the people does not vote for the 
best candidate but  
                                                 
60 Quote from Linderski (1985: 87). 
 
39 
 
promotes those who court it most assiduously (facit eos, a quibus est maxime 
ambitus); and even if after all it does give a deliberate verdict, that verdict 
is determined, not by a discriminating wisdom, but frequently by impulse 
and a spirit of headstrong caprice.  For the multitude is a stranger to 
deliberation, to reason, to discernment, and to patient scrutiny. (Planc. 9) 
 
He continues, explaining that the people decided the outcome of elections: 
 
It is the privilege of free peoples, and above all of this people, whose 
conquests have given it paramount sway over the whole world, that by its 
votes it can bestow or take away its offices as it likes.  We too have our 
part to play; tossed as we are upon the stormy billows of popular favour, 
we must bear contentedly with the people’s will, win it to ourselves when 
it is estranged, grapple it to us when we have won it, and pacify it when it 
is in turmoil.  If we set no great store by its rewards, we are not called 
upon to do it homage; but if we set our hearts upon them, we must not 
grow weary in courting its favour. (Planc. 11) 
 
Cicero advises a man who considered he ought to win the aedileship due to 
his ancient and illustrious lineage, but was frustrated by a lesser opponent 
who canvassed more energetically (valde ambiendum), that “the people 
would retort by reminding you of its established usage and ancestral 
precedent; it would point out that it has always desired to be asked, and to 
be approached in suppliant guise” (Planc. 12).  Members of the nobility, no 
matter how prestigious their family, nonethless had to seek popular 
support. 
 
Just as the populus decided who won election to office, they also had power 
over the actions of magistrates.  Once in office, magistrates had to behave 
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within certain boundaries or else face impeachment once their tenure was 
over.  They were not only subject to the dictates of the senate, but they also 
had to answer to the people for fear of court action.61  Even after the 
establishment of standing courts during the second century BC, with juries 
composed of men from the equestrian and senatorial orders, the people’s 
influence was felt during trials.62  
 
The people conferred power and meted out punishment through the justice 
system.  The trial of magistrates took place before juries of equestrians63 and 
those facing capital punishment were tried before the centuriate assembly.  
Polybius (6.14) also notes in passing that the people could make and repeal 
law, elect magistrates, declare war and peace (although in practice this was 
done by the commander in the field), and make alliances.  The people had 
power over the consuls in that the latter relied on popular support to secure 
the passage of bills through the tribal assembly.  The same was the case for 
men facing prosecution in court (Polyb. 6.15).  Similarly, the people could 
limit a magistrate’s powers by legislation (Polyb. 6.16.2-3).  Tribunes acting 
                                                 
61 Brunt (1988: 20; 341f.).   
 
62 See Chapter Five. 
 
63 Sometimes the equestrian juries were replaced by senatorial ones, as ocurred following 
Sulla’s reforms for instance. 
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on behalf of the people could also flex their popular muscles via their veto, 
thus negating any other magistrate’s proposal.   
 
Popular authority also becomes more noticeable in the area of legislation, 
where we find bills passed against the will of the senate, as was the case 
with Flaminius’ agrarian law of 232, the lex Claudia barring senators from 
commerce of 218, and Gracchan laws on holding public land, conscription 
and the ballot.  Indeed, Tiberius Gracchus’ successful intervention on behalf 
of the people in the case of Attalus’ bequest in 133 illustrates that the people 
were able to override senatorial auctoritas and make decisions in areas that 
were usually the domain of the senate.64 
 
Following Sallust (Hist. 1.12; BJ 41), a theory has developed that the people 
made their voice heard more clearly under the influence of the Gracchi 
because, prior to the brothers, the people had been preoccupied by foreign 
wars and had lacked determined leaders.65  By the time of Caesar, popularis 
politicians had learnt from their predecessors how to secure the popular 
support needed to win elections and get bills passed into law.  Dio claimed 
                                                 
64 Brunt (1988: 32) notes that in this case Tiberius “asserted the sovereign right of the people 
to take decisions without the prior sanction of the senate.” 
 
65 Brunt (1988: 21). 
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that Caesar “courted the good-will of the multitude, observing how much 
stronger they were than the senate” (36.43.3). 
 
Despite acknowledging these popular powers, others join Taylor in 
questioning their strength, holding that “the people’s share in power was 
largely specious”, 66 a claim that will be tested in the following pages.  
Similarly, it has been suggested that the people did not constitute a 
governing body, and so had less power in comparison to the senate as a 
result.67  This theory, however, supposes that the senate did form a 
governing body, which is arguable, especially when we take into account 
the lack of coherence, general disposition towards competition, and their 
subservient position to magistrates and, as we shall see, the people of Rome. 
 
For example, Sulla’s attempt to reduce popular power in 88, by banning 
tribunes from legislating, reveals that the people did indeed have enough 
power to make him nervous despite the alleged pre-eminence of senatorial 
authority.  Sulla tried to increase the power of the senate by limiting that of 
the tribal assembly, yet his attempt was unsuccessful due to popular 
backlash.  After he marched on Rome in 88, Sulla and his colleague Q. 
                                                 
66 Brunt (1988: 15; 324 ff.). 
 
67 Tatum (2009: 4ff.) refers to the senatorial order as the “governing class”, and believes the 
people only had power when acting in one of their assemblies. 
 
43 
Pompeius Rufus announced two new rules to the people: firstly they 
revived the procedure whereby the senate considered any bill before it was 
put to the people to vote on and, in a flashback to the days before the lex 
Hortensia, they stipulated that the voting be in centuries, not tribes.  Appian 
(BC 1.59) explains that these modifications to legislative procedure were 
designed to put an end to civil discord because decision-making would be 
removed from the hands of the poor and reckless, and vested instead in the 
“well-to-do and sober-minded”, and tribunes’ power, which had become 
tyrannical according to this source, curtailed.  Whatever Sulla’s justification, 
he failed to convince the people.  Nor did he persuade his lieutenants of the 
benefits of his new system; Pompey was behind the eventual reversal of the 
reform.  The people’s response to this reduction of their power will be 
investigated in Chapter Four below. 
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EXERCISE OF POWER AND ELIGIBILITY 
 
I will focus on the two areas in which power is exercised through political 
institutions: legislation and election of magistrates.  Before we analyse cases 
of popular action in the following chapters, we need first to evaluate the 
relative power of the vote of the populus, that is the universus populus, in the 
centuriate and tribal assemblies.  In so doing, we will test Taylor’s 
hypothesis that the populus had more power to legislate than to elect higher 
magistrates,68 alongside Yakobson’s belief that “the importance of the 
popular element in [the electoral] system was far greater than is often 
supposed.”69  After analysing the formal procedure and theoretical limits of 
power in each, I will turn to the actual practice of popular participation in 
the late Roman Republic, including involvement outside official institutions 
which nonetheless afforded elite and non-elite alike the opportunity to take 
part in civil life, by attendance at funerals, triumphs, demonstrations, 
festivals, the theatre, trials and lawsuits, and by escorting magistrates and 
those canvassing for office.  Indeed, Claude Nicolet has suggested that these 
alternate forms of civil life dominate the official forms in the late Republic.70   
                                                 
68 Taylor (1949: 61f.; 1960: ix) argues that the plebs urbanus had greater influence in the 
legislative tribal assemblies, while the greater influence in elections was to be had by those 
resident outside Rome. 
 
69 Yakobson, (1999: 11f.). 
 
70 Nicolet (1980: 345). 
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But first, we must consider who was eligible to participate in politics.  The 
inhabitants of Rome and the Italian peninsula could participate in elections 
and legislation.  Citizenship was granted freely relative to other ancient 
societies (perhaps because initially those involved were all inhabitants of the 
Latium plain and so no geographical barriers distinguished communities).  
However, only men born free (ingenui) or freed from slavery (libertini) were 
eligible and degrees of citizenship existed especially with regard to 
libertini.71  No women or slaves could participate (although we do find 
influential women and slaves in elite households).   In the early Republic 
censors divided the citizens or populus into census groups according to 
wealth based on property ownership.72  Census qualifications prevented the 
poor from standing for office and so barred them from taking part in politics 
as magistrates.  
 
Until the reforms of the third century, patricians enjoyed more power than 
plebeians.  The origin of the distinction between patrician and plebeian is 
shrouded in the mists of time.  Nonetheless, the division between patrician 
                                                                                                                                         
 
71 Cicero says that “servos denique, quorum ius, fortuna, condicio infima est, bene de re 
publica meritos, persaepe libertate, id est civitate, publice donari videmus” (Balb. 24).   See 
below for more on the status of libertini. 
 
72 Yakobson (1999: 44ff.). 
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and plebeian families was rigorously enforced so that originally only 
patricians could be magistrates.  Gradually the plebeians gained 
representation in the senate, in the first instance by the election of tribuni 
plebis in 493.73  In 471 the comitia tributa won the right to elect plebeian 
magistrates and the number of tribunes was raised from two to five (Livy 
2.55.10-58.2; Dion. Hal. 9.43-49).  In 447 it earned the right to elect quaestors 
(Tac. Ann. 11.22).  In 449 plebeians obtained important legislative duties via 
the Valerio-Horatian laws, which stipulated that plebiscites had the force of 
law, as long as they had senatorial sanction (Livy 3.39-41, 49-64; Dion. Hal. 
11.4-6, 19-24, 38-50).  By 287 plebiscites gained independent validity over the 
whole populus not just the plebs (Livy Per. 11; Plin. NH 16.37).  This was 
maintained except for a period during which Sulla required senatorial 
approval of plebiscites before they were put to the vote after he instituted 
various other restrictions on the powers of tribunes.74 
 
There is some disagreement about why the patricians shared power with the 
plebeians.  Until recently the consensus was that plebeians applied pressure 
by withdrawing from Rome in times of peril, thus leaving the patricians in 
the lurch and encouraging concessions.  Mitchell challenged the existence of 
such secessions by suggesting there never was a “struggle of the orders,” 
                                                 
73 See MRR 1.16 n. 1 for the competing traditions regarding the number of tribunes. 
 
74 Taylor (1960: 47); see Chapter Four. 
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although he has not received much encouragement.75  In effect, most citizens 
were plebs and so formed the majority, and thus were crucial members, of 
the Roman army.  The army flexed its muscle in the fashion of the hoplites 
in seventh century Greece when they demanded political power in return 
for military duties: the aristocrats were compelled to allow those wealthy 
enough to afford the hoplite armour to participate in government.  The 
Roman soldiers sought representation in the form of plebeian magistracies 
and increased participation via assemblies in exchange for increased 
military responsibilities.76 
 
As Rome’s conquered territory increased in the Italian peninsula, so too did 
the number of her Italian allies, many of whom were obliged to serve in 
Roman armies by way of the levy (dilectus), although they served in separate 
allied auxiliary contingents.77  Roman assidui (property owners, mostly small 
farmers) provided most of the Roman manpower, but were fewer in number 
than the Italian allies who made up as much as two thirds of the army until 
                                                 
75 Mitchell (1990). 
 
76 See Chapter Three on how popular pressure brought change in the people’s favour. 
 
77 See Brunt (1971a: 545-548) on the formula togatorum which decided how many allies were 
levied.  Brunt concludes that it is impossible to reconstruct the exact formula, but that we 
know enough to conclude that something short of a full levy of allied iuniores was the 
practice.  
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the first century BC (Vell. Pat. 2.15.2).78  The situation had changed by the 
late Republic, by which time volunteers began to constitute a significant, yet 
debatable, proportion of the troops.79  Similarly controversial is the claim 
that those Romans serving under Caesar, largely members of the proletariat, 
received pay and so were wholly professional.80  Nonetheless, soldiers 
carried a lot of weight at elections, as we can see when Cicero asks the jury 
about the influence of milites at elections:  
 
Do these things appear to you trifling supports and aids towards 
obtaining the consulship? Is the good-will of the soldiery a trifle? who are 
both intrinsically powerful through their own numbers, and also by their 
influence among their connections, and who in declaring a consul have 
great weight among the entire Roman people. (Cic. Mur. 38) 
 
 
Freedmen, foreigners, soldiers and farmers were all eligible to vote once 
enfranchised, as a result of the state’s generous policy of enfranchisement. 
                                                 
78 Brunt (1971a: 677-686) reckons the ratio of allies to Romans in armies between 225 and 90 
BC was roughly 2:1, depending on the martial situation.  The ratio changes following the 
Social War as Rome’s Italian allies became citizens, although I would suggest Roman 
expansion around the Mediterranean provided a supply of non-Italian allies.  Brunt does 
not provide analysis of ratios after 90 BC.  
 
79 Compare the contention of Nicolet (1980: 91) that volunteers made up the majority of 
Rome’s legions after 106 BC to Brunt (1988: 253) who holds that Marius’ reform in 107 did 
not create an army of volunteers because the property qualification was already so low that 
there was scarcely any difference between the rural assidui and the urban proletariat 
volunteers.  The state had been for some time supplying gear to the poorer rustic soldiers 
and deducting the cost from pay.  Also, the number of urban volunteers was much smaller 
than those conscripts or volunteers from the countryside. 
 
80 Nicolet (1980: 117).  Cf. Brunt (1988: 260): conscripts and volunteers fought together, and 
Brunt consistently contends that the urban proletariat formed only a tiny fraction of the 
armies.  Caesar did however double the soldiers’ annual stipendium to 225 denarii  (Brunt, 
1988: 262). 
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LEGISLATION 
 
Popular power is most clearly demonstrated in the legislative ability of the 
people.  Despite repeated and varied attempts to prevent the popular will 
succeeding, “the last century of the Republic is replete with examples of 
laws proposed or carried in conformity with popular demands against the 
will of the senate”.81   Instances of popular legislation in conflict with 
senatorial interests date back to the third century BC, following the passage 
of the lex Hortensia giving plebiscites the force of law.  The Gracchi showed 
the people how much power they had to effect change in their favour, and 
from the period of their reforms until the end of the Republic popular 
influence was felt throughout the empire.  Popular legislation decided who 
commanded the army, as was the case in 88 when the people decided that 
Marius should usurp Sulla as commander against Mithridates, and so voted 
in favour of Sulpicius’ bill to give him command (App. BC 1.57; Livy Per. 
77).82  The people also passed a law allowing Caesar to stand for the 
consulship in absentia and retain his command until the time that he would 
                                                 
 
81 Brunt (1988: 27), with examples of techniques used to obstruct the will of the people: 
tribunician veto, religious impediments, and a law designed to “annul statutes passed in 
violation of specified conditions for their validity”. 
 
82 Although Sulla overturned this popular decision, had he been more law abiding, the 
people’s choice would have remained in command. 
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become consul.  Caesar claimed in 49 BC that he was crossing the Rubicon in 
defence of the people’s tribunes, whose vetoes the senate was illegally 
overriding, and in defence of the people’s right to legislate, a reference to 
this law (Caes. BC 1.1-9, 22, 32).  
 
A common criticism of the legislative sphere is that the people merely 
enacted laws rather than shaped them in any way.83  This theory we will 
deal with below.  In addition, some hold that senatorial decrees amounted 
to laws.  Alan Watson goes some way in refuting this theory when he 
considers the legal value of senatus consulta and concludes that they did not 
create law in the late Republic because senatorial decrees were just 
recommendations and, based on an analysis of the implications of the 
evidence from the period, the senate did not consider it was making law 
when it passed decrees.  A senatus consultum of 186 BC requested that the 
consul should put it to the tribunes of the plebs that they propose to the 
concilium plebis that P Aebutius and Hispala Faecenia be granted certain 
rights (Livy 39.19.4-5).84  In 58 BC the same principle was followed.  Cicero 
reported to his brother: “senatus consultum factum est ut sodalitates 
                                                 
83 Scullard (1959: 8). 
 
84 Watson (1974: 29). 
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decuriatique discederent lexque de iis ferretur, ut qui non discessissent ea 
poena quae est de vi tenerentur” (Q. fr. 2.3.5).85 
 
Before we deal with the above instances in more detail, it will pay to outline 
the voting procedure during the late Republic.86  Two assemblies met 
regularly in the late Republic: the comitia centuriata (centuriate assembly) 
and the concilium plebis (plebeian assembly).  The first assembled to elect the 
highest magistrates (consuls, praetors, curule aediles and censors).  The 
Roman people also met in centuries to declare war and conclude peace, and 
to judge capital cases.  The concilium plebis met to elect lesser magistrates 
(tribunes of the plebs, quaestors and plebeian aediles), to legislate, and 
increasingly to elect, recall, and extend the command of generals, to 
conclude peace and also, perhaps, to declare war.87  There was a third 
assembly, the comitia tributa (tribal assembly), in existence during the late 
Republic, but due to its similarities in form and function to the concilium 
                                                 
 
85 For more see Watson (1974: Chapter 2). 
 
86 See Taylor (1966) with examples from primary sources.  Also Lintott (1999b: 43-49). See 
Cornell (1995: 378-380) for the typical scholarly take on how the organisation of the 
assemblies gave the greatest influence to the propertied class and discriminated especially 
against the urban proletariat and peasants smallholders further from Rome.  Cornell’s 
analysis is fair and balanced in that he at least acknowledges the democratic elements 
preceding the changes just before 300 BC. 
 
87 Sandberg (2001: 138 with n. 25) gives tentative support to Fascione’s thesis that it had 
become part of the tribe’s regular business to declare war, although he admits that there is 
only one piece of evidence and this is from 383 BC: ‘omnes tribus bellum iusserunt’ (Livy 
6.21.5). 
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plebis it is difficult to distinguish the two.  Some have suggested that the 
tribal assembly had only a nominal existence, and there were no meetings of 
the tribes other than concilia plebis.  But this theory has been rebuffed by 
Andrew Lintott who has provided evidence for meetings of tribal 
assemblies presided over by curule magistrates.88  There was one striking 
difference between the two, namely that patricians were banned from 
participating in the concilium plebis, although they were permitted to attend 
any contiones, as these were not official assemblies.  This exclusion, however, 
had little effect in the late Republic, for by that time patrician families, 
always in the minority, had now almost completely died out.89  In addition, 
exclusion from voting need not have prevented patricians from entering the 
Forum and pressing their fellow tribesmen to vote in their favour.90 
 
One of the most important democratic elements in the late Roman republic, 
this legislative function of the concilium plebis is an example of popular 
power.  The challenge will be, however, to work out the extent to which 
senatorial and magisterial checks and balances, along with vestigial 
timocratic elements in the voting units in the two assemblies, influenced not 
                                                 
88 See Lintott (1999b: 53f.) for detailed discussion. 
 
89 Witness Caesar’s attempts to revitalise patrician clans by creating new families. 
 
90 Taylor (1966: 61f.).  See Gellius (15.27.4) for patricians forbidden to participate in 
legislative assemblies and Livy (5.30.4-7) on patricians circling the Forum in an effort to 
influence the vote of their tribules. 
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only the legislative process but also the voting clout of individual citizens.  I 
will analyse first procedure and participation in the concilium plebis, then the 
comitia centuriata. 
 
CONCILIUM PLEBIS 
 
The magistrates may have dominated formal aspects of the plebeian 
assembly, but Millar has shown that just because an office holder could 
summon an assembly, it does not mean that he could expect the voters to 
agree with him.  Rome’s political leadership needed to win over the people 
in order for laws to be passed.  The bill’s proposer (rogator) literally talked 
the audience in the Forum into supporting his proposal at informal public 
meetings (contiones).  As Cicero put it, in a speech delivered to the people at 
one such contio, “your influence resides in your votes” (Leg. Agr. 2.102).  The 
vote of the citizens in their tribes decided the matter.  Decisions made in the 
senate were thus only confirmed once the people had been persuaded to 
support the bill.91  While the people lacked the initiative to introduce bills, 
they could nonetheless reject them.  Although we only know of a few 
                                                 
91 Millar (1998). 
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instances of such rejection, the shortage of evidence makes it impossible to 
draw conclusions as to the regularity of the occurrence. 92   
 
Since 287 BC, when plebiscites gained the force of law and thus became 
legally binding on both patricians and plebeians alike, tribunes of the plebs 
introduced bills before the citizens assembled in their tribes to be voted into 
law.  The concilium plebis was based on tribal organisation.  Rome had been 
divided into geographically determined tribes by the penultimate king, 
Servius Tullius in the mid-sixth century BC.  By the late Republic there were 
thirty five tribes, four urban and thirty one rural,93 membership of which 
was largely determined by domicile,94 although each tribe was no longer 
necessarily a contiguous geographical unit.  For as Rome acquired new 
territory in the Italian peninsula, at first new tribes were created, but after 
241 BC the number of tribes was set at 35 and newly enfranchised 
communities were added to pre-existing tribes, sometimes quite a distance 
                                                 
92 Flaig (1995: 80) suggests that the people seldom rejected a bill because rogatores made sure 
they had the necessary popular support at contiones to have it passed in to law.  Tatum 
(2009: 12f.) contends instead that the exceptions prove the rule: few examples survive due 
to an abitrary accident of the historical record, the fragmentary nature of the sources.  He 
suggests the failure of bills was not so rare, as a negative leaves little or no trace (unless 
Cicero had a hand in the defeat of a bill as we will see). 
 
93 The four urban tribes were Suburana, Palatina, Esquilina and Collina.  The 31 rural tribes 
were Romilia, Pollia, Maecia, Menenia, Aemilia, Aniensis, Arnensis, Clustumina, Claudia, 
Cornelia, Camilia, Fabia, Falerna, Galeria, Horatia, Lemonia, Oufentina, Pomptina, Papiria, 
Pupinia, Poblilia, Quirina, Scaptia, Sabatina, Sergia, Stellatina, Tromentina, Teretina, Velina, 
Voturia, Voltinia.  The seminal work on tribes is Lily Ross Taylor’s The Voting Districts of the 
Roman Republic  Rome, 1960. 
 
94 For exceptions to the rule of registration according to place of residence, see below, 
especially as regards freedmen. 
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from the original tribal territory, which resulted in an odd patchwork of 
tribal distributions over the peninsula.  The Pollia, for instance, had its tribal 
units spread far and wide following the enfranchisement of the Italian allies 
after the Social War.95 
 
All assembly activity relied on the initiative of the presiding magistrates.  
Magistrates decided which candidates stood for office (though they 
prevented very few men qualified from standing).  They proposed laws 
which those assembled could not amend, only accept or reject.  But the 
predominance of office holders is a practical expedient and exists even now 
in western democracies, with government ministers the prime movers 
behind bills.96  Moreover, the magistrates responsible for passing legislation 
included tribunes of the plebs, and these ten representatives of the plebs 
offered ample opportunity for diverse issues to be initiated.97 
 
The contio (public meeting) opened every assembly: the magistrate 
sponsoring the bill (rogator) addressed the people, as did those whom he 
                                                 
 
95 Taylor (1960: 274).  She also provides a map at the end of this volume on voting districts 
which illustrates the spread of the tribes after the enfranchisement of most of Italy in 89 BC.  
 
96 Miller (2003: 82): in 2002 government ministers introduced 91.7% of bills and 85.6% of 
those bills enacted were government ones. 
 
97 See Sandberg (2001) for the argument that following Sulla’s reforms curule magistrates 
were permitted to legislate via the tribal assembly. 
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allowed on the tribunal, and posed the question (rogatio) to be answered by 
the vote.  Anyone could attend these public deliberative meetings and all 
were free to defend or even oppose measures, although the usual 
participants held at least the rank of praetor.98  The reliability of speeches 
delivered in contiones has been questioned because these meetings were little 
more than political contests designed to win over supporters.99  This theory 
is too cynical.  We could instead interpret the practice of addressing the 
people at contiones as an important democratic element as it was the only 
way at the time to publicise the debate, and discuss issues with the 
community of citizens.  Certainly, it provided skilled orators such as Cicero 
the opportunity to compose some compelling speeches: witness the speech 
Cicero delivered at Rullus’ contio on his agrarian bill in 63 BC.  Indeed, 
Millar emphasises the role of the orator and persuasion.100  Cicero hints at 
the active role of the audience at contiones and implies that power lies in 
public meetings, even though it contravenes the tradition of the ancestors: 
 
[Resolutions] are not based upon considered votes or affidavits nor 
safeguarded by an oath, but produced by a show of hands and the 
undisciplined shouting of an inflamed mob.  Oh, if only we could 
                                                 
 
98 Nicolet (1980: 286-289).  See Chapter Five below on the ex-centurion Sp. Ligustinus, who 
was invited by the consul and tribunes to talk about his military service (Livy 42.34). 
 
99 Mouritsen (2001: 15). 
 
100 Millar (1984: 18f; 1986; 1995a; 1998).  See also Pina Polo (1996: 34 ff.) on non-magistrates 
addressing contiones. 
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maintain the fine tradition and discipline that we have inherited from 
our ancestors!  But somehow it is now slipping our of our hands.  
Those wisest and most upright of our men did not want power to lie in 
the public meetings [but in the assemblies].  (Flac. 15) 
 
This depiction of what had become a typical contio, the show of hands in 
response to a question asked by the speaker, the shouting of answers and 
suggestions,101 shows the importance of such meetings as simultaneously an 
opportunity for magistrates to persuade the people and the people to 
express its will, for contrary to the theory that only those invited by the 
presiding magistrate were able to speak, it must be remembered that the 
populus Romanus could communicate its support or lack or it by way of this 
hand showing and shouting.  They had redress to other forms of public 
demonstration too.102 
 
The development of the secret ballot in the second century was another 
crucial democratic element.  Without voting tablets (tabellae), voters’ 
decisions were public knowledge.  This lack of privacy compromised the 
citizen’s liberty, his freedom to vote as he pleased, and compelled votes to 
follow the direction of influential men and patrons. Cicero states that the 
advent of the tabella was a “champion of liberty thanks to its secrecy” (vindex 
                                                 
101 As usual with Cicero’s forensic speeches we need to take care with his often unfair 
interpretation of participants at public meetings. They are here characterised as the authors 
of undisciplined shouting, and termed an “inflamed mob”.  The evidence is from a defence 
speech designed to dirty the reputation of that “mob”. 
 
102 For more on demonstrations at contiones see Chapter Five below. 
58 
tacitae libertatis, Leg. Agr. 2.4).  Voters could no longer be called to account by 
their patrons who under the system of oral voting could stand near the 
pontes and oversee the vote of their clients (Plut. Aem. 31.7).  The secret ballot 
was introduced first for elections in 139 BC by the tribune A. Gabinius.  He 
successfully passed a bill through the concilium plebis (Cic. Leg. 3.35; Lael. 41; 
Livy Per. 54).103  137 BC saw the lex Cassia extend the secret ballot to all 
trials before the people (except those dealing with the charge of perduellio) 
thanks to the support of Scipio Aemilianus, who convinced the tribune M. 
Antius Briso to withdraw his veto (Cic. Brut. 97; 106; Leg. 3.35-37; Sest. 103; 
Lael. 41; Corn. 1, fr. 50 and Asc. 78 C; Schol. Bob. 135 (St)).104  The secret ballot 
was finally introduced into legislative assemblies in 131 and so made 
complete the replacement of the rogatores who went through the assembly 
asking individuals whether their vote was negative or positive regarding a 
bill or judgement.  Following the reform, citizens scratched V (uti rogas) or A 
antiquo on their tabella cerata.  
 
Another democratic element was the widespread participation of men from 
all orders in the tribal assembles.  Anyone who qualified for citizenship was 
allowed to vote, and so take part in the decision-making process of 
legislation.  There was no hierarchy of status groups within the citizen body 
                                                 
103 Nicolet (1980: 267ff.). 
 
104  For the secret ballot see further Finley (1983: 112 f. with nn. 30 and 31) and  Brunt (1971b: 
66). 
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as a whole: libertini voted alongside ingenui, but freedmen and newly 
enfranchised citizens were disadvantaged by being enrolled in only a 
limited number of tribes.   
 
Historians have traditionally considered members of rural tribes to have 
had a more powerful vote in the legislative assembly.  The 31 rural tribes 
contained citizens with property outside Rome, and the commonly held 
belief is that only those wealthy enough to have the time to make the trip to 
Rome could participate in legislation.  The remaining four tribes were urban 
and held all other citizens, which meant these tribes contained more poor 
citizens than the rural ones.  In addition, the freedmen were limited to these 
urban tribes for most of the Republic.  The 35 tribes in which all Roman 
citizens were enrolled had equal weight as voting units, but contained 
unequal numbers voters.  As a result citizens’ votes were of unequal 
value.105   
 
The four urban tribes were mainly made up of landless men, including 
freedmen, while the landed aristocracy preferred to be registered in the 31 
rural tribes, even when their residence was in Rome.106  Some families, 
however, opted to remain registered in urban tribes in order to claim a link 
                                                 
 
105 Taylor (1960: ix.). 
 
106 Taylor (1966: 64f.). 
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to the original inhabitants of Rome and so augment their prestige.  Thus we 
find an Aemilius Paullus registered in the Palatine tribe (ILS 949) and 
perhaps also a L. Manlius (ILS 4942).107  Rural tribes contained not only the 
landed aristocracy, but also the members of communities which had gained 
citizenship status over time.  These citizens were predominantly, but not 
exclusively, peasant farmers; many diverse occupations were of course to be 
found in the towns outside Rome. 
 
The majority of citizens resided outside the walls of Rome, and so, 
combined, ought to have had more influence in the tribal assembly.  For this 
reason we might expect that legislation reflect more their interests than 
those of their city-dwelling cousins, especially since rural tribes 
outnumbered urban 31 to four.  To fairly represent the proportion of citizens 
living in the city, the tribal assembly would have needed to provide nine 
urban tribes to balance 27 rural.108  But on the other hand, rural voters were 
disadvantaged as most would have been unable to afford the time to travel 
to Rome to participate in elections or, especially, the more frequent 
                                                 
 
107 Scullard (1973: 22 n.1). 
 
108 On population numbers see Brunt (1966: 6 n. 9): during the last census in the late 
Republic 910,000 male citizens were recorded, and once some allowance is made for those 
who failed to register, Brunt estimates the total male citizens population to have been 
approximately 1,200,000, a quarter of whom lived in Rome based on the number of grain 
recipients in the 40s (Brunt 1966: 8 citing Suet. Caes. 41 cf. Dio 43.21.4).  See also De Ligt 
(2007) and Scheidel (2008). 
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legislative assemblies.  Many citizens lived a long way from Rome, and after 
the Social War this number dramatically increased since all free male 
inhabitants of the Italian peninsula south of the Po were enfranchised.  In 
theory, then, only those wealthy enough to have the leisure time and money 
to make the trip could participate.  In practice, however, rural immigrants to 
Rome brought their rural registration with them, and so voted in rural 
tribes.  This was especially the case in the late Republic, when the censors 
failed to perform their duties and revise tribal registrations between 70 and 
23 BC.  Consequently, there is evidence of urban residents voting in rural 
tribes.  As early as 133 BC we see Ti. Gracchus, having lost his rural support 
at harvest time, looking to the support of the urban plebs in the tribal 
assembly (App. BC 1.14), which would have been pointless had their vote 
been limited to the four urban tribes.109   Indeed, Appian confirms that the 
first two tribes pronounced for Gracchus.  Brunt notes that only a handful of 
immigrants who had removed to Rome between censuses may have been 
enough to outvote the small number of rural dwellers who attended the 
assembly.  Based on Gracchus’ decision to use the urban plebs in his attempt 
to secure re-election, plus the epigraphic evidence which also indicates the 
influence of urban dwellers in rural tribes, Brunt rightly concludes that it is 
                                                 
 
109 Brunt (1988: 25 f.).  For the participation of rural voters in Gracchus’ agrarian legislation 
in 133, see Appian (BC. 1.10).  It should be noted that Tiberius would also have lost the 
support of those seasonal workers amongst the urban voters who worked the harvest.  
Brunt rightly points out that Cicero addresses rural tribesmen dwelling in the city in de Leg. 
agr. 2.71. 
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probable that the plebs who lived in the city normally had a majority in the 
tribal assembly.110 Tatum likewise makes the claim that the urban plebs 
dominated most legislative assemblies, but refers to urban tribesmen rather 
than rural plebs who had moved to Rome but still voted in their rural 
tribes.111  Tatum cites Lintott,112 who must be the source of this 
misunderstanding, based on a misreading of Cicero’s seduction of the plebs 
urbana in his speech against Rullus’ land reform bill (Leg. agr. 2.70f.) in 
which the orator is clearly appealing to those who enjoy the benefits of 
living in the city.  For this reason, then, plebs urbana should be understood to 
mean plebs who are “urban dwellers,” not the narrower definition “urban 
tribesmen.”113 
 
Legislation and judicial decisions were predominantly made by those 
residing in Rome as voting on laws and judgements could occur at any time, 
but not preceding elections (which were held in July following Sulla’s 
reforms) or on dies nefasti.  Yet there had to be a lead time of at least 17 days 
                                                 
 
110 Brunt (1966: 7).  
 
111 Tatum (2009: 5).   
 
112 Lintott (1999b: 204) 
 
113 See Purcell (1994: 644) for the definition: “the Roman citizens resident in the city who 
were not members of the senatorial or equestrian census-categories.”  Also OLD “urbanus” 
1b “living or pursuing one’s activities in the city (usu. Rome).” 
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(trinum nundinum) between the posting of a rogatio and the voting day.114  
According to Rutilius (consul in 105 BC), this time lapse was in order to 
allow rural dwellers time to finish their work in the fields before coming to 
Rome to trade and legislate.115  The jury is still out on who benefited from 
such a lengthy time between promulgation of a bill and the vote upon it.  
Optimates might have benefited because the trinundinum meant that they 
had more than two weeks to prepare a response to rogatores sponsoring 
popular measures, but equally they may have been disadvantaged as the 
provision prevented them from proposing laws immediately after an 
election and so make use of any Italians still in town, those who were 
sufficiently wealthy to have made the journey to Rome for elections in the 
first place.  These wealthier individuals from the towns and countryside of 
Italy were more likely to share the the views of, and so have voted with, the 
more conservative senators.116  
                                                 
 
114 Disagreement exists regarding the meaning of trinum nundinum (three market days).  
Cicero tells us that triunum nundinum  must elapse between the promulgation of a law and 
the vote on it (Cic. Dom. 41). Taylor (1949: 207 n. 61) states that the lex Caecilia Didia of 98 
required an announcement ante trinum nundinum for both proposals of laws and elections.  
Brunt (1988: 23) says three nundinae equal three weeks.  See Lintott (1965) for the evidence 
and the convincing argument that the requirement was for promulgation of a bill on three 
market days, which means that the period between promulgation and vote had to be at 
least 17 days.  Lintott (1999b: 44 with notes 20 and 21) also refers to the original practice of 
candidates presenting themselves before the people on three market days prior to election 
day, which evolved into the practice of canvassing for a trinundinum. 
 
115 Millar (1998: 20) cites Rutilius via Macrobius Sat. 1.16.34 and acknowledges that other 
sources give other reasons for the nundinae, upon which he does not elaborate. 
 
116 Taylor (1949: 207 n. 61). 
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Brunt contends that the people never achieved the level of management of 
everyday affairs such as was achieved by the fifth century Athenian 
assembly because assembly meetings were rare in the late Republic.117  Yet 
he provides no evidence.  Cicero gives the impression that assemblies met 
regularly to pass laws: “leges videmus saepe ferri multas” (Sest. 109).  We 
must remember that there were more ways for a citizen to participate in 
legislation than by voting.  Citizens who wished to participate in Roman 
political life found themselves with a part-time job as contiones and 
assemblies were summoned at least 20 times per year for a total of 40-60 
days.118 
 
The tribal distributions were far from fair.  Although the tribes furthest from 
Rome tended to be the largest (Velina, Pollia), their tribesmen had more 
influential votes if they could afford the time and expense to make a trip to 
Rome come legislation time as the votes of the few who made this journey 
were accorded the same weight as those of the many who attended the tribal 
assembly from the older tribes closer to Rome.  The smallest rural tribes 
(Romilia, Lemonia) were nearest Rome.  These differences in size may have 
                                                 
117 Brunt (1988: 24). 
 
118 Nicolet (1980: 237) bases this conclusion on the evidence of Macrobius: ‘with the growth 
in numbers of the people the assemblies were well attended even in the period between two 
market-days’ (Sat. 1.16). 
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compensated for the limited ability of distant citizens to travel to Rome and 
attend meetings and assemblie.  Fewer men made the journey from the more 
distant territories.  Taylor believes such a “consideration of the number of 
voters who would come to the comitia was clearly a factor in the expansion 
of certain tribes, and particularly of these two [Velina and Pollia] which had 
been marked out for distant voters from the time of Gaius Flaminius.”119  
Yet, although this balanced the number of voters likely to attend, it was not 
fair on the citizen from the far off tribes as they had further to travel and 
therefore were not likely to make the journey.   
 
Participation of citizens from rural tribes took two forms.  As noted above, 
the wealthy could afford to come to the city to vote – whether they were 
tempted to depended undoubtedly on the issue.  Others had migrated and 
were now resident in Rome (or lived close by the city) and had the time, for 
whatever reason, to participate.  Distance did not, however, always put 
people off from making the trip to town to vote.  Cicero describes the 
indignation of the homines honesti atque in suis vicinitatibus et municipiis 
gratiosi at a Manilian law which “confused the vote” of the centuries.  This 
law enacted that votes were counted by tribes and the centuries ignored 
(Cic. Mur. 47).  While this example relates to the centuriate assembly and 
                                                 
 
119 Taylor (1960: 99). 
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elections, it nonetheless provides evidence of the rich making the short trip 
to Rome to vote.  Another instance occurs in 70 BC, when a crowd 
(frequentia) from all Italy attended Rome for the elections, census and games 
(Cic.  Verr. 1.54).  Cicero also tells us that the local plebs from Atina fairly 
near Rome, who voted in Teretina tribe, turned up to vote for local boy 
made good Plancius when he stood for the aedileship (Planc. 21).  
 
In order to participate in legislation, citizens really needed to reside in Rome 
or be able and willing to make the trip to Rome.  Laws were passed in the 
Forum Romanum, and with plenty of notice thanks to the trinundinum.  But 
the majority of citizens resident outside Rome did not attend legislative 
assemblies and there existed no opportunity or mechanism by which those 
absent could cast votes. 
 
So let us look at who dwelled in Rome.  The majority were very poor, a 
mixture of libertini and ingenui.  Most of these appear to have been enrolled 
in urban tribes, but there is evidence that some of the poorer residents of 
Rome retained rural registration.  Tiberius Gracchus’ attempts to gain the 
support of these city dwellers suggest that there must have been rural 
tribesmen among the urban proletariat.120  There was also immigration to 
                                                 
120 See above and Brunt (1988: 26 n. 47).  Sources for urban dwellers in rural tribes: App. 
1.10, 14, 29 f., 32; Cic. de leg. agr. 2.71.   
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Rome, although the number of immigrants and the period during which 
change of residence was significant is the subject of debate. 
 
 
IMMIGRATION TO ROME 
 
People moved in and out of Rome, but the strongest evidence for urban drift 
dates from after Clodius’ frumentary law of 58 BC.  For although Sallust 
records that impoverished rural plebs were attracted by the expansion of the 
dole during the 60s, Brunt queries Sallust’s accuracy and suggests that as he 
was writing in the 30s Sallust may be reflecting more what was happening 
in his day, following Clodius’ corn law of 58.121  The clincher is that it was 
not until 58 that corn was actually given away for free rather than merely 
subsidised.  Although corn was first subsidised by C. Gracchus in 123 (Plut. 
C. Gracc. 5), even then the distributions were never constant but sometimes 
reduced, first by a Lex Octavia (Cic. Brut. 222; de off. 2.72).  Saturninus seems 
to have re-enacted the Lex Sempronia (ad Her. 1.12.21).  There is some 
confusion over whether Saturninus’ laws were annulled (Diod. 36.16; Cic. de 
                                                 
 
121 Brunt (1962: 69 f.).  Sallust includes in the list of “scum” pouring into Rome “the young 
men who had eked out a wretched existence as agricultural labourers.”  He adds that “they 
had been tempted to the capital by the public and private doles which were lavishly 
handed out to the populace by candidates for office, and had come to prefer the 
comparative ease of city life to the thankless toil they had left” (Cat. 37.4-7). 
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orat. 2.107; Balb. 48 ).  Then came Drusus who in 91 BC “with the assistance 
of the Italians carried by force laws on the distribution of land and corn” 
(Livy Per. 71), only to have them repealed with senatorial backing (Cic. de 
Leg. 2.14; Diod. 37.10.3).  Sulla abolished subsidised grain completely (Sall. 
Hist. 1.55.11 M), but by 73 limited distributions once again existed (Cic. Verr. 
2.3.163, 173 and 5.52; see further MRR 2.109).  Cato increased the recipients 
to around 200,000 in 62.  It was not until Clodius’ legislation during his 
tribunate in 58 that grain was given free to a large list of recipients.122 
 
Corn alone was not enough to attract people to the capital.  As Brunt notes, 
“the prospect of free grain encouraged further immigration from the 
country, but free grain alone did not sustain life”.123  Dreams of prosperity 
were no doubt frustrated: while some might have got jobs on building 
projects, work for most would have been hard to find.  Yet this has never 
stopped people from moving in the hope that the grass really will be 
greener on the other side. 
 
There were other reasons to move to Rome.  Although the evidence comes 
from men writing in the 40s and 30s BC, and other sources are imperial, we 
can tentatively suppose that these practices dated back into the Republic, 
                                                 
122 See Chapter Four below on the popular influence behind the grain laws. 
 
123 Brunt (1971b: 135). 
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continuity being a theme in Roman culture.  Varro (RR 2.3ff.) relates the 
migration of family heads to Rome.  Appian (BC 2.120) claims that corn dole 
in 44 attracted the lazy, the beggars, the vagrants of all Italy to Rome.  Livy 
(39.3.4-6) records that ambassadors from allied colonies and Latin cities 
came to Rome in 187 to complain that too many of their citizens had 
migrated to Rome, and as a result 12,000 were compelled to return to the 
place they had originally been registered.  The problem recurred in 177 
when the consul Claudius restricted Latin migration to Rome (Livy 41.9).  
Although Livy places migration of Italians to Rome early in the second 
century, we can believe it persisted: the historian is renowned for his 
anachronistic attribution of circumstances of his own time to earlier periods. 
 
The residents of the communities surrounding Rome had a long history of 
migration to the city.  Influential families from Etruria, Tusculum, and 
Campania made the move during the early days of the monarchy124 and the 
practice persisted during the Republic, though increasingly the move was 
made by soldiers who had lost their farms while they were away 
campaigning, or those dispossessed by creditors.  Citizenship was the prize 
for non-citizen men who left their towns for the big smoke: those Latins who 
                                                 
 
124 Scullard (1973: 10). 
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migrated to Roman territory could exchange Latin for Roman status.125  The 
attractions of the city tempted poor assidui (farmers) to move to Rome.126  
Depopulation of the old ager Romanus was caused by wars and 
depopulation as poor peasant families emigrated to colonies and to Rome.127  
Rural workers drifted to Rome to benefit from shelter and doles handed out 
by aristocrats, with employment provided by seasonal work in the 
countryside and jobs in construction or on the docks.128   
 
Many men may have experienced a relatively high level of transience, 
moving to and from the city.129  This restless group was by no means 
homogenous: freedmen might have sought employment outside the city, 
failed farmers a second chance at Rome.  Other groups, such as seasonal 
workers, were no doubt continually on the move.  The usual practice saw 
the censors change a man’s tribe when he changed his residence as part of 
the quinquennial census, but during the last generation of the Roman 
Republic the usual practice struggled to exert itself.  No census was held 
                                                 
125 Brunt (1971a: 85). 
 
126 See also Yakobson (1999: 147 and 229); Brunt (1988: 26 n. 47); Cic. Arch. 24; Sall. Hist. 27; 
Hor. Ep. 2.2.39; Livy 5.20.6; 42.20.4 (but cf. 7.25.8).   
 
127 Brunt (1971a 345 ff.); Cornell (1995: 393 f.) 
 
128 Brunt (1971a: 380f.). 
 
129 Purcell (1994). 
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between 70 and 28.130  We cannot say for sure what happened to men who 
moved residence in this period when the census was enfeebled, but it is fair 
to suppose they retained their former registration in rural tribes.  A man’s 
original domus dictated tribal affiliation, so that when small farmers 
immigrated to Rome they retained their rural tribal affiliations, thus 
strengthening the vote of the poorer citizens in legislation.131  
 
There is a school of thought that claims poorer Romans did not participate 
in politics because they were not interested in the issues being debated.132  
Yet rogationes clearly did address issues of interest to the poor.  The 
surviving statutes reveal the nature of the measures debated in the contiones 
and put to the legislative assembly.  These addressed a number of social 
issues and so could be expected to appeal to the popular interest.  But was 
this appeal enough to encourage participation by a broad section of society?  
                                                 
130 Brunt (1988: 25) disagrees with those (unnamed) historians who suggest that the tribal 
lists therefore became out of date. 
 
131 Taylor (1960: 149);  “The upper classes, senators, knights and tribuni aerarii, most of them 
landholders in Italy, were in all the rural tribes [despite the requirement that they keep a 
house in Rome]….  As for the lower population, it included many of the small farmers who 
had once manned Rome’s legions and who, having lost their farms, had been attracted to 
Rome by the grain dole.  These men may have retained their registration in rural tribes, at 
least for the tribal assembly, though perhaps not in the classes of the centuriate assembly. 
For the votes on laws the comparatively small group of rural tribesmen in the city had great 
influence.  But the great bulk of the lower population must have been in the four urban 
tribes.”  See also Taylor (1949 ch. 3) for the power of urban plebs come legislation time; for 
it was in this setting that popular leaders could best manipulate the plebs.  According to 
Taylor, then, the plebs never in fact had power in its own right. 
 
132 See for instance Mouritsen (2001). 
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Attendance depended on leadership, political context (that is, the state of 
political affairs both at Rome and elsewhere) and the nature of the bill.133 
 
So then, the evidence we have suggests that citizens from every order could 
vote with the confidence that their vote would count, although distance 
from Rome and lack of interest might have put some off.  But those who did 
attend the tribal assembly would have found in their fellow tribesmen a 
varied bunch of both wealthy and poor men.  Naturally enough, some 
issues failed to ignite the imagination and then turnouts were poor.  Cicero 
reports one such tiny turnout: “We often see many laws passed.  I say 
nothing about those which are passed under such conditions that scarcely 
five in each tribe, and those not from their own tribe, are found to vote” 
(Sest. 109).  This has been interpreted to mean there was a dearth of rural 
voters, yet it more likely reflects a lack of interest. 
 
FREEDMEN 
 
Now that we have established that rural tribesmen were present at 
legislative assemblies in significant numbers because of migration to Rome, 
we need to move onto the presence of another element of the population: 
                                                 
133 Williamson (2005:133-144) analyses the range of issues, calculating that 20% of bills 
during the late Republic involved distribution of resources. 
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men newly enfranchised, free and freedmen.  These two groups experienced 
fluctuating voting power as they were enrolled in only a limited number of 
tribes.  The freedmen suffered most by having their enrolment restricted to 
the four urban tribes, regardless of where they lived.  
 
It is important to assess the influence of the vote of freedmen in the late 
Republic, for evidence suggests that those libertini who resided in Rome 
formed a large and active section of the plebs urbana.  Cicero, for instance, 
gives the impression that the majority of Clodius’ supporters were freedmen 
in order to imply that Clodius appealed to a “lesser” class of citizen (Att. 
2.1.8; Dom. 53 f.; 89; Sest. 34).  Numbers of freedmen may be exaggerated as 
Cicero often fails to distinguish freedmen from slaves (Mil. 87; Ascon. 52 
C).134  Epigraphic evidence gives the impression that freedmen 
outnumbered ingenui in Rome three to one.135  Of course such a scanty 
                                                 
134 Cicero’s bias against the urban plebs comes through clearly via his rhetorical technique 
of terming freedmen slaves: “Why then, Lucullus, do you bring me into disfavour, and 
summon me before a public assembly, so to speak, and actually imitate seditious tribunes 
and order the shops (tabernas) to be shut?  For what is the object of your complaint that we 
are abolishing the practical sciences, unless it aims at stirring up the craftsmen (opifices)?  
But if they all come together from every quarter, it will be easy to stir them on to attack 
your side!  I shall first expound the unpopular doctrine that all the persons then standing in 
the assembly (in contione) are according to you exiles, slaves and madmen” (Acad.. 2.144).  
Asconius (52 C) corrects Cicero’s negative portrayal of urban tribesmen: “At this time laws 
were being engraved at his house which would make us subject to our own slaves”, stating 
that “among Clodius’ proposed legislation there was one measure: this provided that 
freedmen who hitherto voted in only four tribes should be permitted to vote in the rural 
tribes also, these being the preserve of freemen”. 
 
135 For the ratio of 3:1 freedmen to free born in the tomb inscriptions of the late Republic see 
Taylor (1961: 118).  She bases her conclusion on almost 200 republican inscriptions in CIL I, 
22,1226-1422.   
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sprinkling of fewer than two hundred tomb inscriptions is not 
representative of the population of Rome.  There is an additional dilemma 
regarding the motives for leaving inscriptions: some hold that freedmen 
were more likely than freeborn to want to celebrate their life’s achievements 
in stone.136  Nonetheless, in conjunction with the evidence of Cicero and 
others, there can be no doubt that freedmen resident in Rome formed a 
significant section of those who voted on laws in the Forum.  In addition, 
many of the shops surrounding the Forum provided workspace for 
craftsmen who were often freedmen, thus placing them tantalizingly close to 
the action on voting days, provided, that is, they could get leave from their 
employers to attend.  Those on piece rates would have been free to attend so 
long as their bosses could spare them. 
 
The influence of the freedmen’s vote waxed and waned during the Republic.  
For although freed slaves became Roman citizens, their vote was weakened 
when freedmen as an order were restricted to registration in urban tribes.  
Freedmen, however, were periodically enrolled in rural tribes, thus 
increasing their influence in both tribal and centuriate assemblies. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 
136 Brunt (1962: 70 n. 15) disagrees with Taylor’s suggestion that ingenui were less likely than 
freedmen to leave behind epigraphic evidence.  Mouritsen (2005) has reasoned that the 
proliferation of freedmen’s epitaphs deterred free men from setting up their own, with the 
result that freedmen are over-represented. 
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Romans were relatively generous in their manumission of slaves.137  
Although our sources’ lack of objectivity demands caution of interpretation, 
we can nevertheless conclude that slaves were freed in numbers sufficient to 
cause concern over which tribes they were enrolled in.  The usual practice 
was to register all freedmen in the four urban tribes, thus minimising the 
impact of the group’s vote in both the tribal and centuriate assemblies in the 
late Republic.  Urban registration occurred regardless of whether the libertini 
lived in Rome or outside Rome, regardless of whether he stayed in the 
countryside or in a town or migrated to Rome.   
 
Both Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Appian comment on the practice of 
granting civitas to libertini.  Appian notes cynically that the pure blood of 
Roman plebeians was diluted with that of freed foreigners, so that 
“freedmen have equal rights of citizenship with [plebeians]” (BC 2.120).  His 
attitude is a reflection of the conservative elite during the late Republic.  
Dionysius is less critical of the practice when he reports that King Tullius 
                                                 
137 Wiedemann (1985: 162-175) suggests that manumission was less frequent than has been 
supposed by those who base their arguments on statistics gleaned from funerary 
inscriptions as these are more likely put up by descendants of freedmen keen to celebrate 
their freedom than those who fail to achieve manumisson.  Also, he emphasises the 
master’s self-interest as the prime reason for manumission: once freed, the ex-slave owed 
his master a debt of gratitude through which the master expected his slave to work for him, 
and the master no longer needed to house, feed and clothe the slave.  A win-win situation 
from the master’s point of view. 
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innovated to enlarge the citizen body by admitting not only foreigners but 
even manumitted slaves:  
 
For he ordered these also to report the value of their property at the same 
time as all the other free men, and he distributed them among the four 
city tribes, in which the body of freedmen, however numerous, continued 
to be ranked to my day;138 and he permitted them to share in all the 
privileges which were open to the rest of the plebeians. (4.22) 
 
Tullius, according to Dionysius, convinced the patricians to support his 
proposal by pointing out that the freedmen and their sons would be loyal 
clients to them and their descendants (4.23).  Dionysius thus reflects the ever 
pragmatic Roman approach to enfranchisement. 
 
Masters (domini) granted their slaves freedom as a reward for good work 
and loyalty, out of respect for the individual, as an incentive to other slaves 
to behave well in the absence of a police force, to prevent slaves testifying 
against masters under torture, to rid themselves of older slaves who had 
become a burden, or to make the newly enfranchised citizen eligible for the 
corn dole; the custom was that freedmen still owed ex-masters, now 
patrons, duty once manumitted.139  During the proscriptions, slaves might 
receive their freedom for killing a proscribed man.140  
                                                 
138 See below for periods during which, contrary to Dionysius’ opinion, freedmen were 
assigned to all 35 tribes. 
 
139 Treggiari (1969: 11-20). Several sources suggest that state subsidisation of corn caused a 
rush of manumissions because it offered an incentive to masters to manumit, and thus no 
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Citizenship (civitas) was conferred at the same time as libertas, as Livy 
reports in his account of the first manumission: the slave who informed 
against the conspiracy to restore the Tarquins was rewarded with freedom 
and citizenship (2.5.9 f., libertas et civitas; see also Plut. Publ. 7).  This 
Vindicius was the first freedman and so great was his service to the new 
Republic that he was allowed to choose the tribe to which he would belong.  
Cicero also acknowledges the link between freedom and citizenship:  
 
You advance no reason why, if liberty cannot possibly be taken away, 
citizenship can.  For we have inherited the same tradition with regard to 
both, and if once it is possible to take away citizenship it is impossible to 
preserve liberty.  For how can a man enjoy his rights to the freedom of a 
Roman citizen if he is not among the number of Roman citizens? (Caec. 
96).141   
 
                                                                                                                                         
longer feed and house slaves yet still retain their service as once freed slaves still had to 
perform operae for their patron. Cassius Dio records that Pompey’s grain distribution was 
delayed because “many slaves had been freed in anticipation of the event [and so] he 
wished to take a census of them in order that the grain might be supplied to them with 
some order and system.” (39.24).  Dionysius of Halicarnassus claims that in the good old 
days most slaves were freed due to worthy conduct while a few purchased their freedom, 
which was nonetheless lawful and honest.  But the situation had so deteriorated by his day 
(i.e. during Augustus’ Principate) that  robbers, burglars, and prostitutes were able to buy 
their freedom, or worse still men who had aided and abetted poisoners and murderers, 
traitors and blasphemers.  At the end of this list of unworthy freedmen he adds those who 
received the corn dole in order to pass it on to their former masters (Dion. 4.24); Treggiari 
(1969: 27 f.). 
 
140 During the Second Triumvirate a slave was rewarded with his freedom and so granted 
citizenship if he killed a proscribed man (App. BC 4.11), although in reality death was 
sometimes the slave’s reward for betraying his proscribed master (App. BC. 4. 29). 
 
141  It should be noted, however, that Cicero proceeds to enumerate upon two instances 
whereby a free man (liber) might lost his liberty (viz. evasion of military service and refusal 
to be included in the census).  He excuses his double standard on the grounds that the 
former were never free in the first place and the latter repudiated their freedom (Caec. 99). 
 
78 
Cicero also emphasises the connection between libertas and civitas in his 
attack on Clodius for having him exiled without trial (Dom. 77).   
 
Freedmen were added to tribal rolls in one of three ways, depending on the 
method of manumission.  Those freed by a magistrate (vindicta) were 
perhaps enrolled by the same magistrate in one of the four urban tribes, 
while those freed censu were enrolled then and there by the censors.  Slaves 
freed by will (testamento) would have waited to be enrolled in the next 
census.142 
 
Libertini thus enjoyed the basic rights of citizenship, although these were 
limited in several ways.  Not only was their vote weaker as a result of 
registration in only four out of 35 tribes during most of the Republic, but 
they struggled to gain access to the equestrian order and so political office.  
Freedmen also suffered reduced rights of succession, litigation and 
marriage.143  In addition, no matter what their legal status, freedmen always 
suffered socially for having once been slaves.  Evidence of their social slur 
associated with servile background is ubiquitous in the written sources.144 
 
                                                 
142 Treggiari (1969: 41). 
 
143 Treggiari (1969). 
 
144 See, for example, Appian (BC 2.120) on freed foreigners diluting the blood of plebeians, 
quoted above. 
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Freedmen were teased with the prospect of registration in rural tribes.  From 
time to time magistrates sought to have libertini enrolled in all 35 tribes.  
Magistrates, usually censors and tribunes of the plebs, tried to elevate the 
status of freedmen from second class citizens several times in the last three 
centuries of the republic.  Otherwise freedmen possessed little clout in the 
tribal assembly due to their large numbers being crammed into the four 
urban tribes, even if they resided in a district where free-born citizens 
belonged to a rural tribe. 
 
Appius Claudius Caecus was the first magistrate who sought to redistribute 
freedmen through all the tribes, rather than have them limited to 
membership of the four urban tribes alone.  During his censorship in 312 
Claudius first tried to open the Senate to the sons of freedmen by putting 
their names on the senatorial roll (Diod. Sic. 20.36.3; Auct. Vir. Ill. 34),145 but 
the consuls of 311 refused to use the new list of senators.146 
                                                 
 
145 Cf. Suetonius (Claud. 24.1) who quibbles that in Appius’ day libertini referred not to 
freedmen themselves but to their freeborn sons and it was these, the grandsons of the 
freedmen, who gained entrance to the senate under Appius.  Treggiari (1969: 53) rightly 
notes that Suetonius’ idea gains no support from any other source, all of whom support the 
emperor Claudius’ argument that he was following his ancestor’s example by adlecting 
sons of freedmen to the senate (Tac. Ann. 11.24; Plut. Pomp. 13; Diod. Sic. 20.36; Livy 9.46.1). 
 
146 Livy states that the consuls of 311 ignored Claudius’ new list of senators (and I quote at 
length to include highlight the disdainful tone with which the reform was greeted by not 
only the consuls but Livy’s source): “the consuls of the following year… complained to the 
people at the outset of their administration that the senatorial order had been depraved by 
the improper choice of members, in which better men had been passed over than some that 
had been appointed.  They then gave notice that they should ignore that list, which had 
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Despite this temporary setback, Claudius forged ahead with another piece 
of legislation.  The censor used his powers to redistribute men from 
overcrowded urban tribes into the tribes of their patrons.147 Livy records a 
slightly different version of the reform, substituting humiles for freedmen:  
 
Claudius had been the first to debase the senate by the appointment of the 
sons of freedmen, and afterwards, when no one allowed the validity of his 
selection, and he had failed to gain the influence in the senate-house 
which had been his object, he had distributed the humble denizens 
(humiles) of the city amongst all the tribes, and had thus corrupted the 
Forum and the Campus Martius. (Livy 9.46.11) 
 
There has been some debate over to whom “humiles” refers.  Badian agrees 
with Taylor that the term must refer mostly to freedmen, including those 
resident in the country based on the rationale that Appius would surely 
have courted such an important group.148  Treggiari believes that “humiles” 
refers to freedmen based on Livy’s inclusion of the topic in his treatment of 
Claudius’ failed attempt to get freedmen into the senate.  Plutarch indeed 
reinforces her claim when he records in his section on the first ever 
freedmen that ‘as for other freedmen, Appius, wanting to make himself 
popular, procured them a right of voting’ (Publ. 7).  Diodorus Siculus 
                                                                                                                                         
been drawn up with no distinction of right and wrong, in a spirit of favouritism and 
caprice; and proceeded to call the roll of the senate in the order which had been in use 
before Appius Claudius and Gaius Plautius were censors” (9.30 1 f.). 
 
147  Treggiari (1969: 41 f.) states that these were mostly libertini  as many city ingenui had 
been sent off to colonies. 
 
148 Badian (1962: 206 f.); Taylor (1960: 137). 
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(20.36.4) claims that Claudius “also gave each citizen the right to be enrolled 
in whatever tribe he wished and to be placed in the census class he 
preferred,” but this sounds rather too generous. Treggiari is no doubt 
correct to suggest that freedmen were included in their patrons’ tribes.149  
Claudius’ reform remained in force until it was overturned in 304, which 
suggests that the freedmen had some power before this point to resist 
challenges, or else that Claudius’ opponents were powerless.  The censors in 
307 followed his example but those in 304150 reacted to the election of Cn. 
Flavius, son of a freedman and himself a scribe, to the curule aedileship by 
reversing Claudius’ law and reassigning all freedmen and their sons to the 
four urban tribes (Livy 9.46.10, 14).151 
 
At least one other pair of censors followed Claudius’ example, but we do 
not know when.  There may of course have been more, but the sources for 
this period are lean and made more so with the loss of Livy’s books 
covering the period from 291-222 BC.152  Livy’s second decade has not 
                                                 
 
149 As she notes, this was the technique later favoured by Manlius (1969: 42). 
 
150 The censors were elected irregulary in this instance, hence the three year gap. 
 
151 Cn. Flavius was elected curule aedile “to the vast indignation of the nobilitates” (Val. 
Max. 2.5.2 – note that Val. Max. mistakenly states elsewhere that he reached the 
praetorship, 9.3.3)).  The unknown author of Vir.Ill. records that Q. Fabius Rullus “removed 
the sons of freedmen from the list of tribes” (32).  See also Plutarch (Pomp. 13) who records 
that Fabius Rullus was given the title Maximus when as censor in 304 he expelled 
freedmen’s descendents from the senate after they had been enrolled due to their wealth. 
 
82 
survived, so we have only other fragmentary sources covering the period 
292-219.  In addition, all books after book 45 (which takes us to the end of 
167 BC) are lost.  But two kinds of summary have survived: the Oxyrynchus 
Epitome, which covers books 37-40 and 48-55 and was composed during 
first half of third century, and Periochae (‘Summaries’) composed in the 
fourth century AD of all 142 books except 136 and 137.  The summary of 
book 20 tells us that “freedmen were assigned to four tribes, whereas before 
they had been dispersed through them all” (Livy Per. 20).153   This reform 
should perhaps be attributed to the 220s as it is contained in the Periocha of 
book 20, although the reliability of the Periochae is such that no firm 
statement of date can be made. 
  
Efforts may also have been made by Scipio the elder in 189/188 to win new 
supporters when he backed the tribune Terentius Culleo, who persuaded 
the tribes to carry a law which compelled the censors T. Quinctius 
Flamininus and M. Claudius Marcellus to register all men of free birth in 
tribes including the sons of freedmen and to disperse them among all the 
                                                                                                                                         
152 Livy does, however, refer to events and personalities from his missing books in later 
books, so all is not lost: historians are able to piece together enough evidence to gain some 
picture of the period. 
 
153 Treggiari (1969: 42) agrees with Taylor’s suggestion (1960: 138) that Q. Fabius Maximus 
returned freedmen to the four urban tribes. 
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tribes (Plut. Flam. 18.1).154  Treggiari disagrees with Taylor’s suggestion that 
freedmen’s sons were the target of this lex, and suggests instead that it 
applied to illegitimate sons of ingenui for Plutarch mentions only freeborn 
residents and does not specify that their fathers were freedmen.155  Similarly 
Badian points out that the single source is very vague and mentions neither 
freedmen nor tribes, so that the only conclusion that can be reached is that 
Culleo, with the support of the populace, forced the censors to add to the 
roll of citizens all freeborn men.156  Indeed, the evidence of Plutarch is 
insufficient to support Taylor’s theory that the sons of freedmen were the 
exclusive target of the legislation.  Instead we should consider the possibility 
that all hitherto unregistered freeborn men were the object of the lex, 
including both illegitimate sons of ingenui and sons of libertini. 
 
There is also considerable debate over the form of the change in voting that 
occurred in 179, which perhaps limited freedmen once more to urban tribal 
registration.  Our only source is Livy and he records that the censors of 179 
BC “changed the method of voting and constituted the tribes according to 
                                                 
154 Taylor (1960: 138 f., 306 ff.); Bleicken 1955: 68 ff. Interestingly, this same Culleo as praetor 
peregrinus in 187 ejected 12,000 Latin allies from Rome (Livy 39.3.4-6).  No doubt he was 
acting in the interests of the Italian communities who were suffering a loss of man power to 
Rome.  Indeed, ten years later C. Claudius Pulcher as consul proposed a law adapting the 
ius migrandi so that men who moved to Rome only gained citizenship if they left a son 
behind (Livy 41.9.9-12).  
 
155 Treggiari (1969: 43). 
 
156 Badian (1962: 207). 
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districts and to the social origins (generibus) and status (causisque) and 
income (quaestibus) of the members” (40.51.9).  Walsh comments on the lack 
of detail supplied by Livy and notes the obscurity of what detail he does 
supply.  He suggests that the reference to social origins is meant to 
distinguish those of free birth from those who were once slaves, with the 
result that a freedman with a son and property valued at 30,000 sesterces or 
more was now eligible to vote in the appropriate tribe (which can be 
assumed from the reform referred to in Livy (45.15.1 ff.), for which see 
below); that ”status” probably means that of the family, that is whether the 
family has male progeny and therefore eligible for enrolment in a rural tribe 
(as above); and “income” determined allocation of class, so that those with 
over 30,000 sesterces belonged to the first or second class and so not only 
were they able to seek registration in a rural tribe, but they also voted 
first.157  Badian remarks that “Livy clearly cannot have had any idea of what 
these men did: his words cannot have made sense even to himself”, and 
instead recommends that we use this passage as evidence for the existence 
of “a pair of unusually efficient censors early in the second century.”158  The 
emphasis on redistribution according to region is revealing: it indicates that 
the small farmers who had moved to Rome after losing their farms while 
                                                 
157 Walsh (1996: 173)  
 
158 Badian (1962: 204 f.)  
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absent fulfilling their military duties had greater influence than was usual. 
The reform of 179 was trying to redistribute these men to lessen their power. 
  
There is evidence that during the second century an increasing number of 
freedmen took up residence in rural areas, some of whom came into 
possession of sizeable estates.  Taylor and Staveley take Livy (40.51.9) to 
mean that freedmen who possessed landed property sufficient to gain them 
access to the second class and with sons older than 5 years were permitted 
to enrol in rural tribes, which they believe is supported by this concession’s 
removal ten years later (Livy 45.15.1-2).159  Taylor suggests that the focus of 
reform was on these men who lived in country district as the change in 
registration of 179 was regionatim, that is by district, and so unlikely to affect 
residents of Rome.  But later it was the freedmen resident in the city of 
Rome that became the object of reformers because their votes would have 
been valuable in legislation, thus the efforts to get them registered in all 
tribes.160  
 
                                                 
159 Taylor (1960: 139 f.) and  Staveley (1972: 140 f.).  Note that Staveley errs in his end notes 
when he cites as the source Livy 41.50.8 instead of 40.51.9. 
 
160 Taylor (1960: 147).  Also (158): “if [the city freedmen] could be distributed, as their 
patrons were, through all the tribes, [they] would have had great influence on the votes on 
laws which were usually in the hands of the city population.”   But compare Treggiari  
(1969: 164f.) who rightly suggests that Taylor (1949: 54) is wrong to claim that patricians at 
first sought to manipulate freedmen in rural tribes, and only later (after the Lex Tabellaris of 
139 BC) did populares try to woo them with gifts of favourable rural registration.   
 
86 
Two further instances of reshuffling registration methods occurred during 
the second century BC.   The first saw libertini once more transferred from 
rural tribes to one single urban tribe by the censors of 169-168 B.C., C. 
Claudius Pulcher and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus.  Livy records the decision 
of the censors:  
 
Freedmen had been distributed among the four city tribes except for those 
who had a son over five years old (these they ordered to be reckoned 
where they had been enrolled at the census immediately previous), and 
those who had an estate or estates in the country valued at over thirty 
thousand sesterces [censors’ or tribes’ names]161 the privilege of enrolling 
was granted. Although the arrangement had become established in this 
way, Claudius said that it was impossible for a censor without a decree of 
the people to deprive any individual of his ballot, let alone a whole class.  
For if, said Claudius, the censor could move a man from his tribe, which 
was exactly what ordering him to change his tribe meant, he could 
remove him from all thirty-five tribes, that is, deprive him of citizenship 
and status as a free man – not determine where he should be enrolled but 
exclude him from enrolment.  This was argued between the two censors; 
finally they resorted to the following solution: they drew lots publicly in 
the Hall of Liberty for one of the four city tribes, to which they would 
consign all those who had been slaves.  The lot of the Esquiline tribe was 
cast; Tiberius Gracchus announced that they had decided to enrol all 
freedmen in this tribe (Livy 45.15.1-6)   
 
– one of the many reforms made by the two who became known for the 
severity of their measures.162  Cicero is surely mistaken when he says that 
Gracchus “libertinos in urbanas tribus transtulit” (De Or. 1.38).  That 
Gracchus and Claudius reduced freedmen to registration in one tribe should 
                                                 
161 At this point there is a lacuna in which the Loeb editor believes the rural tribes for these 
wealthy freedmen may have been listed; cf. Badian (1962: 207) who suggests the hiatus 
would have contained the names of the censors responsible for the change. 
 
162 Treggiari (1969: 34, 47). 
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not surprise anyone.  To reiterate: these censors were notorious for their 
“tristis …atque aspera censura” (Livy 43.16.1), for their tough treatment of 
those whom they regarded as unworthy, regardless of whether their victims 
were freeborn or once slaves: they deprived many equites of their horses 
(Livy 43.16.1, 44.16.8) and were so mean when they let contracts that the 
tribune of the plebs Rutillius charged them with perduellio (Livy 43.16.2-16; 
Val. Max. 6.5.3). 
 
There was more activity in 115, when the consul M. Aemilius Scaurus 
carried a law affecting liberti, but only the bare details are recorded: “Consul 
legem de sumptibus et libertinorum suffragiis tulit” (Auct. Vir. Ill. 72.5).  
Sulpicius Rufus next sought to distribute freedmen more fairly throughout 
the tribes as tribune in 88 (Asc. 64C).  He proposed that those exiled by Sulla 
should be recalled, that new citizens and freedmen should be distributed 
among the tribes, and that Gaius Marius should be appointed commander 
to oppose Mithridates (Livy Per. 77) but had his legislation annulled by Sulla 
(App. BC 1.59), only for it to be revived under Cinna, although only two 
sources specifically refer to libertini (Schol. Gron. 286 Stangl and Livy Per. 84; 
cf. on new citizens: Cic. Phil. 8.7; Vell. 2.20.2; App. BC 1.64).  The law was 
abolished once and for all by Sulla as dictator in 81.163  
                                                 
163 Treggiari (1969: 37-52); Taylor (1960: ch. 10). 
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Manilius also tried his hand at improving the weight of the freedmen’s vote 
during his tribunate in 66 by spreading them throughout the tribes only to 
have his legislation annulled the following day for failing to observe the 
trinundinae.164  There is some disagreement over the reason behind the 
annulment of the law.  Treggiari backs the argument that it was termed 
invalid because it was carried by force (following Dio 36.42.2), whereas 
Taylor says it failed because Manilius did not observe the lead time of 
trinundinae.165  Whatever the reason the result was the same: freedmen were 
not registered in all 35 tribes. 
 
Finally, Clodius was planning a reallocation of tribes for freedmen when he 
died in 52, but again there is disagreement between secondary sources.  
Treggiari suggests he aimed to “enrol freedmen in the same tribes as their 
patrons, since Cicero complained that people like himself would have been 
controlled, which probably means outvoted by their own freedmen.”166  
Clodius’ promise to enrol freedmen who lived outside the city in the rural 
                                                 
164 Asconius (45C) contradicts himself, at first stating that Manilius proposed a bill “ut 
libertinis in omnibus tribubus suffragium esset” then changing the bill so that it pertained 
to the franchise of the sons of freedmen, on the details of which Asconius (64-65 C) is vague.  
Dio says Manilius “had granted the class of freedmen the right to vote with those who had 
freed them; this he did on the very last day of the year toward evening, after suborning 
some of the populace” (36.42.2). 
 
165 Treggiari (1969: 50); Taylor (1960: 144 f.). 
 
166 Treggiari (1969: 50).  Cic. Mil. 87; Asc. 52C. 
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tribes was perhaps a deliberate ploy to win votes in the centuriate assembly 
in his effort to attain the praetorship.167  Clodius’ carrot makes sense if 
freedmen had some influence in the centuriate assembly and so would 
increase the likelihood of his successful candidature, otherwise his purpose 
in buttering them up is unclear.168  The freedmen’s vote in the comitia 
centuriata was limited to only 8 of the 70 first class centuries (see below), so it 
is unlikely that Clodius expected their support to ensure his election.  Rather 
he hoped to impress the patrons of these men who, following redistribution, 
might have increased numbers of clients in the more influential rural 
tribes.169  The method of redistribution varied: some reformers sought 
registration according to location of domus, others would have freedmen 
enrolled in the tribes of their erstwhile masters. 
 
Sons of freedmen were in a better position vis-à-vis voting clout as they 
could probably secure registration in rural tribes if they owned property in 
                                                 
167 Evidence for Clodius planning legal reform that would see Cicero and his ilk ‘made 
subject to their own slaves’ (Cic., Mil 87); Asconius expands upon these mysterious words 
of Cicero: the law proposed that ‘libertini, qui non plus quam in IIII tribubus suffragium 
ferebant, possent in rusticis quoque tribubus, quae propriae ingenuorum sunt’ (Asc. 52 (C)); 
a Clodian programme (leges Clodianes) found in Clodius’ house (Mil. 89); that Clodius 
planned to redistribute freedmen “Nec suffragia dabis, quibus ostentas….Nec vero illam 
nefariam libertatem” (De aere alieno Milonis, frr. 17, 18 (Crawford)); Schol. Bob. 173 (St). 
 
168 Unless Clodius was following family practice.  Tatum (1999: 237) suggests a traditional 
Claudian tactic was to take an interest in freedmen’s electoral rights. 
 
169 Thus Taylor (1960: 133, 146): those who tried to redistribute freedmen through the rural 
tribes sought a new client class. 
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the countryside.170  It has also been suggested that the elite would have tried 
to secure the registration of their freedmen in the rural tribes.171  
 
                                                 
170 Treggiari (1969: 52) is rather speculative here, offering neither sources of evidence for 
this claim nor examples. 
 
171 Scullard (1973: 22).  Disappointingly he supplies no sources to reinforce his verdict.  But 
his suggestion is sensible. 
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NEW FREEBORN CITIZENS 
 
Freedmen were not the only citizens to suffer restricted tribal registration; 
those freeborn Italians who gained citizenship following the passage of the 
lex Iulia also experienced unequal tribal distribution.  The Italians who were 
enfranchised following the Social War were freeborn, yet they were at first 
enrolled in ten newly created tribes in 90BC:  
 
The Romans did not enrol the new citizens in the thirty five existing 
tribes, lest they should outvote the old ones in the elections, but 
incorporated them in ten new tribes, which voted last.  So it often 
happened that their vote was useless, since a majority was obtained from 
the thirty five tribes that voted first.  This fact was either not noticed by 
the Italians at the time or they were satisfied with what they had gained, 
but it was observed later and became the source of a new conflict. (App. 
BC 1.49) 
 
But these new tribes were abandoned after the new citizens demanded 
distribution throughout all rural tribes with the help of Cinna and others.  
For they were unhappy with the prospect of second class citizenship, as the 
new tribes were huge and would vote after the existing 35 tribes, thus 
rendering their vote unnecessary if a majority had already been reached.  
Velleius Paterculus criticises Cinna’s lack of restraint and in so doing 
emphasises the senator’s role in this struggle:  
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Accordingly, although the citizenship had been given to Italy with the 
proviso that the new citizens should be enrolled in but eight tribes,172 so 
that their power and numbers might not weaken the prestige of the older 
citizens, and that the beneficiaries might not have greater power than the 
benefactors, Cinna now promised to distribute them throughout all the 
tribes. (Vell. Pat. 20.2) 
 
Appian attributes the strife to the actions of Marius and the tribune of the 
plebs Publius Sulpicius in 88 BC, for Marius planned to use the new citizens 
to further his own ends once their vote was strengthened via tribal 
redistribution.  The old citizens, however, were not prepared to have their 
vote weakened and fought the new citizens “with sticks and stones” so that 
the consuls were compelled to proclaim a cessation from all public business 
to put off the voting and attendant violence (App. BC. 1.55).  The main 
problem with Appian here is that he does not define who the “old citizens” 
were – which sector of Roman society was prepared to risk life and limb to 
participate in this action against the new citizens in the forum?  Sulpicius 
was not put off by the consuls’ proclamation and after forcing them to flee 
the city, his laws were enacted, one providing for tribal reallocation and 
another giving Marius command against Mithridates (App. BC. 1.56).  But 
Sulla had his laws annulled after he marched on Rome (BC. 1.59).  Sulpicius 
met his end in the aftermath (App. BC. 1.60). Following Sulla’s departure for 
                                                 
172 The discrepancy regarding the number of tribes created for the newly enfranchised 
Italians is discussed by Taylor (1960: 102f.  n. 6 ).  Sisenna records that the new citizens were 
enrolled in two tribes (fr. 17 Peter). 
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the East, Marius retook Rome and all the new citizens were eventually 
enrolled in all 31 rural tribes (App. BC. 73).173 
 
Newer citizens’ voting clout was diminished because they were registered 
in the bigger tribes.  Factional politics played its part.  The distribution of 
new citizens in tribes following the Social War favoured Marians:  
 
Great inequalities remained in the tribes, with the largest tribes in general 
at a distance from Rome.  The distributions were carried out in the 
interests of the Marian-Cinnan party, and perhaps some sign of their 
influence can be detected, for instance in the wide distribution of tribes in 
Etruria, a region favorable to Marius, and in the influential position 
accorded Sora in the Romilia, a site on the border of Marius’ home, 
Arpinum.174  
 
Sulla later settled veterans in Etruria in an attempt to increase his support in 
a hitherto Marian district. 
 
There exists further evidence of senatorial influence over tribal allocation of 
new citizens.  Following the enfranchisement of the Transpadani these new 
citizens were distributed over at least twenty of the 31 rural tribes, thus 
providing these northern Italians with influence in the majority of tribes.  
Taylor believes the spread was designed “to serve Pompey’s influence 
against the Sullan nobility”.  In the end, however, the distribution served 
                                                 
173 Taylor (1960: 101-107); Gabba (1994: 123-128). 
 
174 Taylor (1960: 117; 314).  See Ch 16 for tribes of senators. For the general character of the 
tribal assignments see 115 f. 
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Caesar’s interests against those of Pompey for Caesar was able to use his 
influence as governor of Cisalpine Gaul to encourage these men to enlist 
(Caes. BC. 3.87.4) – helped by the fact that Caesar ultimately secured full 
citizenship rights for them in 49.175  Hirtius records that Caesar sent his 
lieutenant Sergius Galba to stand for the consulship and M. Antonius for a 
priesthood and regularly asked voters to travel to Rome for elections (BG 
8.50). 
 
Treggiari suggests the new citizens with the best chance of gaining access to 
rural registration were the individual provincials like Balbus, who moved 
from one of the urban tribes to the prestigious Clustumina (Cic. Balb. 57), of 
which Pompey was a member (ILS 8888).176  Influential freedmen may have 
enjoyed the same sort of privileged treatment.  Magistrates could also confer 
privileges.  The case of Seleucus, a newly enfranchised nauarchos (captain of 
                                                 
 
175 Brunt (1962: 77); Taylor (1960: 130 f.).  Brunt (1971b: 142) suggests that even the erstwhile 
Pompeian supporters from Picenum went over to Caesar because Pompey could not protect 
them, despite his father’s granting them Latin rights in 89BC, whereas Caesar as proconsul 
had long recruited his legionaries from among their number and granted them full 
enfranchisement in 49 BC.  They respected his authority; Caesar was their patron. 
 
176 Treggiari (1969: 52) refers to Taylor (1949: 54, 114) and notes that while technically the 
reward was for a successful prosecution, the transferral to a more influential tribe reeks of 
favouritism.  But such a change of registration to the tribe of the convicted man was the 
standard practice according to Roman criminal law (Taylor (1960: 18 f.); Lex repet. (CIL  12 
583)). 
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a vessel), provides one such example, for Octavian had him registered in the 
rural tribe Cornelia in gratitude for services rendered.177   
 
Elite manipulation of tribal affiliation was a challenge to the fair sharing of 
voting clout and so the democratic nature of tribal voting.  The composition 
of tribes was tweaked by senators hoping to increase their own personal 
power and auctoritas.  Senatorial influence over voting districts was 
achieved during the creation of districts and new tribal assignments.  There 
were several methods of achieving this influence.  In the days when new 
tribes were still being established, the big gentes left their old ones to take up 
land and influence further from Rome, thus doubling their influence as they 
still held sway in their original tribes (which were named after them).178  
They saw to it that newly enfranchised clients were registered in their own 
tribes, thus increasing their influence amongst their tribesmen.179  They 
weakened the influence of other tribes by making them huge and keeping 
their own small, thus weakening the strength of the individual vote, and 
increasing their own relatively.180  Ultimately, the desire to enrol clients in 
                                                 
177 On Seleucus see Ehrenberg and Jones (1949: 301). 
 
178 Taylor (1960: 299). 
 
179 Taylor (1960: 305 ff.; 311). 
 
180 Taylor (1960: 303 ff.; 308 f.). 
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one’s own tribe contradicted the desire to have fewer voters and so a 
weightier vote.181 
 
Romans were aware that unfair tribal distributions diluted the power of 
legislative votes.  This much is clear when we see the efforts of those who 
tried to make the distribution more fair, especially for newly enfranchised 
free and freedmen, with mixed results.  That the struggle existed to do away 
with the unequal distribution illustrates that we are dealing with an 
emerging democracy, where there was awareness of what was right, and the 
beginnings of change for the better. 
 
VOTING AREAS 
 
The limited capacity of voting areas has been used in arguments against the 
existence of democracy in Rome.  The areas were too small to contain every 
single eligible voter, whether it be the Campus Martius where the centuriate 
assembly was convened, or the gathering area of the tribal assembly in the 
Forum.182  The existence of two distinct voting areas can in part be put down 
to the tradition which barred soldiers from crossing the pomerium.  The other 
                                                 
181 Taylor (1960: 314 f.). 
 
182 See Mouritsen (2001: Chapter 2) for the latest and most conservative estimates; Taylor 
(1966); MacMullen (1980: 454-7); Richardson (1992) for layout of public spaces. 
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reason is the different voting procedures.183  Thus elections could not be 
held in the Forum where there was not enough space for all 193 centuries to 
assemble at once.  Legislative and judicial assemblies on the Capitoline 
outside the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus were limited by the small 
area, but only from 211-121 BC, after which Castor’s tribunal became 
available.  Legislative assemblies were held outside the temple of Castor.  
Pontes carried voters up stairs to vote at the tribunal.184 
 
Theories abound regarding the capacity of the Forum and Saepta.  The 
majority share the view that the areas in which assemblies gathered to vote 
were too small to contain all those citizens eligible to vote.185  While it is 
impossible to establish the exact number of citizens eligible to vote in the 
assemblies, it is clear that the areas in which the people met to vote were 
insufficient to hold every citizen.  This small size of congregation points can 
be taken as evidence for the levels of voter participation: not every citizen 
was expected to turn up.  As stated elsewhere, soldiers and farmers busy 
with the harvest could not make the trip to Rome.  Others refrained from 
                                                 
183 Taylor (1966: 40). 
 
184 Taylor (1966: 43 f.). 
 
185 There are some, however, who do not deal with the issue.  For example, Mouritsen (2001: 
16) criticises Millar for being vague regarding the basic components of politics, “the scale 
and capacity of the popular institutions… numbers, composition, motivation and 
behavioural patterns.” 
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voting for various reasons, such as lack of interest in the issue to be 
legislated upon and general apathy.  But although only a small minority 
attended meetings and assemblies in the Forum, any level of popular 
participation is remarkable at a time when the average citizen endured long 
working days (if he was lucky enough to have work that is), food shortages, 
and other worries about survival. 
 
Taylor bases her opinon that the ordinary citizen did not exercise his right to 
vote on the evidence of the setting of assemblies.  There is no way everyone 
who was qualified to vote could physically cast a vote due to insufficient 
space in the Forum and even the relatively capacious Saepta would have 
held only 70,000 men, which may have been room enough for the centuriate 
assembly (as many citizens had no property and so little clout), but not the 
tribal.186  In addition, there is evidence of voters being excluded and 
shouting their support for candidates from nearby rooftops (Plut. G. 
Gracchus 3.1).187  Taylor suspects that these spaces did not need to fit the 
whole citizen population of the city as those of the four urban tribes had 
such a weak vote, even though they were the majority of the inhabitants, 
that they would not bother voting.188  Contrary to what Taylor suggests, 
                                                 
186 Taylor (1966: 52 ff.) calculates numbers of voters and who could vote in reality. 
 
187 cf. Mouritsen (2001). 
 
188 Taylor (1966: 113). 
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however, the Saepta would have held roughly one third of the male citizens 
resident in Rome.  If these many men participated, then that would be a 
higher rate than that expected by the existence of the 6,000 man quorum at 
the Athenian ekklesia. 
 
It is clear, then, that the system for voting was not designed to include every 
potential voter.  We need to ask why, when reformers worked to make 
unfair aspects such as tribal distribution more egalitarian, there were no 
moves to make full participation possible.  The answer may well be that 
Romans considered the existing system satisfactory because it did cater for 
those who did arrive at assembly areas to vote.  Only on the rare occasion 
was pressure put on the capacity of voting areas (as above).  The areas were, 
quite simply, big enough. 
 
 
ELECTIONS 
 
The space allocated to elections was substantial, especially after the reform 
of the Saepta.  It was here that the citizens decided who from among the 
senatorial and equestrian order would hold office, that is, who would take 
command of armies, preside over courts, and manage the administration of 
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Rome, Italy and the provinces.  The populus Romanus decided who would 
effect policy in these areas too, as only magistrates could propose laws.  The 
citizens elected these magistrates, so the electoral procedure will be examind 
in this section to examine whether some citizens had more influence than 
others in the election of magistrates. 
 
Again it is the people who bestow office on the deserving, the noblest 
reward of virtue in a state; the people have the power of approving or 
rejecting laws, and what is most important of all, they deliberate on the 
question of war and peace.  Further in the case of alliances, terms of peace, 
and treaties, it is the people who ratify all these or the reverse.  Thus here 
again once might plausibly say that the people’s share in the government 
is the greatest, and that the constitution is a democratic one. (Poly. 6.14.9-
12) 
 
Policy-making was thus theoretically in the hands of the people as 
magistrates were elected by popular vote, laws were passed in popular 
assembly and foreign policy (or at least the decision to go to war) was made 
by the people.  The tribal assembly began to break with tradition and so set 
new precedents in the late third century BC in that it elected military 
commanders, recalled military commanders, and ended wars.189  But as a 
rule the senate and centuriate assembly ruled over external (that is, military) 
affairs, while the tribal assembly decided domestic matters.  As wars 
                                                 
189 Sandberg (2001: 137) cites instances of the populus electing commanders, mostly during 
the Hannibalic War (Livy 29.13.7 (204 BC), 30.27.3-4 (202), 30.41.4 (201), 35.20.9 (192); Cic. 
Phil. 11.18 (131).  See Rotondi (76-77) for a list of leges and rogationes enacted which recalled 
commanders.  Tribunicians passed laws ending wars according to Livy (30.40.14, 30.43.2-3, 
33.25.6-7) and Polybius (18.25). 
 
101 
became less attractive (for a number of reasons: less booty, grimmer 
conditions of service, especially in Spain) citizens’ reluctance to enlist 
further influenced foreign policy.190 
 
The Roman constitution in the late Republic has been criticised for the lack 
of direct popular involvement in the development of policy at Rome: it has 
been compared to classical Athenian democracy and found wanting in that 
fewer citizens, it is supposed (bearing in mind the inexact nature of our 
evidence of numbers participating), presented themselves at voting time.  
Yet we know that wars were the result of a vote of the people, and so the 
people played a significant role in the direction of foreign policy.  Other 
examples include increasingly frequent interference in the realm of foreign 
policy in the late Republic, beginning with Ti. Gracchus' gaining popular 
support for his annexation of Pergamum. 
 
It has been suggested that the senate had more control over setting policy 
than the people.  Those citizens outside the senate had no direct influence on 
military policy except through the comitia centuriata, but even then evidence 
suggests that the question was not always put to the vote from the second 
                                                 
190 Toynbee (ii. 95 f.) notes that peasants became reluctant during the second century to sign 
up because following the Hannibalic War the aim was no longer to protect Rome but “the 
maintenance and extension of an empire.” 
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century.191 In the later Republic, however, the senate found its powers 
increasingly wrested from it, and it tended to be offended when foreign 
policy decisions were made by other bodies.  Livy  (21.63.3 and 38.36.8) as 
noted above records that the enfranchisement of men from Formiae, Fundi 
and Arpinum went ahead without senatorial authority in 188 BC.  Again, 
the people took the initiative and made the decision to support the generals, 
a faction of the senate, in their plan to relieve Messana against the votes of 
the majority of senators, and so began the First Punic War (Poly. 1.11.1-3).  
In 167 B.C. the praetor peregrinus M’. Iuventius Thalna tried to start a war 
with Rhodes without senatorial sanction but was prevented by tribunician 
veto (Livy 45.21.1-8).  Diodorus says the praetor appealed to the people for 
support; he summoned the assembly and urged the people to make war on 
Rhodes (Diod. 31.5.3).  Thus Thalna provided the precedent for Tiberius 
Gracchus, who gave the power to decide foreign policy to the tribal 
assembly in the case of Attalus III’s bequest in 133.  In this case, Tiberius 
                                                 
 
191 See Harris (1985: 263) for wars lacking the authorisation of a comitial vote, including 
against the Galatians in 187 with neither the authority of senate nor people (Livy 38.45.4-7, 
46.13, 48.9, 50.1), the Istrian war in 178 (Livy 41.7.8, though since the aggressor was the 
brother of the man who attacked the Galatians Livy or his source may be developing a 
topos rather than reporting what actually happened), the Third Punic War (App. Lib. 75 f.), 
the Jugurthine War, and Mithridatic War (App. Mith. 22.83; Livy 4.30.15; cf. Cic. Pis. 50).  
Compare Sandberg  (2001: 138 with n. 25) who, as noted above, suggests that the tribes 
declared war. 
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Gracchus was acting in the public interest; he “asserted the sovereign right 
of the people to take decisions without prior sanction of the senate.”192   
 
Examination of the procedure surrounding election of magistrates reveals 
both democratic and undemocratic elements.  Voters were given plenty of 
time to decide whether they wanted to take part in elections, depending on 
whether any men worth supporting were standing for office.  A candidate 
made his preliminary notification (professio) at least seventeen days 
(trinundinae) before the day on which the elections were to be held.  If his 
professio was accepted by the presiding magistrate, the candidate began 
campaigning or canvassing (petitio).  Informal meetings (contiones) called by 
friendly magistrates to discuss public business provided an opportunity for 
candidates to present their agendas and criticise their opponents.193 
 
The electorate was subject to continual canvassing as candidates competed 
for annual elections, some beginning well in advance (Cic. Att. 1.1).  By the 
late Republic some began their election campaigns a year before the big day, 
utilising the tribal organisation with its divisores (election agents), men who 
distributed candidates’ hand-outs to their tribules (fellow tribesmen), 
originally to their own tribes for the purpose of securing the tribe’s vote, but 
                                                 
192 Brunt (1988: 32). 
 
193 Mouritsen (2001: ch. 3). 
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increasingly the process became perverted as candidates bribed other tribes 
to vote for them (ambitus).194   
 
Favourable auspices were needed before an assembly could be called, a 
prerequisite open to abuse in the ultra-competitive days of the late 
Republic.195  Then after sacrifice and prayer came a preliminary contio 
probably limited before elections to statement of business with little or no 
discussion (in contrast to the deliberative function of the contio preceding 
acts of legislation and jurisdiction).  Non-voters withdrew after the contio 
and the voters divided into centuries or tribes separated by ropes or wooden 
fences in an enclosure (ovile or Saepta).  Group-voting prevailed, but first 
individuals filed along narrow passages (pontes) to register their votes, 
originally verbally, with tellers (rogatores), although, following the reform of 
139, voting was performed by secret ballot whereby citizens scratched the 
initials of the preferred candidate on tabellae ceratae (the lex Gabinia: Cic. Leg. 
3.35; Lael. 41).  These individual votes were tallied up and the vote of the 
majority determined the vote of the century or tribe. 
 
In 241 BC or shortly after, the comitia centuriata was reformed, so that there 
were 193 centuries divided into five classes.  The evidence is patchy, but it 
                                                 
194 Bribery is discussed below. 
 
195 See Chapter Five on methods of obstruction. 
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appears that the first class contained 70 centuries, with each of the 35 tribes 
represented by two centuries, one each of iuniores and seniores, plus 18 
centuries of Equites.  Centuries voted one after the other, with the eighteen 
centuries of Equites originally voting first – these were the centuriae 
praerogativae.  The order of voting was significant, as the remainder of the 
centuries often followed the lead of the first to vote (Cic. Planc. 49; Ad. Q. 
2.14.4; Div. 1.103; Festus, 249.7).  As election was decided once a majority 
had voted for a candidate, he was elected, even though he might not have 
received as many votes as someone who failed to be elected.196  Hence the 
additional importance of the lot choosing who voted first.  At the time of the 
reform of the assembly the vote became more democratic “by no longer 
observing the strict ancient manner of calling [the centuries]” (Dion. Hal. 
4.21.3), for now a century was selected by lot to vote first (the centuria 
praerogativa) and, while this was always from the first class, the new 
organisation was now based on tribe and so many small farmers were 
registered in each century, thus reducing the influence of the senatorial 
order.197 Following the publication of the vote of the praerogativa the 
remaining 69 centuries of the first class voted, with the result of each 
                                                 
196 Taylor (1966: 81 f.). 
 
197 Taylor (1966: 91).  Though Taylor (1960:303 f.) argues that any seeming democratisation 
of the process was illusory: the wealthy land owners still dominated the first class and were 
few, and so their vote had more weight.  Scullard (1973: 20) supposes that this change 
occurred at the same time as the reform of the comitia. 
 
106 
century proclaimed after each voted.  Then came the turn of the 18 
equestrian centuries: first the 12 centuries of equites, then the weird anomaly 
of the century of fabrii (engineers or craftsmen) followed by the six ancient 
equestrian centuries (sex suffragia): Tities, Ramnes, and Luceres.  The second 
through fifth classes voted next.  These constituted 100 centuries of 
uncertain distribution through the classes.  Finally, the five unarmed 
centuries voted.  Last to vote was the century of proletarii, a substantial 
percentage of the population, if not the majority (Dion. Hal. 4.18.2; 7.59.6).  
Cicero reports that the first class was but a small fraction of the citizen body 
(Rep. 2.40). 
 
In addition, while voting ceased once a majority was reached in favour of 
one candidate, it was repeated for no office was held by one man alone.198  
Ultimately, the centuriate assembly was still weighted in favour of elite, 
although now the majority was not reached until at least second class voted, 
which would have occurred fairly frequently as the competition between 
candidates was fierce in the late Republic, thus making a majority difficult 
to achieve for the aristocracy did not vote in one block.199  The success of the 
candidates was not confirmed until the presiding magistrate made a formal 
                                                 
198 Scullard (1973 19 n. 2) notes the problems in deciphering the reform; re. praerogativa: 
Scullard 1973: 20 n. 1 with Livy 43.16.14 and Cic Phil 2.82.  
 
199 Taylor (1966: 88 ff.); Scullard (1973: 21) 
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announcement of the result (renuntiatio).  Very occasionally a presiding 
magistrate refused to confirm the election, as occurred in 67 when Piso 
disagreed with the result (Val. Max. 3.8.3).  
 
More of a challenge to the emerging democracy of Rome than the arbitrary 
actions of consuls such as Piso was bribery.  Wealthy men owed a duty of 
euergetism: they were expected to “feed their own tribe”.  As a display of 
civic benefaction, patrons were expected to give clients gifts, or impress 
their own tribe with public games or buildings.  It was traditional and legal 
to give gifts of money in order to win elections.200  Yet exceeding the legal 
limitations saw men charged with ambitus or bribery.  In this sense, Romans 
had a concept of “corruption,” as seen in the scathing comments in the 
Commentariolum Petitionis regarding bribery (56).  People should instead 
support candidates because of past good work and prospect of more to 
follow (19).  Also, by Cicero’s day divisores had become professional bribery 
agents.  Cicero had a concept of corruption, though no doubt it was different 
to ours.201  Veyne argues that Hellenistic euergetism in the form of 
“benefactor politicians” was a sign of a weakening democracy as 
                                                 
200 Tatum (1999: 57). 
 
201 On electoral corruption see Gruen (1974: 212 ff.; 271 ff.); Nicolet (297 ff.); Lintott (1990); 
Yakobson (1992); corrupt divisores: Asc. 75 (C); negative view of divisores Att. 1.16.2, 1.18.4 
(personal slur); Verr. 3.161; Planc. 48; De Orat. 2.257.  Less negative: Verr. 1.22f. 
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dependence on the wealthy few increased.202  Yet Rome was a different 
story from Athens as the Roman empire was expanding and needed 
investment on infrastructure – building programmes were the obvious 
result.  If Rome resembled a period in Athens, it was more like that of the 
Peisistratid tyranny, than Periclean democracy, with similarly impressive 
public works and reforms for the common good.  A similar phenomenon is 
visible in the contemporary New Zealand practice of dangling carrots in 
election year budgets and policy announcements regarding perennial vote 
winners such as tax cuts, restrictions on immigration, and abolition of 
interest on student loans. 
  
Laws had long been in place to curb malpractice in elections (ambitus).  The 
earliest was passed in 358 BC to stop the campaigning of plebeian 
candidates  who were making visits to market-places and to settlements of 
Roman citizens (conciliabula).203  Bribery was common in the late Republic 
and well organised through middlemen called divisores who arranged 
payments, originally to members of a candidate’s own tribe.  By the late 
Republic, however, the process had been perverted so that it no longer 
functioned as a legitimate form of patronage.  Candidates, compelled to give 
gratuities to tribes other than their own in order to compete with the bribery 
                                                 
202 Veyne (1990). 
 
203 Mouritsen (2001: 35) notes the law was probably aimed at novi homines. 
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of the other candidates, employed another tier of agents, usually a friend or 
ally termed sequester or interpres, to ferry the funds to the divisor, for a 
candidate faced a certain charge of ambitus if he was caught directly handing 
funds intended for another’s tribe to a divisor.204  It has been suggested, 
however, that moral probity was a pretext, and that the ambitus laws were 
really aimed at controlling electoral competition arising from personal 
ambition and the survival instinct.205 
 
Bribery encouraged participation and was an institution in and of itself.  
Although the primary purpose of tribal headquarters, centrally located in 
Rome, was to organise voters, this function expanded over time to include 
the distribution of a cash incentive.  Tribes managed the “bribery” 
themselves. Taylor describes the imperial procedure:  
 
Through [the headquarters] men circulated (circumire tribus) to beg the 
members of the tribes for their votes.  The officials of the tribes at this time 
were the curatores tribuum, elected in the empire and presumably in the 
republic by each tribe.  There were other officers who had an important 
part in delivering the tribal vote, the divisores, whose duty was originally 
to distribute the gifts which it was legitimate for the wealthy members of 
the tribes to make to their fellow tribules.  In the late republic, when 
bribery was rampant, these divisores, gave out money provided by 
candidates for all the tribes.  Efforts to curb such donations by more and 
more severe laws on ambitus were ineffective, and bribery of the masses 
                                                 
204 See Linderski (1985) for more on the role of divisores. 
 
205 Linderski (1985: 93 f.). 
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lured to Rome by the emoluments of the ballot became a regular feature of 
the campaigns.206 
 
Bribery, then, can be added to food distribution and games as a lure to 
Rome.  As we turn to the issue of participation in elections, we need to keep 
in mind the effect of such enticements on the composition of the citizen 
body that was present and voted at elections. 
 
The degree to which the centuriate assembly favoured the vote of the tiny 
minority of extremely wealthy elite is currently under debate.  Cicero 
emphasises its plutocratic bias (Rep. 2.39).  While the centuriate assembly 
might appear to favour those in the first class because this small group of 
citizens was spread over more than its fair share of centuries, the popular 
element was more important than usually supposed.207  Yakobson notes the 
sheer size of the urban plebs, and concludes that it must have been “diverse 
enough in its social composition to provide the centuries of the first class 
with a good many voters”.208  He also points out that when our sources 
mention the presence of soldiers in Rome at elections, this equates to the 
                                                 
206 Taylor (1960: 14 f.) cites: Festus (508 L) as evidence for tribesmen coming to Rome for 
comitia when rural tribes were all in close proximity to Rome; Livy (7.1.2-3) on the law 
preventing plebeians campaigning; and Taylor (1949: Chapter 3) on the use of tribal 
headquarters to gather votes by candidates and rogatores.  See also Tatum (1999: 26 f.) on 
divisores with a note providing primary sources on aristocratic scorn of the post. 
 
207 Yakobson (1999: 11, 233). 
 
208 Yakobson (1999: 61). 
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presence of rural tribesmen, for soldiers were recruited from among 
peasants not urban proletariat.209  
 
Although this might have been affected by the migration to Rome of farmers 
who had hit hard times, for veterans were amongst this number, it also 
resulted in the presence at elections of rural tribesmen.  Hugh Last has 
argued that rural tribesmen had a marked influence on elections: poverty 
forced migration to Rome so that these additional rural tribesmen would not 
only be present dwelling in Rome, but were also mixing with the urban 
tribes in day-to-day life.  This contact with urban poor meant the rural 
tribesmen adopted their urban cousins’ interests, but on most occasions 
retained their registration in the rural tribes to which they belonged before 
moving their residence to Rome.210  These men, if in need of money and 
unethical enough, would be more ready to sell their votes to men in tribes 
other than their own.211  It was, as we have seen, only a small step from the 
traditional practice of distribution amongst a candidate’s own tribe to the 
more widespread largesse visible in the last generation of the Republic. 
 
                                                 
209 Yakobson (1999: 94). 
 
210 Last (1932: 7-9). 
 
211 Yakobson (1999: 147). 
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The author of the Commentariolum Petitionis emphasises the importance of 
the popular vote at elections: he is scornful of Antonius because he preferred 
to go overseas and plunder the innkeepers, rather than stay in Italy and 
solicit the votes of the people (populo Romano supplicare, Comment. Pet. 8).  He 
also reminds candidates of the value of rural tribesmen: the consular 
candidate should visualise the whole of Italy divided into its tribal 
divisions, and ensure he has sufficient support in every town, colony, and 
rural district, “or indeed any place in Italy”.  In order to achieve this 
widespread support the candidate is to “inquire and seek out men 
everywhere, get to know them, pursue them, secure them, see that they 
canvass their localities for you and act like candidates on your behalf” 
(Comment. Pet. 30f.). Cicero also notes their importance when he expects 
rural voters from Cisalpine Gaul to count heavily in the voting (videtur in 
suffragiis multum posse Gallia, Att. 1.1.2).  Non-elite city dwellers were 
worth courting too: “reckon up the whole city – all the collegia, pagi, 
vicinitates; if you strike a friendship with the leading men from among their 
number, you will easily, through them, secure the masses that remain” 
(Comment. Pet. 30).   
 
Political theorists hold that frequent elections are a prerequisite of 
democracy as elections offer the people the chance to oust an under-
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performing or unrepresentative government.212  The shorter the tenure, the 
more pressure on the government to keep the electorate happy.  In this 
sense, the Roman system of annual elections during the Republic was 
relatively democratic: Roman magistrates were under significant pressure to 
perform according to the desires of those who elected them.  Elections were 
held regularly and so allowed citizens ample time to schedule them in: they 
took place in July each year and would be well attended, more so than the 
tribal assemblies gathered for legislation which could be summoned at any 
time so long as the period of trinundinae had been observed.  These were 
more likely attended by those at hand, and so tended to be less 
representative of the wider citizen body.  By the end of the Republic, 
however, elections became irregular due to disprution, and so came more to 
resemble legislative assemblies in this respect. 
  
The old theory that those whose wealth derived from property enjoyed 
more power because their vote dominated the comitia centuriata assumes 
they were united, which was clearly not the case in the late Republic, as 
competition to maintain dignitas resulted in fragmentation of friendships.213 
Also, the centuriate assembly favoured the propertied citizens and 
                                                 
212 Henderson and Bellamy (2002: 75): in New Zealand “triennial elections provide for 
decisive periodic accountability.” 
 
213 For fighting for dignitas consider Caesar and his decision to cross the Rubicon, as argued 
by Gruen (1974: 496 f.)  
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especially the older voters (seniores, who were relatively few, yet were 
represented in half the first and second class centuries).  While these could 
be expected to be conservative, they did not always act conservatively in the 
election of consuls: Marius, Cinna and Caesar were all consuls that clashed 
with the conservative senators.  Yakobson offers an explanation: he notes 
how the votes of the lower orders shaped the outcome of elections and the 
preceding campaigns.  He maintains that the competition at elections was 
such that the lower classes sometimes voted.  The comitia centuriata did 
sometimes require every century’s vote to decide an election, though not in 
Cicero’s case (Leg. agr. 2.4).214  
 
In praetorian elections especially, there were sufficient candidates to allow 
most centuries to vote, hence the encouragement in the Commentariolum 
Petitionis (53) to ensure the support of each stratum of society.215  Even if 
they did not always vote, ordinary Romans had to be courted for candidates 
had to gain wide support as they never knew who would turn up to vote 
form year to year.  Yakobson’s argument has not found favour in all 
quarters, however, as he has faced criticism for ignoring the evidence that 
the last century was almost never called on to vote (Dion. Hal. 4.20.5; Livy 
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1.43.11).216  Yet the tiny amount of evidence we have fails to support either 
argument, so we should follow Tatum’s suggestion that numbers varied.217   
 
Freedmen wealthy enough to belong to the more powerful classes of the 
urban centuries may have had more clout in elections.  On the whole, 
however, their impact in the centuriate assembly was similarly small to that 
of the tribal assembly because tribal membership and property classification 
combined to dictate the century to which each citizen belonged.  Thus 
wealthy freedmen were limited to participation in 8 of the 70 elite (and most 
influential) centuries.  That there were freedmen wealthy enough to have a 
vote worth courting is clear from the Commentariolum Petitionis (29): Cicero 
ought to include among his supporters the “multi homines urbani industrii, 
multi libertini in foro gratiosi navique.” Lack of evidence has compelled 
some to speculate about the position of freedmen in the comitia centuriata, 
leading to the conclusion that “there is no evidence that freedmen were not 
registered in the appropriate classes.” 218  The state could benefit from the 
collection of taxes from the richer freedmen (until citizens were relieved of 
this responsibility in 167 BC) and freedmen could vote in elections.  The 
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Commentariolum Petitionis agains provides the evidence for freedmen’s 
influence in the centuriate assembly: if a consular candidate needed the 
support of freedmen who were ”gratiosi navique in foro” (obliging and 
energetic in the forum, 29) then some libertini must have belonged to 
influential first and second class city centuries.219 
 
As a result of the changing circumstances in the late Republic, the wealthy 
no longer dominated either the tribal or centuriate assembly.  With 
increasing numbers of farmers and veterans moving to Rome, and slaves 
winning their freedom and so gaining citizenship, the balance was tipped in 
the favour of the non-elite voter.  Therefore, each class of the populus 
Romanus could participate in Roman politics, and members of each did.   
 
So much for the workings of the traditional assemblies.  The following three 
chapters of case studies will examine the evidence for political participation 
outside the formal avenues analysed in the present chapter. 
                                                 
219 Treggiari (1969: 51).  Freedmen may have been confined to one century, that of the capite 
censi, in an earlier period, but after the state enacted the reform above it stood to gain 
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sought to restrict the power of rich freedmen. 
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CHAPTER 3:  DEMONSTRATIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION I: 
SECESSION, REFUSAL OF THE DRAFT AND MUTINY 
 
 
Few now deny the central role popular pressure played in decision-making 
during the late Republic: “Democracy did not exist in Rome, but popular 
pressure did.”220  Citizens especially played a pivotal role, and so too did 
women and non-citizens, although the fragmentary and biased nature of the 
ancient sources prevents us from getting a clear picture of their significance.  
The citizens’ ability to persuade the decision-makers that their opinion 
counted was then, as it is now, one of the most important aspects of popular 
sovereignty – even more so once we consider the popular assembly’s central 
role in the decision-making process.  In Rome, the senate was the central 
governing body, responsible for decisions regarding foreign affairs and 
redistribution of state finances; in addition it provided advice to magistrates.  
But senators did not govern alone; they shared power with the people at 
both the formal and informal levels.  Formally, the people voted bills into 
law and elected magistrates, and informally various popular groups made 
their opinion known through demonstrations.  They could also interfere in 
the areas considered the preserve of senators.  If citizens wanted their 
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material interests attended to and their libertas preserved, they needed to 
persuade the senate to introduce bills which ensured that the wealthiest 
Romans shared the benefits of empire with poorer Romans.  This meant not 
only redistribution of wealth and land won through conquest, but also the 
reasonable treatment of fellow citizens by those with imperium so that libertas 
was not compromised.  We may well discover that a different sort of 
democracy existed in Rome. 
 
In this chapter I will examine first how Roman citizens used the pressure of 
collective action to effect change in their favour via secessions, refusal of the 
draft and mutiny.  I will use these case studies as a spring board into an 
introductory analysis of the nature of popular demonstrations and the 
identity of participants, both at leadership level and below.  This analysis 
continues in the following chapters. 
 
In Chapter Four, I will move onto other forms of demonstration, through 
which they sought material assistance in the form of subsidised and 
guaranteed grain distributions, land redistribution and debt relief, along 
with the restoration of tribunicia potestas.  In Chapter Five, I will investigate 
how different elements within the populus used games (chariot races and 
theatre performances), contiones, triumphs, funerals, elections, legislative 
assemblies and trials to express their opinion and achieve their aims.  There 
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was a development, unreported by Livy, our main source for the early and 
middle Republic, from the use of military secessions and mutinies, to 
movements based more on urban elements of the population, although still 
with support from veterans and people from the countryside, towns and 
municipia. 
 
The Roman people wielded power over the senate by the latent threat of 
secession.  That is, the threat of withdrawing their military support and their 
productivity, for as not only soldiers but farmers and artisans also their 
contribution was significant.221  There were no secessions in the late 
Republic, but the danger nonetheless remained despite changes to the 
practice of recruitment.222  And, of course, mutiny was common wherever 
there was a strong sense of unity and an understanding of common interests 
frustrated.223  The five secessions recorded by our primary sources in 494, 
449, 445, 342 and 287 succeeded in a relatively peaceful manner in 
preserving libertas and strengthening plebeian rights when these were 
threatened by members of the Senate.  The plebeians showed impressive 
                                                 
221 For food shortage following the first secessio plebis, see Livy 2.34.1. 
 
222 The changes attributed to Marius meant members of the capite censi could be recruited 
should the assidui refuse, but this was far from ideal given their inexperience in comparison 
to veterans. 
 
223 See Messer (1920) for the argument that mutiny was a common occurrence in the Roman 
army, the result of a tradition of freedom of thinking and acting. 
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levels of organisation, their main method being collective bargaining 
reinforced by general strike.224  Out and out civil war was avoided, although 
only narrowly and not without violent episodes, as we shall see.   
 
Such dark and desperate times were not easily forgotten; on the contrary, 
authors during the late Republic and early Empire recalled in sombre tones 
the discordia between the orders that caused the withdrawal of plebeian 
arms.  They had themselves witnessed the disastrous effect of factional strife 
and refusal to compromise.  And it is exactly such late Republican 
contamination that we need to scrape off early developments to avoid 
distortion of the historical reality.225  No doubt we will get a different idea of 
the situation than Livy, filtering as he did his reading of the sources through 
the experiences and understanding of a man living in the days following the 
Battle of Actium, when Octavian was shaping his new Republic.  As for the 
argument that the secessions did not occur,226 while this has an impact upon 
our interpretation of the period and the development of key institutions of 
                                                 
224 See Canetti (1973: 63-66) on such “prohibition crowds.” 
 
225 See G. Forsythe (2005) and his review (BMCR 97.3.26) of T. J., Cornell, The Beginnings of 
Rome, London, 1995 and T. J. Cornell’s review (CR 29.1 (1979): 106-109) of R. M. Ogilvie, 
Early Rome and the Etruscans, London, 1976.  These two book reviews highlight the dangers 
of not taking authorial bias into account when tackling the unreliable material on the fifth 
century BC (e.g. the taint from contemporary laws and customs, and the likelihood of 
historians’ access to the Annales Maximi  even before they were published in the time of the 
Gracchi). 
 
226 Forsythe (2005: 172ff.); cf.  Cornell (1995: 256-8, 263, 265-7, 273, 276,). 
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the Roman state, it does not detract from the fact that the threat of secession, 
and indeed the threat of other forms of disharmony between the orders, 
loomed large in the minds of those living in the late Republic and early 
Empire.  Take for example the gloomy omens that accompanied 
disagreement over the first agrarian law recorded in Livy:  
 
Bellum inde Veiens initum, et Volsci rebellarunt; sed ad bella externa 
prope supererant uires, abutebanturque iis inter semet ipsos certando. 
Accessere ad aegras iam omnium mentes prodigia caelestia, prope 
cotidianas in urbe agrisque ostentantia minas; motique ita numinis 
causam nullam aliam uates canebant publice priuatimque nunc extis, 
nunc per aues consulti, quam haud rite sacra fieri; qui terrores tamen eo 
euasere ut Oppia uirgo Vestalis damnata incesti poenas dederit. (2.42.9-
11) 
 
The secessions were also used to threaten senators who opposed those 
seeking reform.  Here, Sallust has Macer remind the Quirites in 76 how their 
ancestors used secession to secure tribunes as the defenders of their rights.  
Macer’s speech aimed to rouse the plebs to take back their liberty which was 
then oppressed by the domination of the Sullan faction. 
 
Si, Quirites, parum existumaretis quid inter ius a maioribus relictum uobis 
et hoc a Sulla paratum seruitium interesset, multis mihi disserundum fuit, 
docendique quas ob iniurias et quotiens a patribus armata plebes 
secessisset utique uindices parauisset omnis iuris sui tribunos plebis. 
Nunc hortari modo relicuom est et ire primum uia qua capessundam 
arbitror libertatem. Neque me praeterit quantas opes nobilitatis solus, 
inpotens, inani specie magistratus, pellere dominatione incipiam, 
quantoque tutius factio noxiorum agat quam soli innocentes. Sed praeter 
spem bonam ex uobis, quae metum uicit, statui certaminis aduorsa pro 
libertate potiora esse forti uiro quam omnino non certauisse. (Sall. Hist. 
3.48.1-4M) 
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The use of historical exempla to persuade an audience occurs elsewhere also.  
There is evidence of a symbolic secession in the late Republic: Fulvius led 
some of C. Gracchus’ supporters to the Aventine (Plut. C. Gracc. 15; App. BC 
1.26; Livy 3.54, Per. 61), site of the second secession, which suggests that 
these Gracchans may have been trying to remind their fellow citizens of the 
dangers to the res publica of such disharmony as they were experiencing.  
The incident also prompted men to recall the origin of Gracchus’ tribunicia 
potestas and the citizens’ rights.227  Cicero similarly threatens the need for 
another secession to remind the prosecution in Murena’s trial that members 
of plebeian families now counted as well born, thanks to the efforts of their 
seceding ancestors (Cic. Pro Mur. 15). 
 
Analysis of the techniques used to encourage reform in the secessions sheds 
light on those used in the late Republic as our major source is Livy and we 
have already noted how his work is influenced by the era in which he lived.  
The first secession was in response to patrician refusal to address the debt 
crisis or, more precisely, refusal to stop abusing plebeians.228  Plebeians used 
                                                 
227 Chrissanthos (2004: 346). 
 
228 Cornell (1995: 267).  Cornell thinks that the “distinguished veteran” is a commonplace, 
perhaps modelled on a prototype from the fourth century after the institution of tributum at 
the end of the fifth, anachronistically mentioned in this story from 494 BC.  That the figure 
is based on such a recognisable stereotype lends force to the argument for his existence. 
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public oratory to recruit support, then the threat of their numbers, noisy 
disturbances, violence, refusal to enlist and, finally, secession to influence 
senatorial opinion.  Veterans as high up the hierarchy as centurions had 
become debt slaves due to the twin dangers of defending Rome from 
marauding invaders and Roman creditors.229  An unnamed ex-centurion 
addressed the people in the Forum and so inspired other debtors, all 
veterans according to Livy, to demonstrate their frustration at the punitive 
debt laws. They surrounded the senate house, Livy explains, “to oversee 
and regulate the deliberations of the senate” (Livy 2.23).  When the Volsci 
threatened to attack, the plebeians held the patricians to ransom and in a 
prelude to the first secessio plebis they said they would leave the patricians to 
fight the war against the Volsci unless the debt law was revised (Livy 2.24).   
 
Was there even a debt crisis?  Scholars have expressed the view that the 
problem of debt was created to explain the origin of the secession, since the 
issue does not appear again for some time after the first secession. The other 
possibility is that the record for the period is defective. The most sensible 
answer to the problem has been suggested by Cornell, who, after weighing 
up these two options, favours the defective evidence theory: there must 
have been a debt crisis as the conditions for one existed and the prominence 
                                                 
229 See below also for the centurion freed by Manlius Capitolinus (Livy, 6.14.3-8), who 
specifically placed the blame for his state of penury on usury, as interest piled up on his 
loan during his absence from home while fighting and then rebuilding his house (6.14.7). 
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of the issue in the Twelve Tables confirms the persistence of the problem.230  
Our sources’ failure to preserve the record of an issue does not preclude the 
existence of that issue. 
 
The popular reaction to the debt crisis forced the senate to act.  Such a 
united instance of collective action could not be combated by force, so 
senators sought a peaceful resolution.  The senate appeased the debtors, 
who enlisted immediately, by persuading the consul Servilius, “whose 
temperament was more in tune with popular feeling” than his colleague’s, 
to pass an edict, which he issued to the people assembled in an informal 
contio.  The edict stated that: “no Roman could be held in chains or 
prevented from participating in the levy, nor any soldier have his property 
sold or his descendents interfered with” (Livy 2.24.6).  But his fellow consul 
Appius Claudius continued to pass harsh judgements on debtors (Livy 
2.27.1).  Servilius was powerless to help the people because all the nobles 
supported Appius.  So, with no prospect of help from the consuls or senate, 
the plebs took action and obstructed the consul’s judgments by making an 
uproar.  They also resorted to violence, beating up creditors (Livy 2.27.8-9), 
equestrians, patricians and lictors (Dion. Hal. 6.34).  In these ways Roman 
                                                 
230 Cornell (1995: 267) asks why debt drops off the radar after the first secession and posits 
these two possibilities. 
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citizens outside the senate made their displeasure at magisterial 
intransigence known. 
 
The power struggle between populus and magistrates continued when the 
new consuls took office in 494 BC.  The plebs began to gather nightly on the 
Aventine and Esquiline hills, worried that these consuls too would ignore 
their plea for debt reform.  Members of the plebs then refused to respond to 
the consuls when the latter tried to conduct the levy, insisting the senate 
adhere to its promise from the previous year to outlaw enslavement of 
citizens due to debt (Livy 2.27-28).  They returned to fight the invading 
Aequi, Sabines and Volscians after the senate appointed a dictator, Manius 
Valerius, who resolved the stalemate with the promise of an end to debt 
bondage; he passed an edict based on the one issued by the consul Servilius 
the year before (Livy 2.28-30; Dion. Hal. 6.39-42.1).  In the end the senate 
reneged on its deal, so Valerius resigned (Livy 2.31; Dion. Hal. 6.44) and the 
plebs withdrew to the mons Sacer under the leadership of Sicinius, who 
convinced them to secede rather than kill the consuls.  Menenius Agrippa, 
himself a member of the plebs, convinced them to return to the city using 
the parable of body parts working together; for the disaffection of the plebs 
caused the civic body to waste away, just as the body wasted away when 
limbs and internal organs refused to cooperate (Livy 2.32; Dion. Hal. 6.83-
86).  In this way harmony was restored and a new magistracy created to 
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protect citizens from unfair treatment by curule magistrates: two (or five) 
tribuni plebis were given ius auxilii (the right to aid citizens in distress).  In 
addition the lex sacrata was carried, making the tribunes inviolable: anyone 
harming a tribune faced the death penalty (Livy 2.33; Dion. Hal. 6.87-90). 
 
Some have doubted the existence of this first secession, yet we must verify 
its existence to justify our argument that secession was a means of effective 
popular demonstration.  The reasons for rejecting the event include the 
appearance of the tribunate as a fully formed office when it most likely 
developed over time, retrojection of powers dating from the time of the 
Gracchi, conflation of people, etymological connections interpreted literally 
(for instance, the plebeians’ withdrawal to mons Sacer is derived from the lex 
sacrata), and topoi lifted from Greek history.231  Yet this hesitation seems 
exaggerated: the tribunate as described by Livy is created with only two 
powers: the proactive right to intervene on behalf of plebeians (ius auxilii) 
and its defensive status as magistratus sacrosanctus (2.33.1) – hardly the full 
arsenal the office later came to possess.232  There is also criticism of the 
rationale in Livy’s story, claiming it is illogical to explain the creation of 
                                                 
231 Forsythe (2005: 171-176).  Gabba (1991: 85) likewise notes that Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus projected certain topics of historiography from the first century B.C. back to 
the fifth, such as the debt problem. 
 
232 Cornell (1995: 259 f.) agrees: he traces, for example, the development of the tribunician 
intercessio. 
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tribunician ius auxilii in response to the debt crisis when it is obvious from 
the Twelve Tables that tribunes could not intervene to save debtors.233  This 
contradiction might be explained if we consider the hiatus of 44 years 
between the creation of the tribunate and the codification of the laws.  By 
the time the Twelve Tables were set down the power of the tribunes to aid 
citizens had been refined, as often happens in practice.   
 
While some may have their doubts, no one can deny that the record of the 
incident in 494 is nonetheless important for the attitudes to the threat of 
secession it reveals.  Livy reports the atmosphere of fear and desire for 
reconciliation:  
 
Pauor ingens in urbe, metuque mutuo suspensa erant omnia. Timere 
relicta ab suis plebis uiolentiam patrum; timere patres residem in urbe 
plebem, incerti manere eam an abire mallent: quamdiu autem tranquillam 
quae secesserit multitudinem fore? Quid futurum deinde si quod 
externum interim bellum exsistat? Nullam profecto nisi in concordia 
ciuium spem reliquam ducere; eam per aequa, per iniqua reconciliandam 
ciuitati esse. (2.32.5-7)234   
 
                                                 
233 Forsythe (2005: 173). 
 
234 “A great panic seized the city, mutual distrust led to a state of universal suspense.  Those 
plebeians who had been left by their comrades in the city feared violence from the 
patricians; the patricians feared the plebeians who still remained in the city, and could not 
make up their minds whether they would rather have them go or stay. `How long,' it was 
asked, `would the multitude who had seceded remain quiet? What would happen if a 
foreign war broke out in the meantime?' They felt that all their hopes rested on concord 
amongst the citizens, and that this must be restored at any cost.” 
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And so Livy expresses the desire for concordia in terms that his 
contemporaries in the late Republic and early Empire understood.  Cicero 
immediately springs to mind, with his obsession with achieving concordia 
between the senatorial and equestrian orders. 
 
The plebs demonstrated their frustration at further magisterial refusal to 
respect their recently won rights and withdrew their services in a second 
major incident.  This second secession was provoked by the refusal to step 
aside of the tyrannical second decemivirate appointed to draw up the last of 
the Twelve Tables.  Livy (3.34) passes quickly over the first board of ten set 
up to codify the law.  The little he relates, however, is interesting for its 
democratic flavour: the decemvirs address the populus in contione and 
encourage the citizens to go away and discuss the laws so that they could be 
emended to reflect popular opinion prior the vote in the centuriate 
assembly.235  He focuses instead upon the conflict between the decemvirs, 
senate and plebeians.  Although a second ten men were appointed to 
complete the final two tables (perhaps to address the issue of limiting 
consular imperium, on which see below), popular rights were instead eroded 
further: the decemvirs acted like tyrants under the leadership of Appius 
                                                 
235 Forsythe (2005: 213) suggests that the Twelve Tables provided codification of laws 
hitherto interpreted by the pontiffs.  The laws offered, amongst other rights, limited 
protection from the harshness of debt bondage.  As Cornell (1995: 282) notes, while this still 
allowed for some rough treatment by today’s standards, regulation of punishment was 
preferable to arbitrary action. 
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Claudius.  They intimidated the plebeians, and at first also senators, with 
their lictors’ rods and axes, even removing the right of appeal (3.35), and 
stripped tribunes of their powers, scourging and beheading those who tried 
to stand in their way (3.36-37).  This provided the motivation for the second 
secession.  The decemvirs were so detestable that the plebeians longed to 
return to the days of the consuls of whose powers they had just recently 
been so critical.  The plebeians also believed that the senate had betrayed 
them and answered the summons of privati (for the decemvirs’ term of office 
had ended) to assemble and advise them on how to deal with the war 
against Sabines and Aequi (3.38).  Senior senators hoped that the war and 
push to replace decemvirs with consuls would make the soldiers and 
plebeians forget about the restoration of tribunes’ powers (3.41).  But they 
were not so easily distracted: the first mention of secession came from L. 
Siccius.  He was, however, assassinated before he could convince the 
soldiers with whom he campaigned to mutiny.  He had secretly suggested 
the election of tribunes and a secessio (3.43).  But what really inspired the 
soldiers and city dwellers alike was Verginius’ appeal following Appius 
Claudius’ outrageous treatment of Verginia.  Verginius was a highly 
esteemed soldier, which may have helped attract the following of 400 men 
who accompanied him to the camp; that and the disgust they felt at Appius’ 
enslavement of the girl (3.44-50).  And so the soldiers occupied the 
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Aventine, demanding the return of libertas, the election of tribunes and that 
L. Valerius Potitus and M. Horatius mediate an agreement (3.50.13-16).   
 
The combined pressure of the secession and the newly elected tribunes of 
soldiers,236 compelled the senate to act.  Senatorial decrees were passed 
dissolving the decemvirate, providing for the election of tribunes of the 
plebs and giving amnesty to those who had seceded (3.54).  The liberatores 
Valerius and Horatius were elected consuls and set about righting the state 
through the passage of a raft of laws granting significant concessions to 
plebeians: by the leges Valeriae-Horatiae plebiscites were binding on the 
whole people, the plebeians’ ius provocationis and ius auxilii were restored 
and strengthened, everyone was reminded of the sacrosanctity of tribunes, 
and plebeian aediles were given the responsibility of caring for decrees of 
the senate in the temple of Ceres (Livy 3.55; Cic. Rep. 2.54; Brut. 54).237 
 
Forsythe is skeptical of the historicity of the second secession.  As in the first 
secession he finds there are too many parallels and coincidences which point 
                                                 
236 These military tribunes were appointed for the first time at Verginius’ suggestion to 
provide leadership for the soldiers, along with another ten elected by the army sent against 
the Sabines, two of whom were then elected to direct affairs on behalf of the soldiers (Livy 
3.51).  Some would query the historicity of this episode, supposing it aetiological.  Yet every 
office has an origin, and military tribunes were undoubtedly created to help commanders 
organise soldiers. 
 
237 For plebeian aediles as archivists, see Cornell (1995: 263 f.). 
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to our sources confusing these with other events: the second secession once 
more involved an Appius Claudius; a Valerius and a Horatius were the first 
ever tribunes in 509; and the demise of second decemvirate reminds 
Forsythe of the overthrow of the 30 tyrants at Athens.238  Yet in other cases 
he dismisses incidents as unlikely because they are unparalleled, including 
the conflict of the orders.239  He also believes the Valerio-Horatian law of 449 
reinstating the right of appeal was redundant given that the right was 
already stipulated in the Twelve Tables.240  A final qualm he has regards the 
original unsuccessful rogation of 462 (and the ensuing years of pressure) 
which Livy records was motivated by the desire to control consular power 
                                                 
238 Forsythe (2005: 222).   
 
239 Forsythe claims the conflict of the orders was unparalled and so unlikely to have 
occurred, in his review of Cornell (1995) in BMCR 97.3.26 : “On p.265 [Cornell] significantly 
observes: "The plebeian movement was a remarkable phenomenon, as far as we know 
without parallel in the history of the ancient city-state." The mere fact that according to the 
modern orthodox interpretation the struggle of the orders was otherwise unparalleled in 
the ancient world should immediately set off alarm bells and arouse grave doubts as to its 
historical validity.”  Another unparallelled and therefore unlikely occurrence is the seven 
Fabian consulships (Forsythe 2005: 195).   Forsythe’s inconsistent theory that discounts both 
examples with and without parallels has been noted by Filippo Canali De Rossi in his 
review of Forsythe (BMCR 2005.08.40).  Ogilvie (1965: 451 ff.), noting late Republican 
anachronisms (454), suggests that we should not believe all the detail, but that the 
substance of the decemvirate is historical.  See also Mitchell (1992) for a novel, and now 
widely discredited, theory as to why the Conflict of the Orders was made up. 
 
240 Forsythe (2005: 230ff.) also notes laws on the plebiscites were passed 3 times: 449 (Livy 
3.55.3), 339 (Livy 8.12.15)  and 287 (Pliny NH 16.37 , Gaius Inst. 1.3, and Gell. 15.27.4), 
concluding that the correct formula is that found in the Twelve Tables (ut quod tributim 
plebes iussisset populum teneret, Livy 8.12.15), the rest misinterpretations.  But I find it 
more likely, with Cornell (1995: 277 f.), that these were not copies but reenactments 
introducing modifications: after 449 plebiscites may still have been subject to auctoritas 
patrum or a vote of the comitia populi.  The subsequent laws worked at removing these 
restrictions.  
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(Livy 3.9.1-5).  Yet no clause related to imperium appears in the Twelve 
Tables.   
 
Forsythe solves the mystery by suggesting that the decemviri composed the 
laws “with” rather than “concerning” consular imperium.241  But this does 
not explain the extended efforts of the tribunes A. Verginius and M. 
Volscius Fictor who were elected five times in succession (461-457 BC) to 
deal with the issue (Livy 3.11-14, 3.21, 3.24-25, 3.29-30).  It is more likely that 
the situtation had changed by the time of the second decemvirate.  Back in 
462 the plebeians had sought to limit consular power, but after the outrages 
of the second decemvirate their aims had become less ambitious: they now 
wanted to restore their libertas and see the election of tribuni plebis once 
more.  Indeed, the limit on consular power was still hinted at by Livy as late 
as 451 BC: the plebeians sought to appoint a second commission of 
decemvirs because they loathed the name of “consul” as much as that of 
“king” (3.34).   
 
The second secession was over the issue of abuse of power, only in the end it 
was not consular abuse, but decemviral.  By 449 the extra-legal plebeian 
union set up in the early fifth century no longer had to rely on self-help and 
                                                 
 
241 Forsythe (2005: 202). 
 
133 
unilateral action as it had begun to be integrated with state institutions.  
Later, the influence of plebeian innovation was such that the patricians even 
began to imitate plebeian offices and assemblies.  From 447 quaestors were 
elected to assist consuls.  Thus, just as the plebs appointed aediles to assist 
the tribunes, so too now patricians had two sets of magistrates.  At the same 
time the patricians set up their own tribal assembly, the comitia tributa, to 
elect these quaestors and later curule aediles (from 367).242 
 
Florus alone records the existence of a third secession in 445 B.C.: “qui 
tumultus in monte Ianiculo duce Canuleio tribuno plebis exarsit” (1.17).  
Livy notes only a refusal to enlist but goes into much greater detail than 
Florus the epitomator.  It is likely Florus mistook this refusal for a full scale 
secession.  The incident deserves analysis nonetheless for the light it sheds 
on the plebeians’ technique.  This time agitation was based not on debt as in 
the past, but on status issues: for the restoration of the right to intermarry243 
and for ”the people to elect consuls from the plebeians or the patricians as 
                                                 
242 Cornell (1995: 265 with n. 91) notes that the source for quaestors (Tac. Ann. 11.22) dates 
their origin to the regal period, though this may have been a different sort of quaestor. 
 
243 The most likely explanation of this abrupt volte-face is that the ban on intermarriage, 
designed by patricians to deter wealthy non-patricians from going over to the plebeian side 
or by plebieans to prevent integration, was opposed by moderate patricians and plebeian 
leaders with political aspirations (Cornell 1995: 292).  Forsythe (2005: 225-229) queries 
Livy’s account of the ban on intermarriage but is not clear on why he objects – he seems not 
to like the idea because Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus used different sources.  He 
concludes the law may have referred to the intermarriage of priests (interpreted as 
patricians) with plebeians.   
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they chose” (Livy 4.2).  The consuls tried to distract the plebeians with the 
old subterfuge of exaggerated reports of war and necessity for a levy, but 
this was refused by the tribune C. Canuleius who argued that: “It was 
useless for the consuls to hold out threats in the hope of distracting the 
attention of the plebs from the proposed law; as long as he was alive they 
should never hold a levy until the plebs had adopted the measures brought 
forward by himself and his colleagues” (Livy 4.1.6).  He at once addressed a 
contio, concluding with a threat to refuse the levy: “no one is going to take 
up arms, no one is going to fight for domineering masters with whom they 
have in public life no partnership in honours, and in private life no right of 
intermarriage” (Livy 4.5.6).  When the patricians agreed to legalise 
intermarriage and ignored the request for the consulship to be opened to the 
plebeians, the tribunes obstructed the levy (Livy 4.6.5).  The tribunes and 
plebs were satisfied when the senate offered them the right to stand for the 
newly instituted office of military tribune with consular powers, at which 
point Livy moralises:  
 
Euentus eorum comitiorum docuit alios animos in contentione libertatis 
dignitatisque, alios secundum deposita certamina incorrupto iudicio esse; 
tribunos enim omnes patricios creavit populus, contentus eo quod ratio 
habita plebeiorum esset. Hanc modestiam aequitatemque et altitudinem 
animi ubi nunc in uno inueneris, quae tum populi universi fuit? (4.6.11-
12).244   
                                                 
244 “The result of the election showed that when men are contending for liberty and the 
right to hold office their feelings are different from what they are when the contest is over 
and they can form an unbiased judgment. The people were satisfied now that votes were 
allowed for plebeians, and they elected none but patricians. Where in these days will you 
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As Livy’s eyes were clearly wet with nostalgia here, we should probably not 
believe that every one of the plebeians was as happy as he makes them out 
to be when he says that having won the chance to vote for plebeians, they 
elected patricians instead.  Indeed, in little over one hundred years, the lex 
Genucia (below) legalised the election of two plebeian candidates to the 
consulship, indicating continuing plebeian discontent at patrician monopoly 
of the office.   
 
The refusal to gather for the levy in 445 highlights the effectiveness of this 
form of collective action: the tribunes needed the support of the plebs, and 
so organised the plebs to refuse to undertake military service, with the result 
that the tribunes achieved their end.  First the right to intermarry was 
reinstated.  This was certainly to the advantage of the wealthy plebeians, not 
their poor cousins, for with the passage of this bill the rich and powerful 
plebeians were once more able to marry into prestigious patrician families.  
The right of these same upper class plebeians to hold the consulship took 
longer to achieve, and was only grudgingly conceded in a diluted measure 
allowing plebeians to stand for the office of military tribune with consular 
                                                                                                                                         
find in a single individual the moderation, fairness, and loftiness of mind which then 
characterised the people as a whole?”  On intermarriage measure see Cic. Rep. 2.63; Livy 
4.1.1 – 6.4; Flor. 1.17; Ampel. 25.3. On the right to hold the consulship: Livy 4.1.1-7.1; Dion. 
Hal. 11.53.1-61.3.  See also Livy 4.1.1, 7.3; Diod. 12.31.1; Dion. Hal. 11.53.1. 
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power.  This concession was of benefit to both the wealthy and poor 
plebeians: the wealthy gained the advantage of holding the highest office, 
and the poor the right to vote for who the wanted to elect, rather than being 
limited by the family candidates belonged to. 
 
In 342 BC soldiers threatened to secede and staged a successful mutiny over 
debt and patrician domination of the senate (Livy 7.38-42; Dion. Hal. 15.3.5-
15). During the Samnite wars soldiers stationed at Capua had mutinied over 
land and debt, claiming they objected to defending a city whose population 
lazed about benefitting from the fertility of the Campanian soil.  These 
soldiers wanted good land such as the Capuans possessed, rather than 
returning to the harsh debt laws at Rome.  This was no minor military affair: 
the soldiers were marching on Rome suo impetu, not on the impetus of any 
dux.  The matter was considered sufficiently serious that the senate named 
M. Valerius Corvus dictator, and he saved the day by passing the measures 
requested by the mutineers.  Livy also comments on the severity of the 
situation: “If all these concessions were really made it is quite clear that the 
revolt possessed considerable strength” (7.42.2).245  The measures to which 
                                                 
245 Forsythe (2005: 272) calls the sedition fictitious because Livy’s narrative mentions both 
the dictator and the consuls as ending the mutiny but he seems overly sceptical as the 
section of Livy to which he refers (7.42) is added at the end and forms a summary of other 
versions of the event, with the conclusion: “adeo nihil praeterquam seditionem fuisse 
eamque compositam inter antiquos rerum auctores constat” (7.42.7).  Oakley agrees with 
Livy that “there was some sedition” based on this quote, but doubts the details are correct 
(1998: 363; 362-365 for discussion; 383-388 on the Genucian laws). 
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Livy refers were passed by the tribune L. Genucius and consisted of: “a 
measure declaring usury illegal, whilst other resolutions were adopted 
forbidding any one to accept re-election to the same office in less than ten 
years or fill two offices in the same year, and also that both consuls might 
legally be elected from the plebs” (Livy 7.42.1-2).  When agitation occurred 
in camp, the consul in charge of the army in Campania, C. Marcius Rutilius, 
used the old divide-and-conquer ruse: the mutiny was solved in part by 
sending some ring-leaders on furlough, others on special missions, and 
retiring others from service (Livy 7.39).  Magistrates had an established 
tradition of using warfare and colonisation to distract the seditious elements 
from civil unrest: to alleviate tension they could declare war on 
neighbouring territories and send out colonists to conquered areas,246  but 
this may be the first time they used the trick of dispersing soldiers far and 
wide in this particularly diverse way.  
 
The summary of Livy for 287 BC records the bare outline of the fifth and 
final secession: “Plebs propter aes alienum post graves et longas seditiones 
ad ultimum secessit in Ianiculum, unde a Q. Hortensio dictatore deducta est. 
(Isque in ipso magistratu decessit.)” (Per. 11; Plin. NH 16.37).  Q. Hortensius 
                                                 
 
246 Dionysius 6.43; 7.12-13.  Garnsey (1988: 180) likewise notes Rome’s leaders preferred to 
send men to war who would otherwise have stirred up trouble in the city in response to 
food or debt crises. 
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won the plebs over by introducing a bill granting plebiscites the force of 
law, thus making them binding on plebeians and patricians alike:  
 
In eodem Laeli Felicis libro haec scripta sunt: "Is qui non universum 
populum, sed partem aliquam adesse iubet, non "comitia", sed 
"concilium" edicere debet. Tribuni autem neque advocant patricios neque 
ad eos referre ulla de re possunt. Ita ne "leges" quidem proprie, sed 
"plebisscita" appellantur, quae tribunis plebis ferentibus accepta sunt, 
quibus rogationibus ante patricii non tenebantur, donec Q. Hortensius 
dictator eam legem tulit, ut eo iure, quod plebs statuisset, omnes Quirites 
tenerentur. (Gell. 15.27.4)247 
 
As noted, this is the third law on the strength of the plebiscite, with one 
building upon the other.  The contribution of the Lex Hortensia is perhaps 
that the concilium plebis gained the right to instruct any citizens including 
patrician magistrates.248  
 
Debt provided the stimulus for the final secession of the plebs in 287 that 
gave rise to the Lex Hortensia.249  Yet it appears the lex opened no floodgate 
of radical popular legislation.  Instead, so the argument goes, it was a 
triumph of the patricio-plebeian oligarchy because they kept in their hands 
the means of legislation while getting rid of the last vestiges of patrician 
                                                 
247 Also “ut plebiscita universum populum tenerent” (Gaius, Inst. 1.3). 
 
248 Millar (1989: 143). 
 
249 See Hölkeskamp (2004b: 49-83, esp. 78-81) for the argument that the lex included no debt 
relief because those drafting the bill considered the matter too inflammatory; the fear was 
that a clause on debt relief would scuttle the chance for reform in other areas. 
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obstruction.250  But with so few sources extant for this period it is difficult to 
draw such concrete conclusions.  There may have been laws passed through 
the concilium plebis the record of which has not survived.  If so, the plebs 
were legislating well before the most famous early victory of popular 
sovereignty in the legislative assembly, namely Flaminius’ reform in 232 BC. 
  
Between 494 and 287 BC plebeians used secession, resistance to the draft 
and mutiny to gain improvements in their rights and in defence of their 
freedom.  Ambitious plebeians then used the break-away plebeian 
movement to successfully challenge the patrician monopoly on office-
holding and ultimately assimilate themselves into a new nobility.  It was 
perhaps this group that benefitted most in terms of increase in political 
power during this period, yet there is no denying the material 
improvements gained by all plebeians: the abolition of nexum, the 
introduction of punishment for usury and the chance to gain land in a 
colony or viritane allotment are some examples.  These benefits brought 
them closer to libertas and escape from the yoke of elite domination. 
 
We see trends developing in the methods used to achieve plebeian aims, 
trends which also appear in late Republican protests.  Demonstrations were 
                                                 
250 Cornell (1995: 344), citing with favour Hölkeskamp and Eder. 
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organised by leaders from among the plebeians, some of whom were ex-
soldiers, such as the old former centurion who inspired the prelude to the 
first secession; others  were active soldiers such as those who arranged the 
mutiny in 342 that resulted in the piggy-back legislation of the Lex Genucia.  
In this a proposal aimed at benefitting debtors was tied to others in favour 
of the plebeian elite who wanted magistracies to be shared more evenly 
among the aristocracy.  Other leaders were civilian, for instance the tribune 
Canuleius who led his colleagues to bar the levy in 445 BC (as above). 
 
As we have seen, tribunician obstruction of the draft was witnessed often in 
the earlier Republic, where it was used as a method to force patricians to 
agree to demands for land, food, the right to intermarriage, access to the 
consulship and protection against the imperium of consuls.  In another early 
example from 483 BC, the tribune C. Maenius tried to make the senate hold 
true to a promise of land allotments by preventing the consuls from holding 
a levy, but the consuls circumvented him by moving the recruitment to the 
Campus Martius, thus placing the plebs beyond the orbit of the tribunes’ ius 
auxilii (Dion. Hal. 8.87.4ff.).251  Resistance to the draft occured also in the 
second century, but for another reason: unrelenting and unattractive foreign 
                                                 
251 Pompey and Crassus got around the veto of tribunes likewise in 55 (Dio 39.39). 
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wars.252  In 151 tribunes threw the consuls Lucullus and Albinus into prison 
when they “dilectum severe agerent nec quemquam gratia dimitterent” – the 
tribunes had sought exemption from service for amici (Livy Per. 48) and men 
were so reluctant to enlist that recruits were chosen by lot for the first time 
ever (App. Ib. 49).253  Again in 138 Scipio Nasica and his colleague were 
hauled off to prison when they opposed the demands of two tribunes to 
release men from service (Liv. Per. 55; Cic. Leg. 3.20).254  Consuls were also 
imprisoned in 119, 91 and 60.  Threats of imprisonment were made in 59 and 
55 – and a censor was threatened in 109.   
 
Lily Ross Taylor has examined these incidents in her 1962 study “The 
Forerunners of the Gracchi”, in which she rightly suggests that there was no 
period of quiescence between 287 and 133 BC, with tribunician activity 
                                                 
252 Taylor (1962: 21) suggests men did not want to got to Spain because “it was too far away 
and service lasted too long”, adding that there was also less chance of booty compared to 
the more lucrative areas of Carthage, Macedon and Greece.  She bases these claims 
regarding  the lack of recruits in 154 on complaints made in 184. 
 
253 Brunt (1971a: 391 ff.)  
 
254 Taylor (1962: 26, n. 42) calls one of these tribunes, Curiatius (Cicero’s  “lowest and foulest 
of all mankind” (Leg. 3.20)), an effective agitator.  The evidence for such as claim is sparse, 
due to very little material surviving on Curiatius.  But he did address the consuls at a contio 
to try to make them introduce a motion before the senate to reduce the price of grain by 
sending legates out for its procurement, only to be defeated by Nasica who successfully 
won the plebs over by appealing to his  superior knowledge of what was good for the res 
publica (Val. Max. 3.7.3).  Indeed Nasica enjoyed considerable popular support; for when he 
was led off to prison it was popular pressure (precibus populi) that resulted in the remittance 
of his fines (Livy, Per. 55).  Curiatius (inridens) gave P. Cornelius Nasica the cognomen 
Serapio (Livy, Per. 55; a servilis apellatio because he resembled a sacrifical assistant of that 
name: Val. Max. 9.14.3). 
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peaking for the period in the eighteen years before Tiberius’ tribunate.255  
Although extra efforts were made to reach agreement in times of national 
emergency, such as with the unpopular bill for enrolling youths under 
seventeen passed when Hannibal was laying waste to the Italian 
countryside (Livy 25.5), in overseas wars tribunes were still actively 
defending the interests of the plebs in the face of conservative, status-quo-
adhering, opposition.  Taylor may be overstating her case when she 
emphasises the ”revolutionary character of the tribune’s forcible 
interference with the draft” – she herself acknowledges that modern 
historians have not interpreted the tribunes’ actions as anything out of the 
ordinary (bearing in mind that this article was published in 1962).  Taylor 
quotes Smith as the extreme point of view: the tribunes “acted in a 
constitutional and proper way”, for they operated within the limits of the ius 
auxilii – it was their job to protect the people.256  Yet Taylor would argue that 
the imprisonment of consuls who were trying to conduct a levy was an 
infringement of consular imperium – an act more serious than the passage of 
legislation without senatorial authority.257  Her theory that seditious 
tribunes existed before the Gracchi has been criticised by Badian because she 
                                                 
255 Taylor (1962: 22) records twenty three “episodes of the tribunate” in these eighteen years, 
compared to only one episode (of doubtful authenticity) between 166 and 152. 
 
256 Taylor (1962: 19) with n. 3, citing Smith (1955: 177). 
 
257 Taylor (1962: 26f.). 
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fails “to recognise the important differences that made their activities trivial 
and temporary.”  The significance of the Gracchi lies in their drawing 
“wider circles into the framework of Republican politics.”258  Taylor’s study, 
while making a strong case for tribunician independence and sustained 
activity in the so-called “quiescent” period, does indeed appear to have 
exaggerated the seditious element.259 
 
Whenever compulsion is used to recruit soldiers some will refuse to fight.  
Conscription was clearly still in force in the late Republic, especially when 
large numbers of men were required.260 The reaction of Cinna’s troops 
indicates the existence of forced recruitment, and its unpopularity.  These 
men, levied from amongst new citizens, killed Cinna in 84 BC.  The exact 
circumstances are unclear: his death may have been the result of a scuffle 
that broke out (App. BC 1.78), but we should attribute some of the soldiers’ 
hostility to their being unwilling recruits, or at least unwilling to kill fellow 
citizens in a civil war.  The evidence is as patchy as it is dependent on 
partisan sources, but there are signs that refusal to fight were still used to 
                                                 
258 Badian (1972a: 669).  His criticism is aimed also at Astin, Scullard and others.  Taylor 
(1962: 27) does, to her credit, note that the tribunes in her study lacked the comprehensive 
programmes of the Gracchi. 
 
259 Taylor (1962: 27) does indeed water down her earlier claims in her conclusion when she 
states that, with the exception of the imprisonment of the consuls in 151 and 138, 
tribunician acts were not revolutionary, but their repeated interference in state affairs 
marked them out as forerunners of the Gracchi. 
 
260 On conscription as common in the late Republic see Brunt (1971a: 408-410) who states 
that “we can safely assume that conscription was in general use.” 
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express discontent in the late Republic.  Individuals refused to fight: during 
the Social War, C. Vettienus’ punishment was the confiscation of his 
property and he was put in chains for the rest of his life.  He had rendered 
himself unable to serve when he cut off fingers so he could not hold a 
weapon (Val. Max. 6.3.3).  In 67 the lex Gabinia gave Pompey the power to 
levy troops to deal with the pirate problem (Plut. Pomp. 25).  There were 
certainly plenty of levies held in preparation for the war between the 
supporters of Caesar and Pompey.  Cicero notes with concern the reluctance 
of men to respond to the levy, claiming they have no stomach to fight (Att. 
7.13.2), and laments the brutality of the levies carried out in preparation for 
the civil war (Att. 9.19.1).  While civil wars may create exceptional 
circumstances, fighting between armies of Roman citizens was the condition 
of the late Republic, and so these examples can not be excluded as atypical. 
 
And so Roman Quirites used the three tactics of threat of withdrawal from 
war, refusal to enlist and mutiny to make the senate sit up and pay attention 
to their demands.  Progress was sometimes slow, such as the development 
of protection from creditors (still an issue in the late Republic).  But no 
matter how long it took and how often bills were defeated, advances were 
made.  Raaflaub bases his belief in the historical core of the Struggle of the 
Orders on the evidence of critical social and economic conditions, the 
inevitable conflict between patrician and plebeians as social groups and 
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comparison to parallels in other archaic societies.261  It was these conditions 
that the citizens of Rome reacted to in the early Republic, conditions which 
persisted throughout the Republic and on into the next millennium. 
 
 
THE NATURE OF POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS 
 
Popular pressure employed both violent and peaceful methods. One form of 
popular expression was demonstrating, which on occasion turned to rioting 
or mass violence.  Not all demonstrations degenerated in this way, however.  
From the experience of the secessions and challenges to its authority 
described above, the senate was aware of what elements from within the 
populus Romanus could do if the senate failed to respect their wishes.  The 
people could resort to the ultimate motivator: the threat of sheer weight of 
numbers.  If violent means were to be employed, the number of supporters, 
levels of organisation and efficacy of weapons needed to overwhelm those 
of the opposition.  Popular pressure kept senators in line with the threat of 
violent removal: a man might be lynched by a mob of disgruntled citizens or 
ripped apart by angry creditors, as happened to the praetor Asellio in 89.262   
                                                 
261 Raaflaub (1993: 131). 
 
262 Brunt (1966: 18) traces the progress of violence.  On Asellio see Livy Per. 74; Val. Max. 
9.7.4; App. BC 1.54. 
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Yet peaceful pressure often sufficed.  Public disturbances were unusual, but 
increased during the late Republic.  Vanderbroeck finds 68 out of 92 
instances of collective behaviour between 78 and 49 BC involved violence.263  
Even though the majority of episodes of collective behaviour involved some 
kind of violence, their preponderance over more peaceful demonstrations 
may be the result of historians keeping a record of the more exciting, and 
therefore more noteworthy, violent examples, rather than the dull successes 
won in the Forum.  Accounts of a small number of these less racy episodes 
have survived thanks to the publication of Cicero’s speeches, letters and 
philosophical treatises.  Indeed the random reasons for the survival of the 
historical record for this period should make us hesitate to draw conclusions 
regarding what were even the most common aims.   
 
Demonstrations aimed at expressing popular opinion took numerous forms.  
Men shouted, jeered and applauded at public meetings, trials and shows.  
Supporters displayed posters of favoured candidates in the lead up to 
elections.264  Graffiti were scrawled on the tribunal to encourage Brutus to 
take action against the tyranny of Caesar (Plut. Brut. 10) and pamphlets 
                                                 
263 Vanderbroeck (1987: 218-267).  The list, however, is not exhaustive, as Tatum (1990: 105 
n. 8) notes: one example excluded was when Curio was cheered while Fulfius Calenus was 
harassed by jeering (Att. 2.18.1). 
 
264 Dessau 6412a, 6412e , 6418d. 
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scattered about the Forum stating that it was Ptolemy's wish to have 
Pompey as a commander instead of Spinther (Plut. Pomp. 49.6).265  Members 
of the aristocracy also had a couple of tricks designed to elicit a response 
from the crowd.  Caesar revived the practice of displaying imagines (ancestor 
masks) of Marius during Julia’s funeral procession in 69.  In the process he 
increased his popularity amongst the people who applauded him for 
returning the honours due to Marius – when some (unidentified) others 
expressed their disapproval, the People shouted them down (Plut. Caes. 5.1-
2).266  A similar technique can be seen when the prosecution displayed the 
imago of Saturninus at a contio before Rabirius’ trial in 63 in order to remind 
those assembled that the tribune had been the victim of a SCU (Cic. Rab. 
Perd. 25).  Cicero had already made his play for popular sentimental support 
by expertly manipulating the crowd, first whipping them into a frenzy, then 
calming them down (Cic. Rab. Perd. 18).267 
 
                                                 
265 Gregory (1994: 93) suggests slogans and graffiti provide evidence of demonstrators’ re-
appropriation of power (through the formulation of specific written messages) from the 
official messages designed to exercise power over spectators. 
 
266 Flower (1996: 124) notes how Caesar not only advertised his family’s achievements, but 
also his own political programme.  See also Gregory (1994:89) on the use of images to  
“make and reinforce particular political messages” and (84) on political ‘theatre’ at funerals. 
 
267 On the event in general (with none of the above detail from Cicero) see Dio 37.26-27.  
Vanderbroeck (1987: 231) mistakenly believes this is the only time that the author of a 
speech recorded the public reaction – see also Cicero’s speech against Rullus’ agrarian 
proposal in which he acknowledges interaction with his audience: “I see someone who 
confirms that the will was made” (Leg. Agr  2.41).  Similarly, it seems that the crowd 
murmurs a response: “It seems to me your feelings are moved a little” (2.49, after rousing 
the people with references to Rullus selling off land won by the ancestors). 
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Demonstrations needed to be organised to attract the attention of the men 
who could make a difference – especially senators, as they alone could be 
rogatores and propose bills – but also those with the leisure and proximity to 
the voting urns to actually partipate in the vote.  There was no point in 
converging on a spot and shouting for land redistribution, for example, if 
there was no audience to hear you.  For this reason the Forum and the 
Campus Martius were sensible venues for attracting attention.  The Forum 
bustled with political and private business and was surrounded by arcades 
and shops,268 while the Field of Mars was the gathering place for large 
communal meetings (comitia, religious festivals, sacrifices, funerals and 
military exercises and assemblies)269 along with informal recreational 
pursuits.270.  On the other hand, some demonstrations were spontaneous 
efforts which sought the attention of men of influence, such as the food riot 
in 75, during which some members of the plebs attacked the consuls on the 
Via Sacra in the Forum and forced them to flee (Sall. Hist. 2.45; 2.47.6-7 
                                                 
268 Livy 1.35.10; Dion. Hal. 3.67.4 
 
269 Livy 1.44.1-2; Dion. Hal. 4.22.1-2; Gell. 15.27.5. 
 
270 Strabo, commenting on the remarkable size of the Campus, says “it affords space at the 
same time and without interference, not only for the chariot races and every other 
equestrian exercise, but also for all that multitude of people who exercise themselves by 
ball-playing, hoop-trundling, and wrestling” (5.3.8) – the campus was covered in grass (Ov. 
Tr. 5.31-32), and was a popular place to visit for other recreation purposes too.  See Dion. 
Hal. 5.13.2, Hor. Carm. 1.8.3-12, 3.7.25-28 and Veg. Mil. 1.10 (for horses and drill ground); 
Hor. Carm. 4.1.37-40 (for running race).  See Wiseman (1993: 222) and TLL III 216.79-217.69  
for further references. 
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M).271  In other instances, it is more difficult to distinguish organised from 
spontaneous demonstrations as the motivating force behind an action can 
sometimes be concealed, especially once a cause received the support of a 
member of the elite.  Also, the distinction between ‘popular’ demonstrations 
and those organised by patrons to make clients advance their cause is not 
always clear.   
 
Clodius’ reputation suffered from the derogative spin often applied to his 
character and motivation, and so we need to be wary.  Cicero is our only 
source for the composition of Clodius’ gangs,272 and gangs are clients by 
another name, or at least a variation on a theme, a development of the role 
of client.273  Clodius is a polarising subject, even splitting the opinion of 
seasoned scholars.  Finley, for instance, at one point criticises his use of 
“gangs of hired thugs”274 only to refer to him favourably two pages later 
(albeit in a footnote) as the leader of “a genuine, and wholly exceptional, 
movement of the urban poor and dispossessed.”275  It seems that one 
                                                 
271 Vanderbroeck (1987: 220).  
 
272 Brunt (1966: 23). 
 
273 See Nippel (1995: 38f.) for evidence of the use of armed retainers for self-protection in 
rural areas.  On  the widespread use of gangs (and other forms of organised violence), see 
Brunt (1966), Nippel (1995: 70-78), and Lintott (1999a: 67-88). 
 
274 Finley (1983: 117). 
 
275 Finley (1983: 119 n. 42). 
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method Clodius included in his repertoire to promote the interests of his 
movement was the hiring of men to take on the opposition, and this method 
was also used by his opponents.  Evidence suggests, for instance, that Cicero 
himself hired men to supplement the paramilitary forces of Milo and Sestius 
(exhausting the generosity of his friends, Att. 4.2.7).276  Nevertheless, the 
orator did not hesitate to use derogatory terms to cast his enemy in a 
negative light for employing the same tactic.277 
 
During the late Republic, there were two main venues for the working out 
of tensions between senatorial authority and popular sovereignty: the 
Forum and the Campus Martius.  The Forum was the scene of competition 
between popular and conservative senatorial interests over legislative 
proposals, most notably at the informal meetings which preceded legislation 
                                                 
276 As noted by Shackleton Bailey (ad loc.) and Kaster (2006: 14 n. 30).  In addition, 
Shackleton Bailey suggests that Cicero’s amici paid for Milo’s bands in 57 (e.g. Sest. 86).  
And Kaster  (ad loc.) rightly picks up on Cicero’s defensive tone at Sest. 127, which implies 
that Cicero did indeed resort to using gangs of armed gladiators to secure his return to 
Rome. 
 
277 For instance in the pro Sestio: The most noble youths and the most honest knights were 
summoned to a contio and exposed to the swords and stones of Clodius’ gangs (operae, Sest. 
27).  Similary, when  Cicero alleges that Clodius used the shortage of grain as an 
opportunity for sedition, the orator claims he was backed by desperati duces  and an army of 
perditi (Dom. 13). Brunt (1966: 24) adds that we should not let Cicero’s biased testimony 
convince us that artisans and shopkeepers required money or incitement to surrender a 
day’s earnings and risk their lives in order to participate in demonstrations when real 
grievances were the issue.  Cf. Nippel (1995: 70): “[Clodius] was surely neither the first nor 
the only person to mobilize parts of the urban populace, but by employing every available 
means in so concentrated and unscrupulous a way over a considerable period of time he 
opened up new dimensions of politics.”  Nippel (1995: 73) claims Clodius used members of 
collegia, including respectable tradesmen rather than  runaway slaves, gangsters and other 
such lowlifes. 
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(contiones), and, as we saw above, spontaneous demonstrations over food 
shortage.  Trials in the Forum also saw differences worked out, although 
along more partisan lines than legislative contiones.  The Campus Martius 
too found itself a focus point, occupied the night before elections by men 
hoping to prevent their opponents from entering (Cic. Att. 4.3).  On the day 
of elections the Field of Mars was, of course, the best spot for demonstrating 
support for, or opposition to, candidates. 
 
Not only did demonstrations occur at formal events such as elections, 
legislative assemblies and trials, but also at less formal events: at contiones 
and games, citizens showed their support for popular favourites amongst 
the aristocracy, and for hot topics, especially debt relief and land 
redistribution.   
 
 
ORGANISATION AND LEADERSHIP  
 
The first leaders of the plebs were the wealthy citizens of plebeian status.  In 
the early Republic, the breakaway plebeian movement attracted leaders 
from among the wealthy non-patrician clients of patricians.  These formed 
the small group who benefitted from the Licinio-Sextian reforms that did 
away with discrimination against plebeians and in so doing cleaved the 
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citizenship into two competing groups: patricians versus plebeians.278  After 
this, the plebeians fought through a second phase to do away with 
discrimination against the elite of the new order.  They wanted regular 
access to the consulship, censorship and praetorship, along with an equal 
share of responsibilities, such as presiding over elections, duties at the time 
monopolised by patricians.279 
 
The political leaders of the fourth century BC governed by virtue of the 
offices they held, and their repeated tenure of office was dependent on 
popular appeal and electoral success.  This point highlights the fact that the 
system involved a substantial democratic element.  It has been suggested 
that this popular aspect was largely absent in the later period when the 
senate controlled the government and the outcome of the annual elections 
had little effect on the general direction of policy.280  Yet we clearly see in 
the late Republic a revival of the mid-fourth century trend which had 
witnessed charismatic leaders like Appius Claudius Caecus preferring the 
                                                 
278 For this reason Cornell (1995: 292, 339f.) dates the origin of the Conflict of the Orders and 
the rise of the nobility to 367 BC. 
 
279 Hölkeskamp (1993: 21). 
 
280 Cornell (1995: 371) cites the frequency of the repeated holding of the same office by the 
same individuals in the mid-fourth century as evidence for their position relying on 
popular support. He examines the tendency in the period before 300 BC, prior to the 
strengthening of the senate, during which a few men held office repeatedly and so guided 
policy as long as they had popular support, noting that the only other examples of such 
repeated tenure of office are Marius, Caesar and the emperors. 
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favour of the people to that of the aristocracy, especially in the figures of 
Marius, Clodius and Caesar. 
 
The Genucian and Ovinian laws changed the balance of power, moving the 
direction of policy from these individual magistrates to the senate which 
now began to assume the role of advisory body.  In 342 one of the leges 
Genuciae ruled that no one could hold multiple offices or the same one twice 
in ten years, thus curtailing prorogation.  This provision was largely 
adhered to: for twenty years the Fasti show only one (doubtful) iteration and 
several homines novi enter the lists – only necessity dictated the election of 
experienced commanders who broke the rules on office-holding during the 
Second Samnite War.  Then c. 339 BC the lex Ovinia transferred the power of 
enrolling senators from magistrates to censors (Festus p. 289 L) and so 
created a permanent advisory body, no longer an ad hoc group with an ever-
changing membership dependent on the whim of the current magistrates.  
These reforms changed the nature of government, strengthening the senate 
at the price of the ”plebiscitary” political system in which magistrates had 
directly consulted the people before making decisions and relied on the 
popular vote for iteration of office.  Cornell sums up: “In short, before the 
Lex Ovinia, the Senate as such did not exist.”281  The combined effects of 
                                                 
281 Cornell (1995: 248).  Forsythe (BMCR review of Cornell 97.3.26) agrees that it is wrong to 
suppose, as many have, that the senate was always the preeminent body it was in the 
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these new laws strengthened the oligarchy at the expense of the handful of 
individuals who had previously dominated office-holding, for it is clear 
from the Fasti that more men now gained access to magistracies shared 
amongst a wider, albeit diluted, elite.  The suggestion is that the people also 
lost an important conduit to power with the decline in independent men.  
Another result of the increase in senatorial influence was that individual 
magistrates had less power to direct policy after the growth of senate into a 
permanent advisory body.  But as we shall see, magistrates still had a 
leadership role, although they were not the only ones to organise and 
mobilise the people. 
 
Veterans played an important leadership role.  Above we saw old soldiers 
featuring as leaders in early agitation for reform such as in events preceding 
the first secession, although Cornell questions their significance, calling the 
anecdote of the “distinguished veteran” a commonplace.282  But the fact that 
the figure was based on a recognisable stereotype lends force to the 
argument for his existence.  Indeed, again in the late Republic we find 
veterans leading peasants to do battle with the rich and powerful after 
mistreatment over the issue of debt: C. Manlius was an ex-centurion (Dio 
                                                                                                                                         
middle and late Republic, but he criticises as “too extreme” the way Cornell reduces the 
senate to a “shadowy non-entity” in the early Republic. 
 
282 Cornell (1995: 267). 
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37.30.5) who led the Catilinarian forces in battle (Sall. Cat. 24.2).283  
Moreover, we might also find veterans operating in Rome: the transference 
of the leadership role of veterans after discharge from military to civilian 
arenas is logical, especially in the case of men of rank such as ex-centurions.  
Peter Brunt believes that centurions were the natural leaders and spokesmen 
of troops in revolutionary times, so in a civil context the transition by an ex-
centurion to organising veterans is a natural step.284 
 
As we will see in the following pages, men from among the senatorial elite 
organised a number of these demonstrations.  Some politicians depended on 
popular support for selfish reasons, such as to help settle personal scores 
with other senators or because they struggled to win senatorial support, and 
so needed that of the people to achieve their ends.  The defining feature of a 
true popular leader was his promotion of the populi causa.  Cicero contrasts 
C. Gracchus, a man who proposed laws pro plebe, to Sulla, homo a populi causa 
remotissimus (Cluent. 151).285  While there was no popular party,286 there 
were men such as Tiberius and Caius Gracchus who appear to have acted 
                                                 
283 His involvement in the conspiracy is analysed below. 
 
284 Brunt (1988: 274). 
 
285 Cicero also devotes a substantial passage of his speech in defence of Sestius to defining 
“popularis” (Sest. 96 ff.). 
 
286 As demonstrated by Seager (1972). 
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more altruistically: these “true” popularis politicians offered the people both 
material assistance and an ideology based on ensuring that the senate 
shared power with the people and that popular libertas was not 
overwhelmed by senatorial auctoritas.287  In this chapter I will test Nicola 
Mackie’s thesis that the people of Rome looked to populares to both secure 
material benefits and promote an ideology of legal protection of popular 
rights.  That is, genuine populares consulted the people’s interests and did 
not treat the populace merely as a more effective means than senatorial 
support in securing their objectives.288  Populares offered the people not only 
distributions of land and food, plus debt relief, but also “the power to 
protect its own interests, along with an ideology supporting the transfer of 
power from senate to populace.”289  Mackie agrees with Seager that populares 
promoted popular rights and power, and proposed bills aimed at extending 
these.290  But she takes the idea a step further, claiming this only makes 
sense in a political environment where there is an active ideological debate.  
                                                 
287 See below, for instance, on the lex Sempronia of 123 BC, ensuring protection from 
summary execution.   
 
288 Mackie (1992: 50 f.).  
 
289 Mackie (1992: 61 f.). 
 
290 Seager (1972b) examines the use of the word popularis in Cicero in two sections, the first 
on Ciceronian nuances of the definition in the pro Sestio, the second on the tactics Cicero 
uses to verbally tackle those of his opponents who claim to be popularis.  Seager (331 f.) 
emphasises the existence of a shared tradition of actions, slogans and values, encompassing 
constitutional rights and protection of these (libertas, provocatio, laws on voting and 
sovereign powers of the assembly), plebis commoda (agrarian, corn and colony laws), the 
tribunate and the imitation of popularis models. 
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Thus the senate justified its claim to legitimacy by appealing to res publica, 
mos maiorum and leges; while populares appealed to the same values to justify 
the extension of popular rights and powers.  Populares claimed the senate 
ran the republic in its own interests, and in order to counteract such 
senatorial predominance the people should have more power to guide the 
republic and look after its own interests.  They called for popular libertas to 
balance senatus auctoritas.291   
 
Similarly, Morstein-Marx acknowledges that since the patronage model has 
been found wanting, it is more difficult to deny the “importance of the 
ideological realm”.  Patronage, with its “narrow focus on private, 
interpersonal relationships” fails to explain “the communal, civic 
manifestations of Republican political life (e.g. elections, legislation, 
contiones).”  While he believes “the optimates/populares distinction lies ready 
to hand as a way to delineate the ideological content of the political 
struggles of the late Republic,” Morstein-Marx argues that we have no 
evidence of ideologically opposed debates.  In the contra Rullum, for 
example, Cicero’s tactic is not to pit himself as optimate against Rullus the 
popularis, but to claim that he is the real popularis, not Rullus, so that the 
contional crowd had to distinguish true from false popularis in the 
                                                 
291 Mackie (1992: 52-59). 
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dramatised context of the contio.292  Competition in appearing to champion 
the same popular ideology created “ideological monotony”, reinforced by 
populares and their opponents.293  There was “contional ideology” not 
popular ideology.294  Senatorial authority, however, was not maligned; 
rather the history of compromise between senate and people was 
emphasised, along with the idea of the senate’s subordination to popular 
sovereignty.  The moral worthiness of the men leading the senate was at 
issue, not an ideological dichotomy between pro- and anti-senate.295  His 
conclusion is that popular trust and support depended not on ideology and 
the offering of alternate ideas, but on reciprocal obligation (the popular 
belief that magistrates would hold good to their promise to the people, 
implicit in their election, to defend their interests) and personality, 
worthiness, credibility and the resulting auctoritas.296 
 
The history of the last 25 years of the Republic is one of competition between 
senatorial and popular authority, as evidenced by, for instance, the SCU 
                                                 
292 Morstein-Marx (2004: 206). 
 
293 Morstein-Marx (2004: 229 ff.). 
 
294 Morstein-Marx (2004: 239ff.) likens the Roman situation to the symbolist model of 
democratic politics: today, where governing bodies stage problem-solving shows rather 
than actually deliver lasting benefits to the regimes’ voters. 
 
295 Morstein-Marx (2004: 232). 
 
296 Morstein-Marx (2004: 276 ff.). 
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(twice the hot topic in 63, with the trial of Rabirius and its use against 
Catiline) and the issue of privilegia: the granting of dispensations to 
individuals.  A tribune of 67, Cornelius, tried to pass a bill that would have 
seen the right to grant privilegia transferred from senate to the people (the 
senate’s decision was meant to be approved by popular vote, but the senate 
had usurped the power).  A watered down version that did not undermine 
senatorial authority was passed after senatorial protest (providing that a 
quorum of 200 senators first needed to support the bill in the senate and that 
grants could not be vetoed).297 
 
But senators were not the only men behind demonstrations.  To be sure, the 
mobilisation of popular discontent often required leadership from within 
the aristocracy, but we must not underestimate the spontaneity and 
autonomy of the plebs, and overestimate the input of the elite.298  
Intermediate leaders of more humble origins were also involved, including 
ex-solders, duces of operae, magistri of vici and collegia.299  That Cicero 
considered it worthwhile, for instance, to know the names of the mostly 
freedmen organisers of collegia, such as Sextus Cloelius, indicates not only 
                                                 
297 Mackie (1992: 62 f.). Asconius 58-59 C and Dio 36.39-40 have the details of the row. 
 
298 Lintott (1999a: xxi). 
 
299 Mackie (1992: 67-71); Nippel (1995: 71-73).  See Lintott (1967) on Clodius’ use of 
intermediate leadership 
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their influence but also that members of the elite were not the only popular 
leaders.300  In addition, a number of popular demonstrations have no 
recorded leadership.  Omission of leaders’ names may occur for one of 
several reasons: perhaps the writer was unable to obtain the  name from his 
source, or the leader may have been considered too insignificant to warrant 
inclusion by an elite author, or the leader may not have suited the writer’s 
angle.  Other leaderless demonstrations were spontaneous reactions: the 
response to the food crisis in 75 (Sall. Hist. 2.45 M.); the shouts and applause 
that greeted Pompey when he replied to the censor that he had undertaken 
all the military campaigns demanded by law and all under himself as 
imperator (during the recognitio equitum, Plut. Pomp. 22); the applause and 
hissing which greeted Roscius in the theatre (Plut. Cic. 13); the popular 
affirmation of the oath Cicero made when he lay down his consulship (“I 
swear in very truth,” he said, “that I have saved my country and maintained 
her supremacy,” Plut. Cic. 23) and his happy escort on his walk home after 
the execution of the Catilinarians (Plut. Cic. 22). 
 
Mackie believed that the role of the more humble leaders was that of 
organiser on behalf of senators: “there was no simple division between 
‘manipulative senators’, on the one hand, and ‘naïve populace’, on the other: 
                                                 
300 Nippel (1995: 73). 
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there was a whole range of more or less humble people in between, engaged 
in organising support for popularis senators.”301  Did these more humble 
people never act without elite inspiration?  Vanderbroeck’s examination of 
collective behaviour finds that leaders were at the head of 81 out of the 92 
instances he has identified for the period 78-49 BC.302  Only two were 
spontaneous, though others may also have been (he is unsure of the 
leadership of some, especially in the theatre).  He argues that the urban 
plebs did not act without a magistrate’s involvement as they refused to act 
illegally, without official sanction, which may be true in the case of Catiline 
(he failed to maintain urban support), although this may have had more to 
do with rumours that he had recruited slaves to raze the city to the 
ground.303 We must, however, question Vanderbroeck’s claim; for 
inspection of the eleven remaining episodes reveals that not all have such 
official sanction, and some of the 81 examples have non-elite leadership.  
Non-elite intermediate leaders were sometimes the motivating force, such as 
claquers in the theatre – indeed they led 18 events (although sometimes with 
                                                 
301 Mackie (1992: 68 f.).  She does concede, however, that some, especially Caesar, relied 
more on the exploitation of popularis rhetoric than others. 
 
302 Vanderbroeck (1987: 124-129) 
 
303 Catiline’s supporters were a diverse cross-section of society – more than Sallust lets on.  
See Gruen (1974: 418-422) for a thorough list;  Brunt focuses on debtors (1971b: 129). The 
senate had plenty of support amongst equestrians and plebs (eg. offers to take up arms), yet 
executed the captured conspirators when they could have been kept under guard.  Nippel 
(1995: 68) suggests they were executed to deter others from joining the insurrection.  If he is 
correct, there was more widespread support for the conspirators than the sources admit to.   
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an overall leader from amongst the senatorial elite, in particular Clodius).304   
Intermediate leadership organised and mobilised parts of the urban plebs.305  
If the elite wanted to regain control of the masses, they needed to both 
convince them that they were representing their interests and win over these 
intermediate leaders. 
 
Examination of the motivation of intermediate leaders reveals reasons other 
than loyalty and suggests some independence.  It may even be that, in some 
situations, people from outside the elite were the motivating force.  These 
men then turned to tribunes and other sympathetic individuals from the 
senate to back their popular reforms.  Take, for instance, the Catilinarian 
and ex-Sullan centurion C. Manlius.  From what little we know of him, it is 
still possible to see that he was motivated by need and the desire for reform 
of the justice system, goals that coincided with those of Catiline.  Plutarch 
suggests that Manlius played a prominent role in convincing Catiline to do 
battle with his opponents: he says that it was the ex-soldiers of Sulla who 
prodded Catiline to take action (Cic. 14.1-2).  Manlius may well have had 
plans to raise forces against the dominant factions even before he was 
                                                 
304 I will consider below other leaders such as Curio and his anti-Pompeian demonstrations, 
e.g. in July 59 BC: the spectators at the ludi Apollinares applaud the actor Diphilus’ criticism 
of Pompey’s power, then fail to respond at all to Caesar’s entrance, but applaud the 
triumvirs’ opponent Curio with a standing ovation led by the equites (Cic. Att, 2.119.3.; Val. 
Max. 6.2.9). 
 
305 Nippel (1995: 73 and 78) follows Vanderbroeck (1987). 
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recruited by Catiline, as Cicero says, to set up camp in Faesulae and declare 
war on the Roman people (Cat. 2.14, a speech addressed to the Roman 
people).306  He was a Sullan colonist who sought relief from debt both for 
himself and the plebs whose support he galvanised in Etruria.  In addition, 
he had given up on expecting fair treatment from creditors, praetors and the 
justice system (Cic. Cat. 2.20; Sall. Cat. 28.4, 33).307  Manlius was from 
Faesulae in Etruria (Sall. Cat. 24.2), and this is where he based his 
recruitment operation of plebs, latrones and Sullan veterans:  
 
Interea Manlius in Etruria plebem sollicitare egestate simul ac dolore 
iniuriae novarum rerum cupidam, quod Sullae dominatione agros 
bonaque omnia amiserat, praeterea latrones  cuiusque generis, quorum in 
ea regione magna copia erat, nonnullos ex Sullanis coloniis, quibus lubido 
atque luxuria ex magnis rapinis nihil reliqui fecerat. (Sall. Cat. 28.4) 
 
An objective interpretation of Manlius’ supporters reveals them to have 
been the neediest elements of society: impoverished plebs and veterans 
struggling to make their way in the perhaps alien world of farming.  The 
involvement of latrones, mostly runaway slaves,308 must be questioned, 
however, for although the involvement of runaway slaves should not 
surprise us, as these people were desperate to win freedom and the chance 
                                                 
306 Appian (BC 2.2) and Asconius (50C) also paints Manlius as recruited by Catiline to enlist 
soldiers for him in Etruria. 
 
307 Wiseman (2002: 299) notes the perennial nature of the issues Manlius wanted addressed.  
 
308 Ramsey (2006 ad loc.) translates latrones as “brigands” and adds that these were mainly 
slaves who had escaped from the large estates in the area.   
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to earn a living, Catiline himself asserts that he refused to enrol slaves,309 so 
this allegation is probably a moralising Sallustian slur.  These latrones were 
more likely tenants who despaired of ever repaying their debts. 
 
Such a comprehensive and coordinated group from Etruria implies that this 
uprising was not spontaneous, but that discontent had been simmering for 
some time.  Comparative analysis indicates that where there is discontent, 
diverse groups will join in networks and plan to do something about it, then 
wait for the opportunity to mobilise.310 
 
Tribuni plebis were often the leaders in demonstrations of popular pressure.  
We can access the voice of the people through these men, elected to promote 
and defend popular interests, who worked on behalf of the needy via grain, 
land and debt reform legislation.  Tribunes employed a variety of methods 
to make senators aware of the needs and desires of the people. There are 
numerous cases of tribunes summoning senators to address contiones at 
which popular pressure was applied to convince them to oblige the popular 
will.  For instance, Cn. Sicinius, tribune in 76 B.C., trying to restore the 
powers of the tribunate, summoned the consuls to address a contio in order 
                                                 
309  Gruen 1974: 430). 
 
310 On the nature of social movements in America, see Meyer (2007), esp. chapters 2-4. 
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to pressure them into supporting his reform.311  Three tribunes in 52 BC held 
daily contiones aimed at turning the people against Milo following the 
murder of Clodius: at one they produced Pompey and got him to speak 
against Milo by asking if he was aware that Milo had plotted against his 
own life.312  Not all targets of this tactic buckled to popular pressure: when 
Scipio suggested to a contional crowd that Tiberius Gracchus’ death was 
justified if he had planned to overthrow the government, the crowd cried 
out, and he replied with a caustic remark about their ethnicity rendering 
their threat harmless: "How can I, who have so many times heard the battle 
shout of the enemy without feeling fear, be disturbed by the shouts of men 
like you, to whom Italy is only a stepmother?"313   
 
                                                 
311 In a section on humour in oratory: “When this man, as Tribune of the people, had 
summoned Curio and Octavius, who were then Consuls, into the Forum, and Curio had 
delivered a tedious harangue, while Octavius sat silently by him, wrapt up in flannels, and 
besmeared with ointments, to ease the pain of the gout." "Octavius," said he, "you are 
infinitely obliged to your colleague; for if he had not tossed and flung himself about to-day, 
in the manner he did, you would have certainly have been devoured by the flies.”(Cic. Brut. 
217). 
 
312 Prius etiam quam Pompeius ter consul crearetur, tres tribuni, Q. Pompeius Rufus, C. 
Sallustius Crispus, T.Munatius Plancus, cum cotidianis contionibus suis magnam invidiam 
Miloni propter occisum Clodium excitarent, produxerant ad populum Cn. Pompeium et ab 
eo quaesierant num ad eum delatum esset illius quoque rei indicium, suae vitae insidiari 
Milonem.(Asc. 51C). 
 
313 Hic, eum interrogante tribuno Carbone, quid de Ti. Gracchi caede sentiret, respondit, si 
is occupandae rei publicae animum habuisset, iure caesum. Et cum omnis contio 
adclamasset, hostium, inquit, armatorum totiens clamore non territus, qui possum vestro 
moveri, quorum noverca est Italia? (Vell, 2.4.4). 
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In other instances, popular pressure was more successful.  P. Cornelius 
Scipio won election to the aedileship of 213 BC, despite tribunician 
opposition due to his age, because his popularity convinced the tribunes to 
change their minds (Livy 25.2.6-8).  Scipio Aemilianus likewise enjoyed 
popular support such that he was elected consul 148 BC although he was 
not qualified (and was a candidate for the aedileship at the time: Val. Max. 
8.15.4; Auct. Vir. Ill. 58.5).  Like Marius after him, Aemilianus benefitted 
from a vigorous letter writing campaign.  Soldiers, unhappy with the 
progress of the Third Punic War, wrote home urging friends and relatives to 
elect Scipio consul based on his reputation, recently earned, as a military 
tribune.  When the consuls tried to annul his appointment, the people 
argued that, by the laws of Tullius and Romulus, they were the judges of 
elections.  In addition, a tribune threatened to remove from the consuls the 
power to hold elections.  The senate relented in the face of such pressure 
and permitted the tribunes to repeal the law for a year (App. Pun. 112).314  
 
 
COMPOSITION:  
                                                 
314 Astin (1967: 64) suggests that Scipio and his friends made sure he was elected consul by 
spreading the idea that he must be elected otherwise Carthage would never be captured 
and the war would drag on interminably.  Astin also notes  in a scathing critique of Scipio’s 
technique that within six years Scipio had won the support of freedmen who hung about 
the Forum able to gather a crowd and force all issues by shouting and inciting passions 
(Plut. Aem. 38.4).  According to Astin, Scipio deliberately exploited his popular appeal as a 
political weapon. 
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A diverse cross-section of the populus Romanus participated in politics.  We 
cannot equate “the people” with the urban plebs alone, as Meier does, 
because the plebs was not a united body.315  The case of Tiberius Gracchus 
and his supporters illustrates the different elements that made up the 
politically active part of the citizen body.  The tribune relied first on the 
rural plebs, then, when they were busy with the harvest, he worked hard to 
win the support of those urban plebs who had not joined their country 
cousins as seasonal workers on the harvest (App. BC 1.14).316  C. Gracchus 
explored all his avenues when turned to people from all over Italy, plus 
equestrians, soldiers and hungry plebs (App. BC 1.21-23; Plut. C. Gracc. 12).  
Saturninus used a different tactic when he turned to Marian veterans and 
equestrians.317  Sulpicius had the support of the newly enfranchised citizens 
who wanted to be enrolled in all the tribes and Marians (veterans, 
                                                 
315 Brunt (1966: 21).  Cf. Meier 1997 for the equation of populus with plebs urbana. 
 
316 See Chapter Four for more on Tiberius’ supporters. 
 
317 To impress the veterans he proposed a bill assigning each 100 iugera of land in Africa 
(Auct. Vir. Ill. 73.1).  Saturninus sent messengers to the country districts, sure of the support 
of those who lived there because they had served in the army under Marius (App. BC 1.29-
30).  These may have been the same soldiers to whom Plutarch refers as joining with the 
needy rabble and securing the election of Marius and the defeat of Metellus (Plut. Mar. 28.5)  
The equestrians he had through his amicitia with Marius – and his lex de maiestate which 
delivered to an  equestrian jury the power to try cases of maiestas (Auct. Ad Her. 2.17; Cic. 
De Or. 2.107, 109, 164, 197-201; Inv. 2.53; Part. Or. 105; Sall. Hist. 1.62 M).  In his second 
tribunate he proposed bills on subsidised grain, more veteran colonies, and distribution of 
land seized from the Cimbri.  Refs MRR1: 575. 
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equestrians and recalled exiles),318 while Cinna sought the support of newly 
enfranchised citizens (App. BC 1.65) and the army.  Sulla used his army to 
march on Rome and recover his command against Mithridates in 88, while 
Pompey used his army and veterans in 70 to restore tribunes’ powers (and 
in 59 to ensure the passage of Caesar’s bills).  These soldiers were from the 
Italian countryside.  Likewise, C. Manlius galvinised plebs and Sullan 
veterans to join Catiline, while in the city the movement had the support of 
members of every order.319  The Catilinarians were a group as diverse as 
their aims: politically frustrated senators and equestrians, leaders from 
Italian colonies and municipalities (Sall. Cat. 17.4), veterans, rural and urban 
plebs.320  In contrast, Clodius relied mostly on the support of the urban plebs 
(Asc. 48 C, Cic. Dom. 54). 
 
The men referred to as the urban plebs during the late Republic were a 
mixed bunch.  They were the inhabitants of Rome from outside the 
senatorial and equestrian orders.  From the time of the Gracchi these city 
dwellers consisted of men of moderate means who fell short of equestrian 
property qualification, poor day labourers and the destitute, those in debt or 
                                                 
318 App. BC 1.55f; Asc. 64 C; cf. Livy Per. 77. 
 
319 See Chapter Four on the Catilinarian Conspiracy. 
 
320 On supporters, see Gruen (1974: 418-422). 
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under stigma, dispossessed farmers and a large proportion of freedmen.321  
The ratio of freedmen to freeborn ingenui in Rome is difficult to determine: 
all we can tell for sure is that freedmen made up the majority of artisans and 
shopkeepers in Rome and other large cities.  Funerary inscriptions found in 
Rome are mostly those of freedmen, which suggests that they formed the 
majority of Rome’s inhabitants.  But this theory has been questioned and it 
is now generally agreed that the prevalence of these inscriptions is more 
likely an indication of freedmen’s desire to celebrate and advertise their own 
success.322  This diverse range of men, then, were the urban plebs, crucial 
supporters to have if a reformer’s operations were based in Rome.   
 
CONCLUSION: WHAT KIND OF DEMOCRACY?   
 
We have seen in this chapter that all sorts of citizens participated in political 
reform, decision-making and policy development, regardless of property 
                                                 
321 Scheidel (2008: 17-70) analyses the logic of the demographic debate. See De Ligt (2004) on 
population growth fuelling the rural misery behind the Gracchan reforms.  See also 
Rosenstein (2004: 10-13);  Brunt 1971a; Lo Cascio 1994 and 2001; Scheidel 2004 and 2005.  
Keaveney 2007: 21 critiques Rosenstein regarding the reliability of census figures in the 2nd 
century.   
 
322  D’Ambra (1988: 99) in her study of two tombs in Ostia concludes that the aim of the 
decoration on the façade was to remind the public of the achievements of the deceased.  See 
also the comments of Welch (2007: 507-509) regarding the so-called Tomb of the Baker: the 
tomb of a freedman, it celebrates not only his career, but also features figures of his wife 
and himself out of proportion to the surrounding bread-making apparatus.  Welch remarks 
upon this “career relief”, a development of the late Republic: “The (mostly nouveaux riche) 
patrons often wished to include as much self-advertising material as possible in the 
relatively small space available to them” (509).   
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qualification.  The long drawn out process of reform has encouraged 
students of the late Republic to ignore the progress made, and the success of 
the people involved in achieving reform.  The success of collective action to 
achieve its goal of expressing the opinion of those involved, so that material 
and ideological interests of these citizens were advanced, is an indicator of 
the existence of democratic elements.  In terms of raw figures, Vanderbroeck 
claims that 65 out of the 92 cases of collective behaviour he surveyed 
between 78 and 49 BC achieved their goal.323  We do need to bear in mind, 
however, the effect of making any calculations based on fragmentary 
sources.   
 
In the following chapter, we investigate the role of these Roman citizens in 
the decision-making process by way of case studies on food supply, the 
restoration of tribunicia potestas, debt relief and agrarian reform. 
                                                 
323 Vanderbroeck (1987: 161 ff.). 
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CHAPTER 4: DEMONSTRATIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION II:  
FOOD SUPPLY, RESTORATION OF TRIBUNICIAN POWER,  
DEBT RELIEF AND LAND REFORM 
 
The following case studies aim to evaluate through the examination of 
incidents of collective action the degree to which Roman citizens were able 
to improve their material situation and protect their libertas.324  In order to 
defend my thesis that these people did have political power, I will look at 
the effectiveness of the action taken.  A demonstration will be deemed a 
success if measures were taken to address the problem over which the 
demonstration originated.  Consideration of leadership might also reveal 
that political power was not limited to members of the elite insomuch as 
leadership was provided by men not registered in the top property classes 
but included ex-centurions, heads of collegia and vici leaders.  Citizens 
outside the aristocracy were able to take action that resulted in material 
improvement to the quality of their life.   
 
Consideration of the role of non-elite Romans is important, in order to deal 
with the objections of those who claim that any change to the status quo was 
driven by ambitious demagogues and that an ideology of redistribution of 
                                                 
324 See Chapter One for a discussion of who the Roman citizens were. 
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resources played no part in the politics of the late Republic.  Gelzer was 
incorrect to introduce the idea that Republican politics operated in an 
ideological vacuum.325  Rather, Roman politicians did take sides on matters 
of principle, although they changed sides as it suited.  There existed 
fluctuating factions: some men were optimates, some populares, most were 
either, depending on where the advantage lay.326  But this factionalism does 
not negate the existence of an ideology based on popular principles. 
 
CASE STUDY: FOOD SUPPLY 
 
Food shortages were common in Rome during the Republic, the result of the 
growing demands of an increasing population in a city without the 
infrastructure to ensure regular adequate supply of grain, complicated by 
slave revolts, pirates, civil strife and increased numbers of legions.327  In 
these times of shortage when the usual supply gathered from the Italian 
peninsular or paid as tax by provinces (Sicily, Sardinia, Hispaniae and 
                                                 
325 Wiseman (2002: 306). 
 
326 Wiseman (2002: 293) takes a rather extreme stance when he argues that there clearly 
existed optimates (Sallust’s nobilitas) and populares, not just the former: “the Republic was 
divided into two rival ideological camps – two partes, as [Cicero] put it in a speech to the 
Senate – and that this rivalry had been fundamental in Roman politics since the time of the 
Gracchi.” 
 
327 Garnsey (1988: 195 -206).  See Livy 2.34.1: following the first secessio plebis the consuls had 
to send men out to Etruria, Cumae and Sicily to buy grain because the fields had been 
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Africa in particular) dried up due to a drop in production or disruption to 
supply, the city relied on legates, aediles, quaestors from grain-producing 
provinces,328 specially appointed commissioners,329 along with other 
magistrates and promagistrates to purchase supplementary food, with 
mixed results.330   
 
It was in such an environment of patchy supply that the hunger of the 
people motivated Gaius Gracchus as tribune to first institute a system of 
grain procurement and subsidy in 123.  His lex Sempronia also provided for 
the establishment of state granaries to store surplus and so ensure supply in 
times of poor harvest or interruption of supply, although there is no 
evidence that these were ever built.331  He was perhaps inspired by the 
system set up by Scipio Aemilianus in 134 to supply soldiers with rations 
using granaries in Numantia. As quaestor in Sardinia 126-124, Gracchus had 
also seen food shortage there such that he had been compelled to use family 
connections in Numidia to secure grain for the forces stationed with him.  
                                                 
328 E.g. In 75 BC , when grain prices were extremely high, Cicero was quaestor in Sicily.  He 
sent grain home to Rome (Cic. Planc. 64). 
 
329 E.g. L. Minucius was appointed praefectus annonae in 440 in a period of such severe 
famine that plebeians were throwing themselves in the Tiber (Livy 4.12.8-11, 4.13.7-8; Dion. 
Hal. 12.1).  
 
330 Veyne (1990: 236 ff.). 
 
331 Rickman (1980: 138-140) demonstrates that private horrea were hired for storage of state 
grain surpluses. 
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Appian tells us that the aim of Gracchus’ law was to regulate the food 
supply: the lex provided for a regular monthly distribution (BC 1.21).  
Secondary sources conclude from the weight of this and other rather 
fragmentary evidence that Gracchus proposed the reform to ensure there 
was food for hungry Romans: Rickman, Garnsey and Rathbone argue the 
aim of the lex Sempronia frumentaria was to fix the problem of unreliable food 
supply from Sardinia, Sicily and North Africa.332  Veyne agrees that “his aim 
was a guaranteed subsistence, not an equal division of gains amongst all 
payees or a reduction of relative inequality.”333 
 
So, we can agree on his aim, but what of Gaius’ motivation?  It appears that 
ideas of fairness did play a part in his reform, but it was not that Gaius and 
his plebs had a principle in mind.  Rather, they “were developing an 
ideology, an allegory of justice in which the body politic was likened to a 
share-issuing company, in order to make more concrete the idea that tout le 
monde a le droit de vivre.”334 Rickman interprets Gracchus’ actions as altruistic 
                                                 
332 Rickman (1980: 158 ff.); Garnsey and Rathbone (1985). 
 
333 Veyne (1990: 241). 
 
334 Veyne (1990: 241 f.).  I cite the original French edition (1976: 452) to clarify the ambiguity 
of the translator’s interpretation of vivre as “livelihood”.  This seems to me a misleading 
translation as it gives the impression that the Gracchans believed everyone should be 
entitled to a “means of living” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th ed.), whereas Veyne clearly 
intended vivre to be taken as “life”, i.e. everyone had the right to life – in this context, access 
to subsistence levels of food that ensured life. 
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– “an act of humanity.”335  The sources include so little detail that it is 
impossible to tell if he acted in response to popular pressure or to avert 
public unrest.  Either way, the hunger of the people motivated the reform. 
 
Gracchus may also have been aware of a secondary implication of the 
introduction of state subsidised grain.  Not only was his grain law designed 
to promote price stabilisation, but also to weaken patronage and restore the 
independence of Roman citizens.  In a time of food shortage those with rich 
patrons could turn to them.  Therefore Gracchus may have been trying to 
compete with the handouts given by rich patrons to their clients.  With the 
state providing grain, politicians could no longer buy votes with the 
promise of cheap food.   
 
The dignitas derived from supplying the people with food was jealously 
guarded, so great was the popular following, and so power, that could 
accrue to a reformer.  C. Gracchus introduced his measure as tribune, and so 
avoided the mistake made by Sp. Maelius.  The wealthy equestrian 
responded to a famine in 440 by making free grain handouts as a private 
citizen from his own purse.  It was alleged that he sought to usurp supreme 
power once he had won the support of the plebs in this way.  The magister 
                                                 
335 Rickman (1980:  161). 
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equitum C. Servilius Ahala chased him down and, surrounded by a crowd of 
young patricians, slew Maelius, who died appealing to the plebs for 
protection (Livy 4.13-16).  Maelius’ case indicates that large-scale free 
handouts could only be made with official sanction.  Privati were not 
allowed to participate, as Maelius’ fate illustrates, so fiercely protected was 
the dignitas gathered by such popular activities. 
 
The nature of Gaius’ reform makes it unlikely that he sought to win the 
support of the people at the expense of losing that of the aristocracy, some of 
whom considered provision of support to clients an elite prerogative and so 
opposed state intervention in the food supply.  But it was inevitable that he 
should upset rich patrons who saw their means of gaining prestige cut off.  
It was one thing for the state to provide a quaestor to manage the food 
supply, but quite something else for the state to provide the people with 
cheap food.  The magistrates responsible for food distribution, and even 
those who administered its supply, gained in popularity and dignitas, as it 
was these state authorities who now fed Rome.  Cicero, for instance, credits 
Saturninus’ becoming a demagogue to his removal from office as quaestor in 
annonae caritate, so great was the insult to his dignitas (Har. resp. 43; quaestor 
Ostiensis, Sest. 39).336 
                                                 
336 Saturninus’ job had been to arrange the transport of food from the port to the city (Diod. 
36.12). 
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Indeed, Garnsey considers this removal of the opportunity for acts of 
benevolence from individual aristocrats to the state to be one reason for 
considering the Gracchan reform a revolution.337  However, he exaggerates: 
the system had not changed enough to justify the term revolution.  Wealthy 
individuals were still able to augment their popularity and increase their 
auctoritas by procuring grain for the people, as Cicero did when he was 
quaestor in Sicily (Cic. Planc. 64).  There were other forms of euergetism too.  
Generals gave donativa to soldiers, candidates gave gifts to electors, aediles 
provided games, while other aristocrats built granaries and public 
buildings.  Nor did the new system of grain distribution persist long enough 
to fulfil the definition of revolution in the sense of new way of government.  
Perhaps what Garnsey intended to say was that Gaius Gracchus’ state-
subsidised grain ration was among the first wave of reforms to pit reformer 
against conservative, and so pave the way to the end of consensus politics.  
Taylor suggests this in her study of tribunes active in the years immediately 
preceding the Gracchi: unlike their forerunners, although they followed 
their lead by interfering in state affairs, the Gracchi were unwilling to 
compromise.338  One thing is clear: bills certainly became the battleground 
                                                                                                                                         
 
337 Garnsey (1988: 197). 
 
338 Taylor (1962: 27). 
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for personal competition affecting individual dignitas amongst the senatorial 
elite. 
 
The next food bill we have any significant information on is that of 
Saturninus.339  In 100 BC, the tribune proposed that corn be subsidised.  The 
price at which it was to be sold is not clear.  Our main source says 5/6 as per 
modius, but this is likely a copyist’s error: de senis et trientibus misread as de 
semissibus et trientibus.340  If, then, Saturninus’ proposal was to provide corn 
at the same subsidised rate as the lex Sempronia we must conclude that 
during the intervening years Gracchus’ law had ceased to operate.  In the 
end, Saturninus’ bill probably failed to be passed into law: his colleagues 
vetoed his rogatio and, when he pressed on, Caepio broke up the pontes and 
overturned the voting urns (Ad Her. 1.12.21).  Why did Saturninus put 
forward this rogatio, especially against such open opposition?  It may have 
been that the distributions had ceased and needed to be revived.  Another 
possibility is that it was part of his competition with the conservative 
elements of the senate – he was fighting for popular support, which, once 
added to that of the Marian veterans, would have given him the power to 
take on the optimates.  One thing is certain: there was a strong demand for 
                                                 
339 Plutarch makes passing reference to Marius opposing a law which proposed a 
distribution of corn during his tribunate in 119, but provides no further detail (Mar. 4.4). 
 
340 Our source:  Auct. Ad Her. 1.12.21.  Rickman (1980: 163) suggests the correction. 
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the distributions.  M. Aemilius Lepidus also tried unsuccessfully to 
reintroduce the practice in 78, following Sulla’s cancellation of the subsidy – 
thanks to Sulla the Roman People did not even retain the “rations of slaves” 
(servilia alimenta, Sall. Hist. 1.55.11 M).  
 
There remain four laws and decrees to examine: the first, a law proposed in 
73 by optimates in response to extreme popular pressure expressed by riots 
in 75; then a decree influenced by Cato in 62 (he was eager to win popular 
approval as long as Catiline remained armed and dangerous); the third was 
Clodius’ radical free grain dole of 58; and finally, the law giving Pompey 
charge of the grain supply for five years.  From these we can see the effects 
of popular pressure applied successfully to both popular and conservative 
leaders. 
 
Popular pressure resulted in the senate reinstituting the grain subsidy on a 
small scale in 73.  Following riots in 75 that saw the consuls chased down 
the Via Sacra, the senate responded by having the consuls of 73 propose 
another lex frumentaria which stipulated that 5 modii per month be sold to 
citizens at the same price as Gaius Gracchus’ distributions.  This lex Terentia-
Cassia proves the effectiveness of popular pressure.  Brunt agrees that 
outbreaks of mob violence were directly related to food shortages, although 
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he acknowledges the lack of data.341  The provision of subsidised grain was 
not the only response to the food crisis: Antonius was also sent against the 
pirates who were interfering with the supply.  When his efforts did not 
solve the problem, the people voted Pompey command against the pirates 
in 67.  Cicero emphasises the degree of popular pressure behind his 
appointment:  
 
The whole Roman people (universus populus Romanus), the Forum being 
crowded, and all the adjacent temples from which this place can be seen 
being completely filled – the whole Roman people, I say, demanded 
Cnaeus Pompeius alone as their general in the war in which the common 
interests of all nations were at stake. (Cic. Imp. Pomp. 44) 
 
The extremely high level of attendance, well above the norm, indicates the 
dire need for action to be taken to secure supply routes.  It also points to 
Pompey’s popularity.  Dio relates that the people supported Pompey’s 
appointment with such passion that, when word got out that the senate did 
not share the popular opinion, the people would have attacked the senators 
in the curia if they had not got out of the way (24.2).  The price of grain fell 
on the day his command was announced and markets were soon 
overflowing with food (Cic. Imp. Pomp. 44; Plut. Pomp. 26.2, 27.2).  Such 
sudden plentiful supply suggests that not only pirates but also grain 
speculation was to blame for the shortage: merchants held stores back to 
                                                 
341 Brunt (1966: 26) agrees with the findings of Rudé (1981). 
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cause short supply and so force prices up.  Pompey dealt with the pirates by 
securing the supply lines from the main grain producing regions of Sicily, 
Sardinia and Africa.  Within forty days the seas were free of pirates and 
supplies secured (Cic. Imp. Pomp. 34; Liv. Per. 99; Plut. Pomp. 28; Dio 36.37.3; 
App. Mith. 95; Flacc. 29 f). 
 
Popular leaders competed with the senate for the favour of the hungry.  In 
the events of 62 BC we can see how the threat to the status quo posed by 
Catiline’s attractive proposal to deal with debt sent the more conservative 
members of the senate into a panic.  M. Cato convinced the senate to give 
the poor citizens a monthly allowance of grain at a cost to the treasury of 
1250 talents (Plut. Cat. Min. 26.1; Caes. 8.4).  Cato’s law must have subsidised 
grain so it was only costing the buyer 6 1/3 asses, for Cicero moans that 
under Clodius’ measure in 58 “nearly a fifth of the public income was to be 
lost by lowering the price of grain by 6 1/3 asses per measure” (Sest. 55).  
Also, Asconius (8C) records that Clodius’ law provided grain free of charge 
instead of 6 1/3 asses per modius.  That the senate passed a decree 
admitting “the poor and landless plebs” to the list of eligible recipients 
(Plut. Cat. Min. 26.1), suggests that they had been removed from the lists at 
some point (by the lex Octavia342 or the lex Terentia-Cassia).  The identity of 
                                                 
342 Octavius, an optimate, replaced Gracchus’ subsidised distributions with a less generous 
amount, maybe limiting the number of recipients.  The date of the lex Octavia is unclear: 
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those removed is unclear: Brunt suggests freedmen were targeted.343  
Rickman calculates that Cato doubled the number of those eligible.344  
Plutarch implies the Senate had to do something to steal the support of the 
poor and landless from Caesar, who had “proceeded to stir up the most 
corrupt and dissolute elements of the state to form a party in his support” – 
the corrupt and dissolute are equated in the next line with the poor and 
landless (Plut. Cat. Min. 26.1).  Rickman’s reasoning is more convincing: the 
senate needed to increase the number of recipients to compensate for the 
appeal of Catiline.  The poor could not be ignored.  The senate had to pass 
measures to address the interests of the many or face losing them to the 
other side. 
 
Clodius introduced the first ever free grain dole in 58 BC.345  That he should 
attach this proposal to a raft of popular legislation emphasises the pressure 
from his supporters among the urban plebs for more generous provision of 
food.  Such was the appeal of free food that rural poor immigrated to Rome 
                                                                                                                                         
Brunt (1971a: 377) places it between 121 and 119, but Rickman reckons it to be after 100 
(1980: 161 f.) 
 
343 Brunt (1971a: 377, 379). 
 
344 Rickman (1980: 170 f.). 
 
345 Cic. Sest. 55; Dom. 25; Asc. 8 C; Dio 38.13; Schol. Bob. 132 Stangl; Plut. Cic. 30. 
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and masters felt encouraged to free slaves.346  Some of these no doubt 
attached themselves as clients to Clodius, their patron and provider. The 
impact of more eligible recipients (plus poor harvests) put pressure on the 
supply – complicated also by merchants’ reluctance to deal with Clodius’ 
agent Sextus Cloelius, who had been put in charge of the entire grain supply 
(corn lands, contractors and storage).347  
 
As a consequence of the influx of immigrants and the supply issues, there 
was by 57 BC a severe shortage of grain.  The plebs vented their frustration 
by rioting twice this year: first at the ludi Apollinares in July and then at the 
ludi Romani in September.  The first demonstration is recorded only in 
Asconius’ commentary on the Pro Milone.  He calls the participants “infima 
coacta multitudo”, a collected multitude of the basest men, who caused a stir 
at the price of grain and expelled all the spectators from the theatre (Asc. 48 
C).  Even taking Cicero’s bias into account, for there is no doubt Asconius’ 
commentary reflects the tone of the original speech,348 we should not be 
                                                 
346  I agree with Brunt (1962: 69 f.) who interprets  Sallust’s comments regarding the influx 
of agricultural labourers to Rome tempted by the dole (Cat. 37.4-7) to be anachronistic, 
referring not to the 60s but to the situation  during the time he was writing, following the 
Lex Clodia.  Another reason to interpret Sallust’s comments with care is that in this section 
he is making a case for the corrupt state of Roman society, not the place to find objectivity.  
Rural poor moved to Rome, and masters freed slaves, for other reasons too, of course. 
 
347  Rickman (1980: 173 and 5), citing Cic. Dom. 25. 
 
348 Marshall (1985: 47) notes that not only does Asconius hesitate to disagree with Cicero 
even when the orator makes mistakes, but he also tends to accept Cicero’s statements at 
face value, adopting Cicero’s use of pejorative terms for instance. 
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surprised that it is the infima multitudo who are the first to feel the effects of 
expensive food.  It appears that the state supply had dried up and the crowd 
was protesting at the price of private suppliers.349  This demonstration was 
not spontaneous, as indicated by coacta, but there is no hint in Asconius as to 
who organised the demonstrators.  Vanderbroeck suggests the leader was 
Clodius as it was he who organised the second riot (see below).350  The 
demonstration was a success as the price of food dropped shortly after the 
event.  Not everyone, however, agrees that the demonstration was 
responsible for the price decrease.  Cicero gave himself the credit.  He 
suggests that the price fell because “in meo reditu spes otii et concordiae sita 
videbatur” (Dom. 15) following a senatorial decree proposing a bill for his 
recall (Dom. 14; Sest. 129).  In a speech to the people, he announced that the 
abundance and cheapness of corn was proof that the gods approved of his 
restoration (Red. pop. 18). 
 
We have much more detail on the demonstration at the ludi Romani thanks 
to Cicero’s involvement. 351  He had just returned from exile and the grain 
                                                                                                                                         
 
349 See Garnsey (1988: 203) for factors contributing to the shortage: speculation, harvest 
failure, the influx of people supporting Cicero’s return from exile (to whom I would add 
those attending the games), and the increased amount of recipients eligible for Clodius’ 
dole. 
 
350 Vanderbroeck (1987: 247). 
 
351 Vanderbroeck (1987: 249-251). 
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supply was precarious, both expensive and scarce.  Dio paints a chaotic 
picture of desperate hunger involving more than just the most desperate 
infima plebs who featured in the previous example.  This time the situation 
had worsened so that hunger drove a great throng of people to seek the 
attention of the senate: 
 
A sore famine had arisen in the city and the whole crowd (tou homilou 
pantos) rushed into the theatre and afterwards to the Capitol where the 
senators were in session, threatening at first to slay them with their own 
hands, and later to burn them alive, temples and all.  (39.9.2) 
 
According to Cicero, the senate was discussing the shortage of food at the 
time (Att. 4.1.6-7).  Cicero once more reduces the participants of the riot to 
the more humble, although this time not the infima plebs.352  The plebs pelted 
the senators with stones:  
 
If that [stoning] arose from the indignation of the common people (ex 
dolore plebei), without any one having stirred them up, it is a great 
misfortune; but if it was caused by the instigation of Publius Clodius, it is 
only the habitual wickedness of a wicked man: if both these causes 
existed, if there was both a fact sufficient of itself to excite the feelings of 
the multitude, and if there were leaders of sedition ready and forearmed, 
then, does it not seem natural for the republic to have had recourse to the 
protection of the consul and the loyalty of the senate? But it is quite plain 
that one of these causes did exist; that there was a difficulty obtaining 
provisions, and an extreme scarcity of corn, so that men were afraid not 
only of a continuance of high prices, but of actual famine. No one denies 
it. But I do not wish you, O priests, to suspect that that enemy of all 
                                                 
352 See below for the involvement of tabernarii, that is, men who were by no means destitute, 
but well enough off to run a shop, although lacking, of course, that landed property 
required to, as Mouritsen (2001: 140) has put  it “give them freedom and preserve their 
dignity and honour.” 
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tranquility and peace was likely to seize on this as a pretext for 
conflagration, and massacre, and rapine, unless you see it proved. (Dom. 
12) 
 
The orator alleges Clodius along with his armati duces Lollius and Sergius 
were responsible for inciting this violence, but note his hesitance in blaming 
them outright.  This should make us wonder if he had watertight evidence 
of Clodius’ role.  Cicero’s obfuscation may be attributed to rhetorical 
trickery, an effort to encourage his audience to convict Clodius themselves 
by shying away from doing so himself.353  Yet the possibility remains that 
Cicero was grasping at straws and had no proof that Clodius was behind the 
demonstration.  Q. Metellus fingered Sergius and Lollius for their 
involvement (Dom. 13), but that is not the same as identifying Clodius as 
protagonist. 
 
Analysis of Cicero’s depiction of L. Sergius and M. Lollius reveals the 
technique used by leaders to organise demonstrations.  Amid the slurs 
                                                 
353 Craig (2007: 266) observes that the tension between Cicero the persuader and Cicero the 
model public figure opens Cicero up to the charge of self-promotion, or, as here, self-
promotion via denigration of the foe, and notes the danger to the speaker of calling his 
bluff: “As exemplar of persuasion, the text invites us to imagine the speech as an oral 
performance before a specific audience, to assess Cicero’s persuasive goals and the 
challenges that he must overcome to achieve them, and to see our text as a representation of 
an act of the progressive manipulation of the audience.  This is the essence of persuasive 
process criticism.  But the depiction of Cicero the persuader is also the self-presentation of 
Cicero the model public figure.  This self-presentation may be seamlessly integrated with 
the depiction of an oral persuasive act.  But it may also weaken or break the illusion of oral 
performance, leaving the reader to judge it as a literary exercise in self-promotion cast 
within an oratorical genre.” 
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Cicero slings at Sergius, we discover he was “the exciter of the shopkeepers” 
(concitator tabernariorum) and that Clodius used “these leaders and others 
like them at the time when provisions were dear, under pretence of 
espousing the cause of the poor and ignorant, [to prepare] for sudden 
attacks on the consuls, on the senate, on the property and fortunes of the 
rich” (Dom. 13).  A reconstruction of the demonstration sees Sergius 
organising tabernarii to protest against the scarcity of grain.  Cicero 
purposefully misinterprets the attention the demonstrators pay to the 
consuls, senate and rich as a direct attack on their safety when a more 
honest (and fruitful) approach is to interpret these influential men as the 
obvious audience to be addressed by those seeking economic assistance. 
 
Cicero complained that Clodius enlisted slaves and gladiators to massacre 
the boni, but that the multitude cried out for Cicero, “the guardian and 
defender of the Capitol and of every temple,” to intervene (Dom. 5-7).354  
Thus he paints himself as the saviour of the state, much as he did when it 
came to his involvement in the Catilinarian Conspiracy: 
 
When the senate, in a very full house assembled in the temple of the all-
good and all-powerful Jupiter, had passed a decree touching my dignity 
with only one dissenting voice, all of a sudden, on that very day, a most 
unexpected cheapness followed a time when corn had been excessively 
                                                 
354 Cicero’s inclusion of temples here can be explained by the aim of the speech: to justify 
the removal of the temple dedicated to Libertas which Clodius had erected on the site of 
Cicero’s house.  See especially Dom. 141-147. 
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dear.  Some said, (and I myself am of that opinion,) that the immortal 
gods had shown their approbation of my return by this exercise of their 
power. But some traced that fact back, connecting it with this argument 
and opinion that, as all hopes of tranquillity and concord appeared to 
depend on my return, and as there was an incessant dread of sedition 
connected with my absence, so now that all fear of contest was almost at 
an end, they thought that the state of the corn-market was altered; and, 
because it again had become more unmanageable after my return, then 
corn was demanded of me, on whose arrival virtuous men were in the 
habit of saying that there would be cheapness.  (Dom. 14-15). 
 
In the end it was Pompey, with the help of Cicero’s rhetorical skills, who 
saved the people from starvation, as Dio relates:  
 
Cicero now persuaded them to elect Pompey as commissioner of the grain 
supply and to give him also on this account the office of proconsul for five 
years both in Italy and outside. So now in the case of the grain supply, as 
previously in the case of the pirates, he was once more to hold sway over 
the entire world then under Roman power.  (39.9.3) 
 
Dio’s account agrees with those of Cicero, Livy and Plutarch: Pompey was 
given charge of the grain supply (cura annonae) with imperium pro consule for 
5 years.355  The proposal came from the consuls Lentulus Spinther and 
                                                 
355“legem consules conscripserunt qua Pompeio per quinquennium omnis potestas rei 
frumentariae toto orbe terrarum daretur, alteram Messius qui omnis pecuniae dat 
potestatem et adiungit classem et exercitum et maius imperium in provinciis quam sit 
eorum qui eas obtineant. illa nostra lex consularis nunc modesta videtur, haec Messi non 
ferenda. Pompeius illam velle se dicit, familiares hanc.” “The consuls drew up a law by 
which complete control over the corn-supply for five years throughout the whole world 
was given to Pompey. A second law is drawn up by Messius, granting him power over all 
money, and adding a fleet and army, and an imperium in the provinces superior to that of 
their governors. After that our consular law seems moderate indeed: that of Messius is 
quite intolerable. Pompey professes to prefer the former; his friends [say he wants] the 
latter.” (Cic. Att. 4.1.6-7).  The senate decreed Pompey be given HS 40,000,000 for the rem 
frumentariam (Cic. QF 2.6).  “The fruitfulness of the land” was banished along with Cicero 
(Red. Sen 34).  See also Livy Per. 104 (Pompey was assigned supervision of the grain supply 
for five years); Plut. Pomp 49.4-5 (powers attacked by Clodius). 
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Caecilius Metellus, but with the opposition of Clodius who alleged the 
shortage of grain was manufactured to secure Pompey another command at 
a time when his power was withering away (Plut. Pomp. 49.5).  Clodius’ 
charge may have been motivated by a desire for revenge for a similar 
allegation levelled at him by Cicero, namely that Clodius had exacerbated a 
period of scarcity by keeping food in storage as a pretext to kindle sedition 
(Cic. Dom. 11f.).  On the other hand, Clodius may have been right to accuse 
Pompey: the food shortage was solved suspiciously quickly.  Clodius’ 
allegations suggest that this was due to Pompey’s releasing stores held back 
to create the necessity for his command, but there is insufficient evidence to 
corroborate this.  It is more likely the surplus was, as Plutarch records, the 
result of Pompey’s efforts: he collected grain personally from Sicily, Sardinia 
and Africa (Pomp. 50; Sardinia and Africa: Cic. Fam. 1.9.9). 
 
It is not clear what else Pompey did to alleviate the problem.  Rickman 
suggests that Pompey sought to organise the lists of recipients, that is 
register the manumitted slaves, though he doubts he went so far as to 
conduct a district-by-district recensus – this would not happen until Julius 
Caesar in 46.356  Nonetheless, the fact that popular pressure succeeded in 
persuading Cicero, Pompey and the senate to legislate the formation of a 
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special command with fifteen legati reflects the power of the threat of 
rebellion. 
 
From this study of grain distributions it is clear that the senate responded to 
crises, following the lead of individual reformers and inspired by popular 
pressure, to provide subsidised food in order to maintain stability and 
preserve the status quo.  In this way, then, the people had political power. 
 
 
CASE STUDY: THE RESTORATION OF TRIBUNICIA POTESTAS 
 
Examination of the restoration of tribunicia potestas reveals that consistent 
popular support was crucial.  Twice in the history of the Roman Republic 
the tribuni plebis lost their powers.  In the first instance, the tyrants of the 
second decemviral commission in 450 ignored the tribunes’ powers.  These 
were restored by the tribune M. Duilius in the wake of the Valerio-Horatian 
laws of 449 (Livy 3.55-56).  The second time was the result of Sulla’s reforms 
in 81.  This time some of their powers were not restored for more than ten 
years.  Citizens were active in both cases to restore the power of the tribunes 
because these men protected individual libertas and had in recent times 
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introduced bills promoting popular interests (commoda).357  Analysis of these 
two incidents will reveal popular methods of making the collective voice 
heard.  The people who attended contiones worked hard to see the 
restoration of tribunes’ powers so long as they were not distracted by offers 
of state-subsidised grain from opponents of the restoration.358   
 
The first time the tribunes lost their powers, the technique adopted to secure 
their restoration was wide-spread secession.  Livy describes how the 
soldiers mutinied and were joined by the civilians so that the city was left 
deserted, save for senators and a handful of old men (3.51-52).  The 
withdrawal was a peaceful one, and their collective will was appeased by 
the return of their tribunes’ powers to protect, specifically the restoration of 
the right of appeal (3.53). 
 
                                                 
357 In Sandberg’s 2001 study of legislative practice, he argues that before Sulla’s reform 
disempowered them, tribunes alone proposed rogationes to the tribal assembly.  Curule 
magistrates did not do so until the late Republic.  Curule magistrates were forced to 
legislate in the late Republic due to the “increasing tensions between the optimates and the 
populares which distinguish the Late Republic.  During this political struggle legislation was 
a crucial weapon; if the curule magistrates were affronted with a college of hostile tribunes, 
they had no other choice than summoning the people themselves if they wished to enact a 
comitial law in a civil assembly.  However, it is contended here that it was only with the 
reforms of Sulla that consuls and praetors were formally given the right to legislate before 
the tribes” (Sandberg, 2001: 147). 
 
358 Marshall and Beness (1987: 363).  The second tactic of the opponents of the restoration 
was to destroy any tribunes that emerged as agitators. 
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Tribunicia potestas was seriously diluted a second time when Sulla’s 
legislation made tribuni plebis powerless to introduce bills to the assembly 
(Liv. Per 89) and reined in their ius intercessionis.  We know that their right to 
veto was limited because the tribune Opimius was prosecuted when he used 
his veto in violation of Sulla’s law (Cic. Verr. 2.1.155).  It is a little puzzling, 
then, that Caesar says tribunes never lost their ius intercessionis (BC 1.5.1, 
1.7.3).  He may be serving his own purpose in these passages, however, as 
his aim was to discredit the senators with whom he was then struggling by 
implying that they treated tribunes even worse than the notorious foe of the 
magistracy, Sulla.  Another possibility is that Caesar misinterpreted Sulla’s 
modification of the veto as a complete removal of the power.  For it appears 
tribunes retained a residual right: they were able to use their veto to 
intervene if the rights of an individual were at stake, as Cicero records that 
Sulla did not deprive them of their ius auxili ferendi (Cic. Leg. 3.22).   
 
While Sulla retained this one ius crucial to the protection of popular libertas, 
he did away with another: the right of a tribune to stand for further office 
(App. BC 1.100; Asc. 67 C, 78 C; Ps. –Ascon. 255 Stangl).  This diluted 
popular power as it dissuaded aspiring politicians from considering the 
tribunate as part of their career.  As we saw with C. Gracchus, the tribunate 
could be used to improve the material conditions of the people.  Sulla’s 
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measure sounded the death knell for the tribunate as a rung in the ladder of 
the cursus honorum.  At first sight it appears Sulla made the tribunate a dead-
end job to prevent his opponents from harnessing popular power to use 
against him and the senate.  As Keaveney has noted, the actions of tribunes 
in Sulla’s lifetime had threatened the peace and stability of Rome, and the 
pre-eminence of the senate over other organs of state.359  A desire to 
suppress men who might cause him trouble may have been part of Sulla’s 
motivation, but he may also have had a more altruistic reason.  The move 
benefitted the state as it reduced the corruption that came with the 
manipulation of tribunes.  Patrons had seduced tribunes with the promise of 
future support to attain higher office, so long as during their term in office 
the tribunes did the bidding of their patrons.  Marius was an expert at 
winning tribunes over to his cause.  He used the tribune Manlius Mancinus 
in this way as the rogator of the bill to hand command against Jugurtha over 
to himself (Sall. BJ 73.7).  He also utilised the skills and office of Saturninus 
when he was tribune.360 
 
Cicero claims Sulla introduced another restriction to the tribunate: he 
forbade any tribune to summon a contio, and states that Quinctius was the 
                                                 
359 Keaveney (2005: 140). 
 
360 See Chapter Five below for Saturninus’ attempts to pass legislation for the distribution of 
land to Marius’ veterans. 
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first to mount the rostra (Cic. Cluent. 110).  This is surely an exaggeration, 
however, for we find tribunes addressing the people in contionibus as early 
as 76 (see below).  It is likely Cicero refers not to a law banning contiones, but 
to a brief hiatus during which tribunes feared the repercussions should they 
disobey one of Sulla’s commands.  Once Sulla was dead and buried, 
tribunes ignored the prohibition. 
 
Popular pressure resulted in the gradual restoration of these powers.   But 
not without a fight.  Opponents used two tactics to prevent the restoration 
of tribunician powers: first, they distracted the people from political 
problems by emphasising economic problems, namely food shortages, then 
solving them by providing state-subsidised grain distributions.361  Popular 
agitation declined when grain distributions occurred: in 75 and 74 aediles 
made distributions, and in 73 the senate bit the bullet and finally reinstated 
grain subsidised by the state after eight years of none.  The wealthy 
distracted the hungry with grain distributions, and it was not until 
Palicanus secured Pompey’s support that tribunician power was restored.362 
 
                                                 
361 Marshall and Beness (1987: 362 f.). 
 
362 It is interesting to note that even following the restoration of tribunician powers, grain 
distribution remained a means of winning popular support: Crassus, for instance, not only 
laid on a massive public banquet on 10,000 tables, but also provided grain enough to last 
each man three months (Plut. Crass. 12.2). 
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Magistrates and inhabitants of Rome used several methods to bring about 
reform of the tribunate.  Some adopted the constitutional route and put 
forward bills designed to repeal the leges Corneliae, while others sought to 
undermine senatorial authority in order to win the popular support they 
needed to ensure the success of their legislation.  Those senators who 
refused to acknowledge the existence of judicial corruption also helped 
hasten the restoration of the tribunes’ powers.  Cicero states that the 
demand of the populus Romanus for the restoration was really concealing 
their true desire for honest law courts (Verr. 1.44).  While we may doubt the 
reliability of his claim, given that the context of his claim was the trial of 
Verres for corruption, there may be truth in it: the same connection between 
senatorial corruption in the law courts and restoration of tribunes’ powers is 
a theme of the Pro Cluentio (see below). 
 
M. Aemilius Lepidus, consul in 78, was the first to propose the return of 
tribunician powers (Sall, Hist. 1.77.14M), after originally opposing the 
motion earlier in his consulship (Gran. Lic. 33-35 F.).363  Lepidus’ efforts to 
repeal Sulla’s measures came to nothing, however, as he fell out with his 
                                                 
363 Marshall and Beness (365) accept this conclusion of Rice Holmes (The Roman Republic and 
the Founder of the Empire, Oxford 1923, Vol. I, 367 f.).  Sallust and Licinianus are the sources, 
but contradictory.  Sallust has L. Marcius Philippus say that Lepidus demanded restoration 
of tribunician powers (Hist. 1.77.14M; cf. 1.73 M) in his speech in response to Lepidus’ 
demand for a second consulship (1.77.15). Licianus records that Lepidus opposed 
restoration (Gran. Lic. 33-35F). 
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consular colleague Catulus and other Sullans, marched on Rome, was 
defeated, then died after fleeing to Sardinia (App. BC 1.107; Plut. Pomp. 16; 
Livy Per. 90). 
 
The first tribune to attempt to restore the powers of the tribunate was 
Sicinius (Ps. –Asc. 189 St.).  In 76 Sallust’s Macer tells us that Sicinius “dared 
to talk about tribunician power, but had been stopped to the 
accompaniment of your [the plebs’] mutterings” (Sall. Hist. 3.48.8 M).  The 
consul C. Scribonius Curio then “played the despot to the extent of ruining a 
guiltless tribune” (ad exitium usque insontis tribuni dominatus est, Sall. Hist. 
3.48.10 M).  McGushin interprets this fragment to mean that Curio 
destroyed the tribune politically, through some trumped-up charge, rather 
than physically having him assassinated.364  Sicinius disappears from the 
sources after his tribunate, thus illustrating the effectiveness of this tactic for 
those who defended the Sullan constitution: one way to negate the 
opposition was to eliminate them.  The only other information we have on 
Sicinius is that he had a “coarse but hilarious wit” (homo impurus, sed 
admodum ridiculus, Cic. Brut. 216), which is reinforced by the anecdote 
provided by Cicero (ib. 217).  Sicinius was also wary of Crassus, indicating 
he was politically savvy and so a threat to his opponents:  
                                                 
364 McGushin (1994: 91). 
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Sicinnius [sic], who gave the greatest annoyance to the magistrates and 
popular leaders of his day, when asked why Crassus was the only one 
whom he let alone and did not worry, said that the man had hay on his 
horns.  Now the Romans used to coil hay about the horn of an ox that 
gored, so that those who encountered it might be on their guard.  (Plut. 
Crass. 7.9) 
 
Again his wit comes through in Plutarch’s account, but more than that we 
get a picture of his influence: he annoyed not only magistrates (such as 
Curio, above) but also popular leaders (demagogoi).  The language is 
tantalisingly obscure, but may explain why Sicinius’ fellow tribunes receive 
no mention: they did not support his antagonistic method, or perhaps his 
aim to restore the powers to tribunes.365 
 
It should be noted that these instances of tribunes addressing their fellow 
citizens from the rostra challenge the reliability of Cicero’s claim that they 
were forbidden under Sulla’s laws to address the people in contionibus.  It 
may well be, however, if Cicero is correct, that as the first group to challenge 
Sulla’s prohibition, these men were perceived to have acted outside the law.  
Although we suggested above that Sulla passed no law actually forbidding 
the practice, nonetheless his ban was enough that their contiones failed to 
make as much impression as they might have had they enjoyed official 
                                                 
365 Marshall and Beness (1987: 67) suggest the pressure for reform was not consistent and 
note that there was no popular outcry at Sicinius’ demise, only murmurings as noted in 
Macer’s speech in Sallust (Hist. 3.48.8.M). 
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sanction.  Without the right to lawfully mount the rostra and address the 
people in contione, the tribune’s ability to act as rogator was severely 
diminished.  Hence the need to find a champion outside the tribunate to 
restore the office’s power.  The other possibility is that Cicero ignored the 
actions of Sicinius and Opimius because his focus in the Pro Cluentio was 
Quinctius.366 
 
The following year it appears that the tribune Q. Opimius had learnt from 
his predecessor’s mistakes and made sure he had both popular backing and 
the support of a curule magistrate, the consul C. Aurelius Cotta.  Rome was 
in the grip of a severe food shortage to which the people reacted by chasing 
the consuls (Sall. Hist. 2.45M, see above).  Cotta, one of these consuls, and 
Opimius harnessed this popular enthusiasm.  A question remains, however, 
regarding the object of the people’s zeal: did they want a return of 
tribunician power or food?367  In the end the people got both thanks to 
factional competition to win their favour.  The motives of the tribune and 
the consul are also far from clear: the ancient sources suggest that Cotta and 
Opimius sought to appease the people, rather than to win back popular 
                                                 
366 Thus Marshall and Beness (1987: 371). 
 
367 Marshall and Beness (1987: 368 f.) 
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support following Hortensius’ grain distribution (Cic. Verr. 2.3.215).368  
According to Macer, Cotta was motivated by fear to propose his measure 
permitting tribunes to stand for further office (Sall. Hist. 3.48.8M). Pseudo-
Asconius makes no mention of Cotta and gives sole responsibility to 
Opimius, obviously an oversight (255 St.).  More recent historians offer 
varied interpretations.  Syme maintains that “Cotta spoke to deprecate ill-
feeling and conciliate popular favour, not to support or thwart any law”, 
while Seager suggests Cotta’s aim was to gain popularity for his brother 
who stood for the consulship of 74.369   
 
Whatever the motive behind the lex Aurelia, the law roused much popular 
enthusiasm and not a little disapproval amongst the nobiles (Asc. 66 C).  The 
reformers may have won over the people, but they had further alienated the 
oligarchy.  As a result, both Cotta and Opimius suffered a backlash: in 74 the 
senate revoked some of Cotta’s laws which dealt with trivial matters 
(according to Cicero it was Cotta himself who proposed this: Asc. 67C), and 
charged Opimius with inappropriate use of the veto (Cic. Verr. 2.1.155-157).  
If Sallust correctly captures the spirit of the moment, then the Aurelian law 
for partial restoration of tribune’s prestige (Asc. 78C), if not power, was a 
                                                 
368 Keaveney (1982: 58) believes Cotta sought to appease the people as he was unnerved by 
the their pursuing him and as a result “cracked”. 
 
369 Syme (1964: 200); Seager (1994: 211)  
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sop to the people to pacify their discontent in hard times, with war abroad 
(Sertorius was threatening the senate from Spain) and famine at home.  For 
Sallust has Cotta deliver a speech begging the people to “endure adversity 
and look to the interests of the commonwealth” (Sall. Hist. 2.47M).  The 
theme of the speech is compromise for the sake of the Republic, a theme 
reflected in the measures of both Hortensius and his Sullan supporters, and 
the tribune and his consular patron. 
 
An important step had been made in 75, but tribunes still lacked their 
essential powers: ius intercessionis and the ability to summon the concilium 
plebis.  That is, they were still unable to propose bills.  L. Quinctius was the 
next to try his hand at restoration of powers (Ps. –Asc. 189 St.).370  In 74 he 
made sure he had popular support by successfully prosecuting a judge for 
bribing his jury, corruption in the law courts being a popular issue in the 
70s.371  But in the end he made little progress other than building up 
momentum for those who followed; the consul Lucullus stymied his efforts 
at reform. 
 
                                                 
370 In another strange omission, Pseudo-Asconius fails to mention Opimius and Macer in 
this list of tribunes who worked to restore tribunicia potestas. 
 
371 Marshall and Beness (1987: 371) advance a similar theory. 
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The multitudo did enjoy some success in combination with their champion, 
Quinctius.  Cicero tells us that Quinctius was a homo maxime popularis who 
had his finger on the pulse of those who frequented the Forum (qui omnes 
rumorum et contionum ventos collegere consuesset).  It is implied that he 
gathered information from these citizens.  From the point of view of the 
populus, then, the Forum was the place to go to voice one’s opinion with a 
view to seeking resolution to problems.  With information gathered in this 
way, Quinctius decided that the senatorial courts had such a bad reputation 
that he could use this to his own advantage.  And so he accused the jurors of 
being bribed during Oppianicus’ trial in 74 (Cluent. 77) and alleged that the 
president of the court (iudex quaestionis), Junius, failed to take an official oath 
and did not fill a vacancy among the jurors (ib. 89 ff.).  The bad reputation of 
certain jurors combined with the authority of Quinctius’ office (Quinctius 
was homo cum summa potestate) and his ability to kindle the passions of the 
multitudo to stimulate such a public outcry (clamor) that Junius was removed 
not only from his office (de foro) but even de civitate (79).  From the case of 
Quinctius it is clear that the Forum was the centre of operations during this 
period for those who wanted reform, whether they were members of the 
multitudo or the senatorial order.  It also highlights the reciprocal 
effectiveness of an articulate orator and a stroppy crowd.  Cicero compares 
his own silent audience in 66 to the raucous crowd Quinctius addressed in 
74: 
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The accuser was a tribune of the plebs, whether on the platform or before 
the people, a tribune still (idem in contionibus, idem ad subsellia); and he not 
only came into court straight from his contio but even brought it with him.  
The Aurelian steps yonder – they were new then – might have been built 
to serve as an auditorium for the case: and when the accuser had filled 
them with an excited crowd (concitatis hominibus), there was no possibility 
of speaking for the accused; nor even of rising to speak. (Cluent. 93) 
 
While it is clear from this passage that Cicero thinks little of Quinctius’ 
demogogic techniques372 (not to mention his mores et adrogantiam, 111), there 
is an inescapable hint of grudging admiration for his oratorical skills 
(habetur una atque altera contio vehemens et gravis, 77).  Nonetheless,  despite 
Cicero’s shared interest in the crusade to clean up the juries, there is no 
denying that Cicero’s denunciation of Quinctius is thorough.  He even goes 
so far as to exaggerate the effect of his departure from public life, claiming 
that the next year things returned to normal (Cluent. 103), which is unlikely 
given the food shortages attested to in 73.373   
 
Quinctius’ efforts, however, were not all successful.  As in the previous year, 
attempts were made by the oligarchy to appease the people with grain 
                                                 
372 Consider also his comments on the effect of an accomplished speaker on the Roman 
people: “From this [experience with Junius and Quinctius] it was clear that, as has often 
been said: as the sea, though naturally calm, becomes rough and stormy beneath a strong 
wind, so is it with the populus Romanus; peaceable enough when left to themselves, the 
speech of a demagogue can rouse them like a furious gale” (sua sponte esse placatum, 
hominum seditiosorum vocibus ut violentissimis tempestatibus concitari, 138). 
 
373 See below on the lex Cassia-Terentia. 
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distributions.  Although there is no clear indication of which faction he 
favoured, the examples of Hortensius in 75 and the lex Terentia-Cassia in 73 
would suggest that M. Seius was on the side of the Sullan aristocracy.  
Again they sought to win over popular support from the reformers by 
encouraging Seius, an aedile, to fill the people’s bellies (Cic. Off. 2.58; cf. 
Pliny NH. 15.2 for Seius regulating the price of olive oil).  His distribution of 
grain at one as per modius gained him such popularity that statues of him 
were erected on the Capitoline and Palatine, and, upon his death, his body 
was borne on the shoulders of the populace to his cremation (Pliny NH 
18.16). 
 
Like Sicinius before him, Quinctius’ efforts inspired the intervention of a 
member of the opposing faction.  When Macer provides the bare outline of 
the fates of his predecessors, he laments Curio’s destruction of Sicinius, and 
the animosity with which Lucullus moved against Quinctius (Sall. Hist. 
3.48.11 M).  Similarly Plutarch notes Lucullus’ role in allaying Quinctius’ 
ambition, although his tone resembles as much that of the tribune’s 
opponents as Sallust’s does the reforming tribunes: the consul applied 
pressure to the tribune both privately and in public to change his mind, and 
is praised by Plutarch for dealing with a potentially dangerous situation 
wisely (Plut. Luc. 5.4).  Lucullus failed to completely ruin Quinctius, 
however.  We hear of the erstwhile tribune securing the praetorship in 68 
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and making life difficult for Lucullus by proposing successors to Lucullus’ 
command against Mithridates (Plut. Luc. 33.5). 
 
Macer was the penultimate tribune to take on the establishment in an effort 
to return tribunes to their former position and power.  The survival of a 
fragment of Sallust’s Historiae containing a speech purportedly made by 
Macer offers mixed blessings: on the one hand it is the only extant speech of 
a tribune from the 70s, but on the other it is impossible to tell how much is 
Sallustian invention.  Syme suggests that Sallust may have had access to 
tribunician harangues from earlier times contained in Macer’s historical 
work, along with tradition, his imagination, and the recollections of old 
men.374  Assuming Sallust would not have dared stray too far from the truth, 
especially given the existence of people who had witnessed the event, then 
Macer’s speech offers an invaluable insight into the methods of a tribune.  
He gained popular support by denouncing his opponents as a factio 
noxiorum (3.48.3M), and proceeded to expatiate on the theme of corruption 
in the law courts and senatorial misrule.  He did not, however, counsel 
violence (3.48.17M); rather he exhorted the people to stop talking and take 
action:  
 
                                                 
374 Syme (1964: 207). 
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"Quid censes igitur?" aliquis uostrum subiecerit. Primum omnium, 
omittendum morem hunc quem agitis, impigrae linguae, animi ignaui, 
non ultra contionis locum memores libertatis; deinde – ne uos ad uirilia 
illa uocem, quo tribunos plebei, modo patricium magistratum, libera ab 
auctoribus patriciis suffragia maiores uostri parauere – cum uis omnis, 
Quirites, in uobis sit et quae iussa nunc pro aliis toleratis, pro uobis agere 
aut non agere certe possitis, Iouem aut alium quem deum consultorem 
expectatis? Magna illa consulum imperia et patrum decreta uos 
exsequendo rata efficitis, Quirites; ultroque licentiam in uos auctum atque 
adiutum properatis. (3.48.14-16M) 
 
The Quirites should exercise their rights and not vote for those who profit at 
the expense of the people.  As Marshall and Benness note, “there was still 
the need in 73 to secure more consistent popular enthusiasm for tribunician 
reform.”375 
 
The battle to win the hearts of the Roman people once more turned to their 
stomachs.  The consuls passed a food bill, which Macer viewed with 
distrust, a bribe to purchase the citizens’ freedom at five measures, no more 
than prison rations (3.48.19M).376  That M. Terentius Varro Lucullus was 
acting to undermine the tribune’s efforts is reinforced by Cicero’s judgement 
that the consul was inimicus tribuniciae potestatis (Asc. 79C).   
 
                                                 
375 Marshall and Beness (1987: 373 f.). 
 
376 Cicero records it was Verres’ responsibility to purchase grain in Sicily “ex senatus 
consulto et ex lege Terentia et Cassia” (Verr. 2.3.163).  See also Cic. Verr. 2.3.173 and 5.52 on 
Verres’ duty according to the lex Terentia et Cassia. 
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The tribune M. Lollius Palicanus finally secured Pompey’s support (Ps.-Asc. 
189 St.). Palicanus managed to have Pompey address a contio summoned by 
the tribune (Cic. Verr. 1. 45). It is a mystery how he did it, especially as 
Sallust has a low opinion of him.  He was of humble origin and not eloquent 
but loquacious – the secret to gaining Pompey’s backing may have been 
their shared birthplace, Picenum (Hist. 4.43M).377  Supported by the 
equestrian order, the urban plebs and “omnes qui favent tribuniciae 
potestati” (Ps.-Asc. 220 St.), Pompey and Crassus restored tribunicia potestas 
(Ps.-Asc. 189 St., Livy, Per. 96).  Cicero defends Pompey’s role in the 
restoration against Quintus’ subtle (staged) attack (Leg. 3.22-26).  He asserts 
that Pompey was right to back the reform as the potestas was essential to the 
civitas since the power so eagerly sought by the people could not easily be 
dispensed with now they knew what it was.  Cicero concludes his argument 
in defence of the tribunate by claiming that it was “the duty of a wise 
citizen, in dealing with an institution not evil in itself and so dear to the 
people that it could not be resisted, not to abandon its defence to a popular 
leader, which would have had evil consequences” (Leg. 3.26).  He does not 
count Pompey a popularis!  And yet Cicero himself provides evidence of 
Pompey’s populist method.  To secure popular support for the restoration of 
power to the tribunate, Pompey made it the subject of his first contio as 
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consul-elect in 71.  The people cheered him when he announced his 
intention to restore powers: “his words elicited a murmuring noise 
(strepitus) of grateful approval from the assembly”.  Cicero, however, then 
slips into rhetorical mode and adds that the response from the populus 
Romanus was much louder (maximus clamor) for his criticism of senatorial 
governors and jurors (Verr. 1.44 f.), for it is a theme of this speech that 
corruption in the provinces and law courts must be addressed.  It is 
possible, then, that Cicero is underrepresenting the popularity of Pompey’s 
proposal to make his point. 
 
In little over a decade, then, popular pressure resulted in the restoration of 
tribunician power by convincing Pompey that the popular support derived 
from this action would help secure his position, and election to the 
consulship.  The evidence of Appian and Plutarch reinforces that of Cicero 
above: Pompey appealed to popular sentiment by promising the restoration 
of tribunician powers, though the chronology of these two sources disagrees 
with that of Cicero, who ought to be preferred as he is a primary source: 
Appian and Plutarch place his announcement before his election, suggesting 
it was part of Pompey’s election platform (App. BC 1.121; Plut. Pomp. 21.3-
5).378  Plutarch emphasises that by passing this measure Pompey had chosen 
                                                 
378 This chronological issue has been noted by Marshall and Beness (1987: 375). 
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the best way to thank the people for the favour they had shown him – and 
that had someone else beaten him to it he could not have found a better 
means of showing his gratitude.  Military glory was not enough on its own 
to win over the urban plebs, whose support he needed to compete with the 
more established nobiles and their amici and clientes.  Conservative efforts to 
distract the hungry by bribing them with food delayed the result, but in the 
end Macer and Palicanus won the support of the populist Pompey. 
 
 
CASE STUDY: DEBT RELIEF 
 
Debt relief had long been a burning issue in the respublica.  From the 
opening years of the Republic citizens had been contending with the senate 
to reduce the burden of debt bondage and the arbitrary mistreatment of 
debtors by creditors: Livy records desire for debt reform was so great that it 
inspired the first secessio plebis (2.23-30).379  Not everyone, however, agrees 
with Livy.  Forsythe, for example, claims it is illogical to explain the creation 
of tribunician ius auxilii in response to the debt crisis when it is obvious from 
the Twelve Tables that tribunes could not intervene to save debtors.380  But 
is Forsythe here not guilty of chronological compression?  The Twelve 
                                                 
379 For analysis of events in 495-494 see Chapter Two. 
 
380 Forsythe (2005: 173). 
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Tables date to 451-450, whereas this first secession took place in 494.  The 
codification reflects the laws of a different generation to that of the first 
generation of the Republic.  As noted above, the effect of the Twelve Tables 
was to regulate the punishment of defaulting debtors, not to do away with 
the institution of nexum and the benefits that came with it, viz. the supply of 
dependent labourers to wealthy owners of landed estates. 
 
There was a major debt crisis in the early fourth century, brought on by 
wars with Latins and other neighbours, plus expensive building projects.  
The situation was so dire that Manlius Capitolinus, the erstwhile saviour of 
Rome when the Gauls attacked, lost his life in a bid to provide a cure for his 
countrymen’s indebtedness.  According to Livy, Capitolinus was executed 
for trying to protect debtors by discharging their debt from his own 
personal fortune.  Livy tells us he was the first patrician to intercede in this 
fashion and “turn demagogue” (popularis factus, Livy 6.11.7).381  Although he 
is critical of Manlius’ motives, Livy cannot help but acknowledge that the 
problem existed: freemen were terrified of the thought of chains and 
imprisonment (6.11.8).   
 
                                                 
381 Oakley (1997: ad loc) reminds us that Livy has forgotten earlier describing Publicola as 
popularis in Book 2. 
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Manlius’ technique for rousing popular support reveals a politician who 
used, along with good old fasioned bribery, the passion of another man to 
elicit a positive response.  Livy says Manlius first won the people over with 
speeches and deeds that appeared popularia but were in truth tumultuosa 
(Livy, 6.14.2).  The historian maintains the image of Manlius the demagogue.  
By public display of generosity, he paid off the debt of a condemned 
centurion about to be led away to bondage and so set the old soldier free.  
As a result he was hailed as parens plebis Romanae (6.14.3-6).382  He had the 
support not only of the plebs, but also a band of retainers, in the late 
Republican fashion (caterva sua, 6.14.3).  By this point, the crowd was 
tumultuosa, due in part to the centurion’s scars and tales of sacrifice (6.14.6). 
The centurion specifically placed the blame for his state of penury on usury, 
as interest piled up on his loan during his absence from home while fighting 
and then while rebuilding his house (6.14.7).  He further excited the plebs by 
praising Manlius and promising to devote what remained of his strength, 
life and blood to him (6.14.8).  Once the centurion had warmed the crowd 
up for him, Manlius stepped in and offered the farm which formed the main 
part of his fortune to the plebs to save anyone else from being condemned 
and led off into slavery.  And so he ensured that, as Livy put it, “per omne 
fas ac nefas secuturi vindicem libertatis viderentur” (6.14.9f.).  Livy is torn 
                                                 
382 Oakley (1997: ad loc.) and Forsythe (2005: 261) suggest this is a doublet of the centurion 
anecdote told at 2.23.1-8 and Dion. Hal. 6.26.1-2 (analysed above). 
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between terming him a tyrant on the one hand, and a champion of popular 
liberty on the other, and in so doing unwittingly concedes that Rome had a 
serious debt problem. 
 
Manlius had yet another means of eliciting popular support in addition to 
promising to address the problem of debt relief via speeches given in the 
Forum.  He also delivered sermones at home in the style of a contio (Livy, 
6.14.11, 18.3 and 19.1).  Here Livy dips into the pool of seditious stereotypes: 
the holding of contiones at home is a Catilinarian motif,383 and so increases 
the sense of conspiracy.  But then Livy changes tack and addresses the issue 
of senatorial corruption, thus balancing his criticism of Manlius’ 
demagoguery with a negative portrayal of Rome’s ruling elite.  Manlius’ 
sermones were full of allegations levelled at the patres: if they used the Gallic 
gold they had stashed away for themselves, they could clear the plebs of 
debt (6.14.11).  The senators took fright and summoned the dictator, A. 
Cornelius Cossus, from the army.  Cossus first gave a speech in the curia to 
make sure he had sufficient senatorial support to take on Manlius and the 
plebs, then he entered the Comitium surrounded by a multitudo of his 
supporters,384 before he sent for Manlius, who arrived with a great train of 
                                                 
383  Oakley (1997: ad loc); Kraus (1994: ad loc).  
 
384 Kraus (1994: ad loc) notes that multitudo can mean gang, citing Lintott (1999:a 61).  See 
how Cicero uses the term in this way when he asks Atticus to gather a multitudo to help 
secure his recall (Att. 3.23.5). 
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his own followers from amongst the plebs (agmine ingenti).  Manlius 
convinced them to accompany him by announcing that the time had arrived 
for the contest (certamen) with the senators (Livy, 6.15.1-4).  Cossus called 
Manlius’ bluff and offered him the chance to get the gold off those who had 
it, and, if he failed, it would prove that he was a liar and the stolen gold did 
not exist.  But Manlius was not to be outdone.  He replied that the dictator 
had been appointed to attack himself and the plebs, not the Volsci, Latins 
and Hernici (6.15.5ff.).  When Manlius refused to produce the gold, Cossus 
had him arrested.  So great was his popularity that magna pars plebis put on 
mourning and multi mortales let their beards grow as a sign of mourning 
(6.16.1-4).   
 
The response to Manlius’ imprisonment offers insight into the role of 
rumour in spreading news and informing the people of Rome of 
incidents.385  It was like communicating news by “Chinese Whispers,” 
where opinions and judgements adhere to the original information and 
transform it into something new.  Along with public oratory, rumour was 
the main means of communication in Roman politics.  But why does Livy 
include rumour in this passage?  One commentator has suggested that Livy 
                                                                                                                                         
 
385 See Laurence (1994) on rumour as a means of communication in Roman politics. 
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uses this technique when he wants to claim no responsibility for the opinion 
contained in the rumour.386   
 
In the case of Manlius, we have already seen the effect of speeches; now it is 
the turn of rumour: the plebs grew restive following the dictator’s defeat of 
the Volsci, because there were rumours that the senate granted him a 
triumph not for this victory in the field, but for his victory at home over 
Manlius (6.16.5-6).  Thus the actions of the senate brought about that which 
they had most feared.  Had they not reacted against Manlius’ well 
intentioned actions to relieve debt, the plebs would not have grown 
seditious.  The senate tried to dissipate the tension by ordering two 
thousand citizens to establish a colony at Satricum, but the move back-fired 
on them when this remedy aggravated the sedition as the land parcels were 
considered too small, and given to too few, and came at the cost of Manlius’ 
betrayal (6.16.6-7).  Indeed, rumour made much of this betrayal of a 
defender of popular liberty and dwelt on the unreliability of the plebs and 
the fickleness of their loyalty: they had abandoned Sp. Cassius and Sp. 
Maelius at similar critical points in their campaigns for land and food 
distributions (6.17.1-5).   
 
                                                 
386 Kraus (1994: ad loc). 
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Manlius’ seditious activity continued into the following year with meetings 
of the plebs held night and day at his house so that he might discuss his 
plans with the leaders of the revolution (cum principibus novandarum rerum 
interdiu noctuque consilia agitat, 6.18.3).  Livy has Manlius deliver a speech, 
reminding the plebs of their strength in comparison to that of their enemy, 
and emphasising the desire to fight is more fierce amongst those fighting for 
their libertas than it is amongst men who fight for dominatio.  He promised to 
be patronus plebis.  But then he made his fatal mistake: he appealed to the 
plebs to give him a more significant title of imperium or honos so that he 
might have the power to better attain their wishes (6.18.5-15).  Livy created 
this speech to make his point: he has ceased to paint Manlius as a protector 
of libertas and now portrays him as an out-and-out tyrant, agitating for 
regnum (6.18.16).  He ends his representation of Manlius’ position by 
commenting on the lack of information in his sources on the length to which 
his plans had matured, which indicates that he was following an earlier 
tradition rather than creating a speech out of thin air in order to cast 
Manlius as tyrant.  There existed an established tradition that traced the fall 
of Manlius, but not one that was sufficiently coherent or reliable to convince 
Livy to include material from it.387  This reluctance on the part of the ancient 
historian must make us wonder how reliable the account contained in Livy 
                                                 
387 Kraus (1994: ad loc). 
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is when it comes to other aspects of Manlius’ career, and indeed whether he 
was aiming for regnum rather than his initial stated aim of defending the 
freedom of the plebs. 
 
There are undoubtedly inaccurate details in Livy.  Above we noted late 
Republican accretions regarding his accounts of the secessions of the plebs.  
In the Manlian passage there is one glaring inaccuracy: the anachronistic 
senatus consultum ultimum (6.19.3).  The first attested SCU was passed in 121 
against Gaius Gracchus and his followers.388  Its presence here reinforces 
Manlius’ connection with the late Republican politicians who were declared 
enemies of the state by this, the ultimate decree.389  One thing, however, is 
certain.  M. Manlius Capitolinus caused, as Forsythe puts it, “some kind of 
major disturbance” in the 380s.390  The incontravertible evidence is provided 
by the fact that the Manlian clan forbade anyone ever have the praenomen 
Marcus again and this restraint was adhered to (Livy, 6.20.14).  In addition, 
the foundation of colonies two years later suggests an effort to release 
pressure on social and economic tensions.391  The suppression of Manlius 
                                                 
388 On the SCU see Lintott (1999a: 149-174). 
 
389 Kraus (1994 ad loc).  See also Forsythe (2005: 260 f.) on Manlius’ heavy resemblance to 
Catiline. 
 
390 Forsythe (2005: 261). 
 
391 Forsythe (2005: 262). 
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did not get rid of the debt problem: there was further agitation on the same 
issue in 380 and 378, with the lot of the plebs made worse by the 
construction of the massive “Servian” wall, paid for by new taxes.392  Even 
though the detail may contain anachronisms, the sheer amount of laws 
dedicated to the issue of debt relief guarantee that the problem existed. 
 
Livy’s narrative of the mid-fourth century also suggests there was a debt 
crisis at the time – a crisis to which the plebs responded by electing men to 
the tribunate who would represent their interests.  This was the case in 367 
when again the huge load of debt threatened res novandae:  “[aeris alieni] 
levamen mali plebes nisi suis in summo imperio locatis nullum speraret” 
(6.35.1).  The plebs had no hope of relief unless they secured summum 
imperium for men from amongst their own number.  They also sought to be 
equal to the patricians in honos et virtus (6.35.2).  For this reason the plebs 
elected G. Licinius and L. Sextius tribunes of the plebs, men who 
promulgated laws aimed at redistributing patrician wealth to plebeians: 
 
Creatique tribuni C. Licinius et L. Sextius promulgauere leges omnes 
aduersus opes patriciorum et pro commodis plebis: unam de aere alieno, 
ut deducto eo de capite quod usuris pernumeratum esset id quod 
superesset triennio aequis portionibus persolueretur. (6.35.4)393 
 
                                                 
392 Cornell (1995: 331).  Livy blames building for the piling up of debts in 385 (6.11.9). 
 
393 On the regulation of interest and the Licinio-Sextian laws in general, see Forsythe (2005: 
262-267). 
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A tremendous struggle ensued as the patres tried to prevent the passage of 
the laws by enlisting the support of tribunes to veto the proposals.  These 
tribunes surrounded themselves with a guard (praesidium) of patricians and 
prevented the bills from being read out.  But Sextius fought fire with fire 
and used the opposing tribunes’ tactic to veto the election of curule 
magistrates (at this time, military tribunes rather than consuls, 6.35.6-10).  
Eventually, however, the reformers relented.  The people of Tusculum had 
appealed for help from Rome to lift the seige set on them by Velitrae, and 
the plebs felt shame at not helping their fellow citizens, and so compelled 
the tribunes of the plebs to reconsider their strategy and allow the election 
of military tribunes (6.36). 
 
Livy gives no detail regarding the technique used by the plebs to convince 
the tribunes to change their mind, but it is likely the males of military age 
petitioned their representatives in person, as Livy gives the impression that 
the tribunes were readily available for their people.  Despite relenting on the 
election of magistrates, the plebs nonetheless resisted the levy to show they 
were still frustrated at the patrician refusal to allow the passage of the 
Licinio-Sextian laws (6.36.1-4).  But the tribunes had not run out of tricks to 
secure their proposals’ success.  Re-elected for an eighth consecutive year, 
Licinius and Sextius were now experts at playing on popular passions 
(artifices iam tot annorum usu tractandi animos plebis, 6.36.10).  They had 
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become accomplished orators, skilled in managing their audience, skilled in 
persuasion. The term artifex, however, can evoke negative connotations of 
chicanery and, as interpreted by one commentator, Livy’s choice of the word 
here casts doubt upon the tribunes’ motives: they were more interested in 
their own commoda than those of the plebs (reinforced by their statements at 
6.35.2-3 and 39.5-12).394  We should consider, however, the context of this 
passage: the object of their manipulative language here is not so much the 
plebs as the senate.  This is borne out by their technique.  They would 
summon leading senators before the people and ply them with questions 
about the measures, thus forcing the senators to expose their greed and 
hypocrisy (6.36.11-12).  Livy’s point here, then, is that the tribuni plebis were 
tricking the senators into revealing their corrupt activities in order to 
undermine the position of the patres and in so doing bolster their own. 
 
The senate in response appointed as dictator Camillus, who delivered a 
harangue against the intransigent tribunes, warning them that if they tried 
to pass their measures in defiance of their colleagues’ vetoes he would not 
permit vim tribuniciam to be its own undoing and would distract the plebs 
by making them enlist and go to war (6.38.4-8).  But before Camillus could 
carry out his threat, he resigned his office.  Livy is not sure why, although he 
favours the suggestion that there may have been an irregularity in the 
                                                 
394 Kraus (1994: 285) provides as an example Cicero Verr. 2.5.183. 
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dictator’s election.  The other possibility is that the plebs decreed that he be 
fined should he take any action as dictator, but Livy finds this less likely for 
several reasons.  In the first place, such a decree was unprecedented and, in 
the second, as Camillus was appointed dictator the following year, he can 
hardly have suffered the ignominy of a fine only to return to the office once 
more (6.38.9-13).  Plutarch makes no mention of the possibility of his 
resigning due to an irregularity, but assumes the tribunes had secured a 
plebiscite: “The tribunes, on the contrary, for their part, opposed his threats 
with solemn oaths that they would fine him fifty thousand silver drachmas 
if he did not cease trying to rob the people of its vote and its law” (Cam. 
39.4).  The Licinio-Sextian laws were finally passed in 367 (6.42.9). 
 
This episode is also interesting for the fractures it reveals in the relationship 
between plebs and their tribunes.  Kraus contends that the adversative 
asyndeton (plebi: ducibus plebis, 6.38.9) sets the plebeians apart from their 
tribunes and reflects the conventional view that they did not act 
independent of persuasive leadership; the crowd was “a shapeless mass that 
can be swayed by persuasion but is itself essentially without initiative”.395  
Livy reinforces this distinction between leaders and led: the plebs were most 
keen on the passage of the measures relating to debt and land, and would 
                                                 
395 Kraus (1994: 297). 
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have rejected the proposal to make it compulsory that one consul be 
plebeian had the tribunes not insisted on tying it to the other two measures 
(6.39.1-2).  The tension between the wealthy tribunes and poorer common 
folk began to show when the tribunes vented their frustration at the plebs’ 
lack of commitment to back their reforms (6.39.8-12).  Yet this works against 
the argument of Kraus that the plebs were under the sway of their leaders.  
Rather, they clearly knew what was in their interest (land distribution and 
debt relief), and what was not (plebeian consuls).  Indeed she acknowledges 
the power of the people in her analysis of an earlier passage (6.38): “The 
present crowds, however, are neither simply spectators nor followers of a 
charismatic leader: their potential to exert democratic control means that 
their momentum, as encapsulated by the stubborn tr. pl., is unstoppable.”396  
 
The problem of members of the plebs becoming heavily indebted to 
creditors continued as the latter ignored the law of Twelve Tables which 
limited interest to a rate of one twelth (unciarium fenus).  In 357 the plebs 
ratified a measure proposed by the tribunes M. Duillius and L. Menenius to 
revive the obsolete enactment.  Livy does little more than record the 
maximum rate of interest, and even then he fails to mention the period over 
which it was charged, so we are left with no clue as to what event, if any, 
                                                 
396 Kraus (1994: 293). 
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provoked the lex other than general hardship brought on by greedy 
creditors (Livy, 7.16.1; Tac. Ann. 6.16).397   
 
The plebs did, however, succeed in convincing the politicians to embark 
upon a more serious attempt at dealing with the issue in 352 after they 
brought out into the open their distress at the increasing weight of usury.  
Livy does not explain exactly what form their dissatisfaction took, using 
simply the phrase curaeque privatae in certaminibus publicis erumpebant 
(7.21.3).  Their “public contests” resulted in the appointment of five 
commissioners called mensarii (bankers) to hand out state loans to debtors.  
Livy confirms that the popular protest was successful for a huge amount of 
debt was cleared without either side complaining (7.21.5-8).  
 
Five years later a further measure was passed so that the maximum rate of 
interest set in 357 was halved, and debtors permitted to pay one quarter of 
their debt, with the balance due in three annual instalments.  Although this 
reduction in interest appears generous, the measure still left a section of the 
plebs suffering as paying off a quarter a year would have been a struggle for 
many peasants.  Livy explains that the senate was more concerned with the 
public than private credit, but the senators did try to lighten the burden by 
                                                 
397 Exactly what the interest rate was is not clear as it depended on the period over which it 
was charged.  See Oakley (1998: 177f.) for a discussion. 
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saving the plebs from the twin evils of tributum and dilectus: no tax was 
collected, nor levy held (7.27.3-4).  This at least offered some respite to the 
citizens, if not in the form of out-and-out debt relief.398  It must be noted, 
however, that the tributum in question was that tax paid by those not 
fighting to cover the expenses of those who were.399  And Livy tells us there 
were no wars this year (7.27.3), so the respite from payment was redundant 
as no payment would have been required. 
 
It was not long before creditors were once more in the limelight: in 344 
aediles prosecuted moneylenders (feneratores) and the people found them 
guilty, but, as to the nature of the crime Livy (7.28.9), our only source, gives 
no hints.  Livy also records an interregnum in 344 but does not mention its 
cause, perhaps because he found it too boring to mention.400  He then tells us 
that the interregnum was followed, “so that that might seem to have been 
intended,” by the election of two patrician consuls (7.28.9-10).  This 
statement does not make sense, however, as the appointment of an interrex 
to resolve a disputed election would be expected after, not before, such an 
election, ever since one of the Licinian-Sextan laws stipulated that one 
                                                 
398 Oakley (1998: 263). 
 
399 Rosenstein (2004: 54). 
 
400 Oakley (1998: 272). 
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consul had to be plebeian.401  I suggest that if we combine the evidence of 
the interrex with the prosecution of moneylenders we can propose that there 
was a debt crisis in Rome of such severity that elections could not be held, 
perhaps due to civil unrest with voters preventing or even boycotting 
elections.  The subsequent secession only two years later, which resulted in 
the lex Genucia, supports this theory. 
 
A mutiny led to the proposal of the tribune Genucius finding senatorial 
support.  As noted above,402 soldiers stationed at Capua marched on Rome, 
not demanding the cancellation of interest, but good land such as that in the 
possession of the Capuans.  Debt was, nonetheless, part of the issue: they 
did not want to return to Rome and her harsh debt laws (Livy 7.38-42; Dion. 
Hal. 15.3.5).  The lex Genucia made illegal the charging of interest, although 
the law was seldom enforced. 
 
The next step in ameliorating the plebs’ debt burden was the ban on debt 
bondage, or nexum, and was achieved by direct popular pressure on the 
senate.403  This was an important advance in securing and protecting the 
personal libertas of citizens.  The incident which prompted the reform is 
                                                 
401 Cornell, Forsythe and Oakley are silent on the matter. 
 
402 See Chapter Three. 
 
403 For a thorough treatment of the topic see Oakley (1998: 688-694). 
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unusual: a libidinous fenerator tried to seduce a handsome youth who had 
been handed over as nexus on account of his father’s debt.404  An ingens vis 
hominum rushed into the Forum, and then rushed in a column (agmine facto) 
to the Curia, forcing the senate to be convened.  The consuls were ordered to 
carry a proposal to the people that no debtors should be held in chains or in 
the stocks, and that only a person’s goods, not his body, should be liable for 
money lent.  Livy dates this lex Poetelia to 326 (Livy 8.28; cf. Cic. Rep. 2.59, 
Dion. Hal. 16.5.1-3, Val. Max. 6.1.9). 
 
Debt provided the stimulus for the final secession of the plebs in 287 that 
gave rise to the lex Hortensia (Livy Per. 11; Plin. NH 16.37).405  In the end, 
however, the law itself included no debt relief because those drafting the bill 
considered the matter too inflammatory; the fear was that a clause on debt 
relief would scuttle the chance for reform in other areas.406  The pattern we 
saw above with the Licinio-Sextian rogations was continued in this instance 
also, with the Hortensian law addressing more the commoda of the elite 
plebeians than those of the commoners: the lex was a disappointment to the 
plebs as it opened no floodgate of radical popular legislation but was 
                                                 
404 Livy may be picking up on the theme of reform resulting from father of violated 
progeny.  Compare the case of Verginia, whose enslavement inspired the second secession 
and the dissolution of the second decemvirate (Livy 3.44-55). 
 
405 On the lex Hortensia see Chapter Three and Cornell (1995: 378-380). 
 
406 Hölkeskamp (2004b: 49-83, esp. 78-81).  
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instead a triumph of the patricio-plebeian oligarchy because they kept in 
their hands the means of legislation while getting rid of the last vestiges of 
patrician obstruction.407 
 
There is little evidence of pressure for debt relief between 287 and 89.  This 
may be due to the distraction of the wars against Pyrrhus and the 
Carthaginians.  Another reason: the dearth of sources once Livy’s coverage 
is lost between 292 and 219, then again from the end of 167.  A third 
possibility is that there was less need for debt relief, with the cost to assidui 
and aristocracy of the two Punic Wars offset by the financial gains of 
imperial expansion.  
 
After the Social War, however, a credit crisis gripped the state.  A. 
Sempronius Asellio, the praetor urbanus in 89 BC, upset equestrian creditors 
when he proposed that the lex Genucia be followed so that no interest was 
charged on loans.  Creditors argued that they would follow custom, not 
some obsolete law.  Then they ripped him to pieces.  He was interrupted 
while offering sacrifice to Castor and Pollux, pursued out of the Forum and 
into a tabernula where an unnamed assailant slit his throat.  Even though the 
senate offered a reward, the moneylenders engineered a cover-up and the 
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perpetrator was never found (Livy Per. 74; App. BC 1.54; Val. Max. 9.7.4).408  
Badian observes that the way he was chased and then murdered reveals 
premeditation and deep hatred, which he believes cannot be understood 
without looking into Asellio’s past, and concludes that Asellio was at the 
heart of a movement aiming to recapture the loyalty of the indebted plebs, 
and had probably used this promise as a platform for his campaign for the 
praetorship.409  This incident reveals the importance of popular support to 
the senate since the senators were prepared to take on a powerful equestrian 
faction in order to win the people over, and also how powerful this 
particular faction of equestrians was given that there must have been 
witnesses to the murder of the praetor, and yet they managed to stifle any 
information from leaking out. 
 
Sulla as consul in 88 tried to deal with the serious economic crisis brought 
on the by the Social War and exacerbated by Mithridates’ occupying Asia 
Minor and so preventing the collection of tax revenue.  The details are 
fragmentary, but from what remains it appears that Sulla passed a bill 
which first remitted one tenth of the debt, then applied maximum interest 
                                                 
408 The two main sources, Appian and Valerius Maximus, agree in most aspects of this 
incident, differing only in details, e.g. Appian records Asellio had his throat cut, Val. Max. 
that he was ripped to shreds.  For interpretations of the event, see Badian (1969: 475-481) 
and Brennan (2000: 443). 
 
409 Badian (1969: 478-480). 
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payments on the principal, reviving the law of 357: “Unciaria lex appellari 
coepta est, quam L. Sulla et Q. Pompeius Rufus tulerunt, qua sanctum est, ut 
debitores decimam partem…” (Fest. 516L).  Sulla’s measure was a 
compromise to keep both debtors and creditors content by charging a 
relatively modest rate of interest.  He needed to avoid stirring up any extra 
resentment at home while he was abroad dealing with Mithridates, yet at 
the same time he needed to bring relief to those wealthy Romans who had 
lost property to the enemy during the Social War, and income to the state 
treasury which had been seriously depleted during this period.410 
 
Despite the several efforts to deal with the crisis, it continued.  Within a 
couple of years, Valerius, the suffect-consul of 86, tabled a bill to deal with 
crippling debt.411 Sallust says the magnitude of the debt was so great that 
“silver was paid off in bronze” (argentum aere solutum est, Cat. 33.2).412  This 
lex Valeria allowed those in debt to settle for 25% of the principal (Vell. Pat. 
2.23.2).  
 
                                                 
410 Keaveney (2005: 56). 
 
411 Badian (1962b: 56). 
 
412 Ramsey (2007:152) says debtors had to pay one quarter of the remaining principal, and 
seeing as one silver sesterce was worth four bronze asses, the law required the payment of 
one bronze as for every sesterce owed. 
 
228 
Valerius’ measure remitting three quarters of all debt was a very generous 
act, yet there is no record of any popular activity which prompted the 
action, nor of any response.  There is, however, in the next case.  During the 
praetorship of M. Marius Gratidianus in 85, the tribunes summoned the 
praetors together to draft an edict on the standard of value for the currency.  
The group had agreed to publish it together, but Marius did it himself on 
the sly and so alone received the credit for the measure.  He was heroised 
for his deed: “nemo umquam multitudini fuit carior” (Cic. Off. 3.80).413  
Cicero comments further that Marius’ publication of the edict “excitabat 
fluctus in simpulo,” a reference to its reception in their hometown of 
Arpinum (Leg. 3.36).  Marius was clearly aware of the popular support to be 
gained from such a reform, risking even the rebuke of his colleagues and the 
tribunes to go solo and publish the decree. 
 
The sources are quiet on the topic of debt for more than twenty years.  We 
know of no further agitation for relief until the most infamous of all.  In 63, 
Catiline took on the majority of the senate in an effort to achieve the twin 
aims of cancellation of debt (novae tabulae) and increased dignitas for himself 
and other members of the elite who had suffered political humiliation.414  
                                                 
413 Badian (1969: 478). 
 
414 For his indignant response to repeated election defeats (insulted dignitas, wasted effort, 
and voters electing unworthy men instead of him, Sall. Cat. 35.3-4) being that of a normal 
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The frustrated senator used oratory to encourage popular participation in 
the movement and to unite the disparate groups who sought debt relief.  At 
the same time Catiline and his lieutenants organised an armed rebellion to 
secure the consulship for Catiline.  Once he had secured that office, he 
planned to cancel debt.  His plans, however, never came to fruition as he 
died on the battlefield in the first armed insurrection since the days of 
Lepidus and Sertorius.415 
 
A financial crash motivated Catiline’s movement for debt relief.  Yet, some 
argue otherwise.  Scullard, for instance, makes the common mistake of 
confusing the two aims of debt relief and enhanced dignitas.  He contends 
that Catiline needed a cause to win more supporters in order to secure 
election to the consulship, and that a promise to cancel all debts  
 
would appeal to all the discontented in Italy (e.g. any of Sulla’s veterans 
that had failed as farmers) and especially to many spendthrift nobles, like 
Catiline himself, who were in debt, but it would antagonize the bulk of 
the Senate, the Equites, and the small shopkeepers and workers.416   
 
                                                                                                                                         
Roman aristocrat, see Gruen (1974: 418).  Catiline wanted to be consul, not dictator (Sall. 
Cat. 20.17) 
 
415 See Yavetz (1963: 498) for speculation on what Catiline might have done had he secured 
the consulship. 
 
416 Scullard (1959: 108). 
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Scullard discredits Catiline’s motives from the start by alleging that he acted 
out of self-interest because he himself was in debt.  Cicero too suggests that 
Catiline was short of funds in comments in a defence speech delivered in 63.  
Catiline announced in contione domestica that no loyal defender of the miseri 
could be found except for one that was miser himself (Pro Mur. 50).  In this 
context, miser has been translated as “poor”.  Sallust shares the judgement, 
claiming Catiline’s lack of assets wound up his defiant spirit (Cat. 5.7; cf. 
Florus 2.12.1).  Yet Catiline asserted in his letter to Q. Catulus that he could 
have paid off his own debt (Sall. Cat. 35.3) and his credit was good enough 
to borrow money after his election loss to Cicero and Antonius (Sall. Cat. 
24.2).  It is not clear why Scullard has included shopkeepers and workers in 
the group of those who would oppose cancellation of debt.  Senators and 
equites yes: money they had loaned would not be repaid.  But the small 
shopkeepers and workers had everything to gain.  We have evidence from 
the time of Caesar that rent was a real burden on those who lived in the city: 
Caesar waived rent payments for one year (Dio 42.51.1).  Therefore, these 
poor people would have benefitted had the tables been wiped clean as 
surely they had borrowed money to cover their rent.  Perhaps Scullard 
refers to their suffering should any violence erupt in the city itself, a point 
Gruen validates.417 
                                                 
417 Gruen (1974: 430 f.) with Sall. Cat. 48.1-2: the support of the plebs withered up once it got 
out that there were plans afoot to torch the city, for they feared they would lose the tools 
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What is more, the evidence suggests that there was a real need for reform of 
the financial system.  After heavy Italian investment in Asia, Mithridates 
overran the province, murdering Italian businessmen and taking hold of 
Roman property.  Cicero records the impact on credit as men failed to make 
payments: “nam tum, cum in Asia res magnas permulti amiserunt, scimus 
Romae solutione impedita fidem concidisse” (Imp. Pomp. 19).418  Once 
Pompey had defeated Mithridates, money began to flow back into Asia, but 
to the detriment of those who owed money to creditors in Italy keen to 
retrieve their capital and invest it in the province.419  Money was in such 
short supply in 63 that even the state treasury was  bare, compelling the 
senate to forbid the export of gold (Cic. Vat. 11f.; Flacc. 67).  Therefore, when 
Catiline campaigned for the consulship in 64 on a platform of debt 
cancellation, he was not creating a straw man for the sake of gaining 
popularity.  There was a legitimate problem which the senate had failed to 
solve.  Nor was he serving his own interests as a debtor; for, as noted above, 
he was not in financial difficulty.  Yet, because we cannot be sure of his 
motive due to the bias of our sources, we need to consider all options.  So, 
while he may have been able to manage his own debt comfortably, the 
                                                                                                                                         
they needed to survive in the conflagration. 
 
418 See Jonkers (1959: 34f.). 
 
419 Gruen (1974: 426 f.). 
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cancellation of debt would nonetheless have been a happy secondary result 
for him. 
 
Yavetz offers a concise overview of the modern interpretations of Catiline’s 
motives.420  He suggests that indebted aristocrats and plebs made an alliance 
against the money lending equites and for the first time tried to cancel debt 
by armed force rather than legislation.421  Catiline lost the support of a 
significant sector of the urban plebs when the tabernarii decided a one off 
cancellation of debts was not worth the dangers involved in armed revolt.422  
Others were put off by the threat of fire in the city, a threat greatly 
exaggerated by Cicero, and fear of a repeat of the suffering caused by civil 
disturbances twenty years earlier (Cic. Cat. 3. 24f.; Sall. Cat. 43, 48.1-2; Dio 
37.4; Plut Cic. 18; Cat. Min. 22; App. BC 2.3). 
 
Catiline’s professed aim was noble: he announced in a speech delivered at 
his house before the elections in 64 that he sought the consulship to ensure 
justice: a fairer distribution of wealth and dignitas (Sall. Cat. 20).  The first 
goal would have been difficult enough to achieve in a state such as Rome 
where, for instance, soldiers struggled to get their fair share of booty from 
                                                 
420 Yavetz (1963: 485-487). 
 
421 Yavetz (1963: 498). 
 
422 Yavetz (1963: 497). 
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greedy commanders and landless fought to gain access to land illegally 
occupied by the rich.423  As for dignitas, in the competitive environment of 
Roman politics, the tradition of sharing dignitas existed in theory.  Yet in 
practice we often see laws passed in an effort to curb certain families or 
factions from domination of office-holding.424 
 
When Catiline lost the election, however, his aims changed as his frustrated 
dignitas boiled over.  He borrowed money and sent it to Manlius in Etruria 
to help the ex-centurion rally troops from amongst the veterans who 
populated the area.  Men were also sent to Picenum, Apulia, and other 
strategically favourable spots for the same purpose (Sall. Cat. 27.1).  Others 
still visited Gaul (ib. 42.1f.).  Manlius composed a letter containing similar 
aims: libertas and legal protection from the harsh judgments of praetors 
regarding debt (Sall. Cat. 33.4-5).  Of course the military man did not seek 
dignitas as that is an aristocratic preoccupation, but libertas for Roman 
citizens outside the elite contains the same idea of fair treatment and 
respect.  Gruen warns against accepting the propaganda from both sides: 
                                                 
423 E.g. M. Postumius Regillensis was stoned to death by his own soldiers in 414 because he 
deprived them of booty and acted with ruthless cruelty (Livy 4.49-50).  L Aemilius Paullus 
became unpopular with is troops when he refused to distribute sufficient booty to them, 
although in this case Livy (45.35.5-7) accuses the milites of avarice, not their commander.  
Marius was never so stingy, aware as he was of the mercenary nature of his legionaries.  
The classic case of land redistribution is that set up by Ti. Gracchus’ lex agraria which 
established a commission to oversee the distribution of public land held in excess of the 
legal maximum stipulated by the Licinio-Sextian laws of 367. 
 
424 E.g. the lex Villia Annalis of 180 B.C., reinvigorated by Sulla. 
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naturally the Catilinarians present altruistic motives, while concealing their 
selfish aims of revenge and increasing their own prestige.  By the same 
token, there is a long history of any lower class discontent being portrayed 
as stemming from vicious criminals and degenerates.425 
 
The action of raising an army appears more of a threat to the state than it 
might have been.  Catiline was not the first to use an army to protect his 
dignitas, nor would he be the last.  But his failure to win the consulship 
meant he lacked the backing of an army in the style of Sulla, Cinna or 
Lepidus, and this resulted in his having to raise one from scratch.426  
Catiline’s lack of the official sanction which comes with holding a curule 
office may have contributed to his failure to maintain the support of the 
urban plebs. 
 
His supporters were desperate for relief from debt and protection of their 
libertas and dignitas: poor urban plebs who had borrowed to meet rent 
payments, senators and equestrians who had been humbled in their political 
aspirations, local magnates from colonies and municipalities, and rural 
plebs and veterans struggling to make ends meet in the sometimes alien 
                                                 
425 Gruen (1974: 423).  On the negative stereotype of “mob” or “rabble” pinned to any 
popular disturbance, see Rudé (1964: 7f., 198-208). 
 
426 Keaveney (2007: 101 f.).   
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world of farming.427  This movement was not spontaneous but had been 
simmering in various areas for different reasons and for some time.  The 
rebellion burst into the open once its leaders united.   
 
In Rome, the organisers were the praetor P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura and C. 
Cornelius Cethegus.  According to Cicero (Cat. 4.17), they used a pimp to 
rush around the tabernae to recruit the poor and naïve (egentes atque imperiti) 
but could find no one desperate enough to risk losing his workplace and 
bed, so reliant were the majority of tabernarii on peace for their livelihood 
(quaestus).  From this description it sounds like the owners of shops were the 
target, and perhaps also their customers who could not have avoided 
overhearing the invitation.  Regarding the choice of a leno, we must, of 
course, bear in mind that the orator was trying to discredit Catiline in front 
of a popular audience in the speech from which this evidence originates, 
and so was trying to associate him with the undesirable elements of society.  
In order for Cicero to persuade his audience, he could not associate anyone 
in that audience with Catiline and his movement, as allegations of fraternity 
with criminals and pimps was a sure fire way to lose friends, not influence 
people.   
 
                                                 
427 As noted in Chapter Three above.  Oddly, Vanderbroeck (1987: 231 f.) fails to analyse 
Catiline’s supporters outside of Rome, focusing only on the actions of those in the city. 
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Indeed Sallust gives more detail of Lentulus’ activities.  The praetor used 
freedmen and clients to galvanise the artisans and tradesmen on the streets 
to attack Cicero, and others he sent to elicit the support of duces 
multitudinum “who for a price had been accustomed to ravage the 
commonwealth” (partim exquirebant duces multitudinum qui pretio rem 
publicam vexare soliti erant, Cat. 50.1).  These leaders of the common people 
are characterised by one commentator as trouble-making “leaders of armed 
street gangs”, their actions an “evil” which the senate sought to overcome 
by outlawing collegia in 64.428  The plural multitudinum is unusual, and 
where the singular is usually understood to mean “crowd”, the plural 
becomes “mobs”.429  I am not convinced that the context requires such a 
derogative interpretation.  Sallust could just as easily be referring to “leaders 
of crowds or commoners” rather than leaders of gangs.  Sallust might have 
used duces operarum if he intended to categorise them as heading gangs.  
Rather, these were the men who ran the neighbourhood colleges, the same 
                                                 
428 Ramsey (2007: 190). 
 
429 OLD “multitudo” 5 b gives this translation.  The only other occurrence of multitudinum is 
in Apuleius “In hac non suo nomine de statu et de commodis ciuitatis requirens originis 
eius principia et fundamenta disponit, sed eo tendit quemadmodum ciuilis gubernator, 
eiusmodi locum conuentusque multitudinum nactus, iuxta naturam praesentium rerum et 
conuenarum debeat facere ciuitatem plenam bonarum legum et morum bonorum (De dog. 
Plat. 2.26). 
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men who were highly valued as influential contacts to groom by the author 
of the Commentariolum Petitionis.430   
 
Catiline had also suborned tribunes whose job it may have been to close the 
shops to free up supporters.  In the end, though, the tribune Bestia refrained 
from taking any action – he was to call an assembly after Cicero’s murder.  
Instead, Cicero found out about the plot and posted guards throughout the 
city and arrested Lentulus and Cethegus after a SCU was passed.  Despite 
attempts by their slaves and freedmen to set them free with the help of 
artisans, Cicero had them executed.  Cicero’s move calmed the crowd, but 
their pacification was not complete until Cato proposed to increase the 
number of grain recipients.431 
 
The significance of the Catilinarian conspiracy for my study is that it reveals 
the lengths to which a frustrated populace will go for the sake of the 
protection of their libertas.  Although Catiline and his supporters failed to 
achieve their aims, Caesar learnt from their mistakes and succeeded in 
lightening the debt burden through first crossing the Rubicon in defense of 
                                                 
430 See Comm. pet. 30: “reckon up the whole city – all the collegia, pagi, vicinitates; if you strike 
a friendship with the leading men from among their number, you will easily, through them, 
secure the masses that remain”. 
 
431 App. 2.2-6; Cic. Cat. passim, esp. 1.8, 10, 2.26, 3.5, 10, and 4.17; Diod. 40.5; Sall. Cat. passim, 
esp. 24.4, 26.4, 29.2, 30.7, 37.1, and 50; Plut. Cic. 10.2-11, 14-22; Dio 37.29-36; Liv. 102; Flor. 
2.12. 
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his dignitas, then resorting to more legitimate means to reform the credit 
system.432 
 
One of those who has defended Catiline from his critics and contended that 
Catiline sought debt reform is Walter Allen, Jr.  The historian argues that 
Catiline’s actions in 63 were not a bid for power but an attempt at reform.433  
Allen concludes with one final piece of evidence that Catiline sought reform 
– his erstwhile friend Caelius Rufus died struggling against Caesar to 
achieve debt reform. 
 
Caelius proposed suspension of payments of interest during his time as 
praetor peregrinus in 48. 434  Then, when he met stiff opposition, he came up 
with new measures designed to be even more enticing to potential 
supporters: free rent for a year and the cancellation of debts.  Livy says the 
praetor stirred up the plebs with the hope of cancellation of debts and 
incited sedition in the city (Per. 111). Another theory suggests that he 
desired reform to solve his own indebtedness (Vell. Pat. 2.68.1-2), but we 
should be suspicious of this explanation as it has a distinctly Catilinarian 
                                                 
432 Frederiksen (1966) analyses Caesar’s response to the problem of debt. 
 
433 Allen (1938: 70-85). 
 
434 Caes. BC 3.20.1-22.4; Dio 42.22.1-25.3; cf. Cic. Fam. 8.17; Vell. 2.68.1-3; Quintil. Inst. Or. 
6.3.25. 
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ring to it.  Caesar had illustrated the best way to go about reform: suggest 
boldly, act modestly.  Some debt reform was good, but not too much, as that 
risked allegations of self-interest. 
 
Caelius’ next move was not legal.  In order to start helping to settle people’s 
debts he set himself up beside the urban praetor Trebonius whose 
responsibility he thus impinged upon.  The motivation behind this move is 
not clear.  It may be that he was angry with Caesar for supporting 
Trebonius’ candidature for the plum job of urban praetor and not his own, 
and so sought revenge.  Another possibility is that he believed Caesar’s 
measures insufficient to address the issue of overwhelming debt and a 
shortage of cash with which to settle loans, so tried to stop Trebonius from 
dealing with debtors based on Caesar’s measures.435  A third option is that 
he sought to compete directly with Caesar for popular support.  This last 
suggestion would explain why Caesar had him killed: he feared competition 
for popular affection and the power that came with winning the support of 
the populus Romanus. 
 
Caesar had undertaken a general revision of debt as dictator 49 BC.  As the 
consul put it himself, “as credit throughout Italy was somewhat restricted 
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and loans were not being repaid, he decided that arbitrators should be 
appointed to estimate the value of real and movable property as it had been 
before the war, and that the creditors should be paid on that basis.” (Caes. 
BC 3.1).436  There was a shortage of coin which prevented the repayment of 
loans (Cic. Att. 7.18.4; 9.9.4; 10.11.2).437 
 
A comparison of Caesar’s version of Caelius’ activities with those of Caelius 
himself and Dio reveals the extent of Caesar’s bias in favour of promoting 
his own good image, along with that of his closest followers.  Caesar claims, 
Caelius “causa debitorum suscepta” set up his tribunal next to the urban 
praetor Trebonius and promised to help anyone who wanted to “appeal 
about the valuation and payment of debt, as Caesar had arranged when he 
was in Rome”.  But according to a hostile Caesar, jealous to protect his own 
popularity, no one lodged an appeal with Caelius because his man 
Trebonius offered a better deal:  
 
But through the equitable decrees and humanity of Trebonius, who was of 
the opinion that in this crisis law should be administered with clemency 
and moderation, it happened that none could be found to originate an 
appeal.  For a man of merely ordinary spirit can make the excuse of 
poverty and complain either of his own difficulties or of the difficult times 
and set forth problems of sale, but to insist on holding onto one’s 
possessions when one admits to owing a debt – what kind of person, what 
kind of cheek is that? (Caes. BC 3.20). 
                                                 
436 See also Suet. Iul. 42.2; Plut. Caes. 37.1; App. BC. 2.48; Dio 41.37f., 42.22, 51.1 f. 
 
437 See Carter (1993: 140 f.) on the debt problem in this period. 
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Thus Caesar portrays Trebonius as offering a better deal than Caelius so that 
anyone with half a brain would go to him and get half the principle waived.  
So, with no one keen to take up his offer, Caelius promulgated a law (legem 
promulgavit) that debtors repay their loans without interest in six annual 
installments (Caes. BC 3.20.5).438  Note that Caesar emphasised what he 
wished his audience to believe regarding Caelius’ motivation: the praetor 
proposes the law “lest he seem to have embarked upon a disgraceful cause 
in vain” (ib.).  Caelius’ cause is turpis; he does not make the usual praetorian 
ruling (formula), but passes a lex.  It seems unlikely that Caesar mistook a 
formula for a lex.  Indeed, a recent study has found that curule magistrates 
acted as rogatores more frequently in the late Republic.  Prior to 88, curule 
magistrates seldom legislated, and when they did it was regarding election 
of magistrates and declarations of war and peace.439  In this earlier period, 
they used tribunes to pass their bills into law.440  Sandberg dates the change 
in practice to Sulla’s reforms, and attributes the change to the crucial role of 
legislation in the political struggle between the optimates and the populares.  
When consuls and praetors failed to find the tribunes obliging, they 
                                                 
438 See Sandberg (2001: 62) on Caelius’ legislation.   
 
439 Sandberg (2001: 94).  This tallies with the theory that consuls’ main activity pre-Sulla was 
campaigning in the field, not regulating matters at Rome. 
 
440 Sandberg (2001: 97). 
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summoned the people and proposed measures directly to the assembly.441  
Therefore, Caelius must have secured popular support in order to pass this 
measure. 
 
In the face of still more opposition, this time from the consul Servilius, 
Caelius cancelled his law and put forward two others: one by which tenants 
received a free year’s rent, another cancelling debt (ib. 3.21.1).  It appears he 
did all this in the Forum from his position next to the urban praetor, for then 
the multitudo made a rush at Trebonius and Caelius drove him from his 
tribunal.  Caelius had won the support of the multitudo.  The response of his 
opponents was swift as they sought to preserve peace in the city, but also 
their own popularity.  Servilius referred the matter to the senate which 
passed a decree removing Caelius from office and the senate.  Then Caelius 
tried to address a contio but the consul led him from the rostra – a clear sign 
that there was fear he had won over the people.   
 
Caelius’ next move was bold.  He pretended he was going to seek the 
support of Caesar, instead turning to the support of Milo and his gladiators 
whom he sent to the area around Thurii to win over the farmers (pastores) 
while he himself reached Casilinum.  But when his plans were discovered, 
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and he was shut out of Capua, he changed his mind “periculum veritus, 
quod conventus arma ceperat atque eum hostis loco habendum existimabat” 
(Caes. BC 3.21; Livy Per. 111).  Caelius may have won the support of the 
urban multitudo back in Rome, but had not had the opportunity to do the 
same with the conventus (body of Roman citizens) in Capua.442  He had not 
had the chance to use his rhetorical abilities, nor enourage them with the 
promise of debt relief since he was now no longer a magistrate.  Like 
Catiline before him, his prestige suffered for not holding office. 
 
Enough of Caesar’s version.  We are in the rare position of having a candid 
letter written by one of the protagonists.  Caelius writes from Rome around 
the end of January 48, claiming to be a Caesarian helping out Cicero’s 
Pompeian side.  Caelius was with the party that left Rome to join Caesar at 
Ariminum in 50, but Caelius regrets Cicero did not save him from the type 
of people that were supporting the Caesarian cause.  He laments that if only 
Appius had been Caesarian and Curio Pompeian, Caelius’ hatred of the first 
and affection for the second would have seen him with the Pompeians in the 
East rather than with the Caesarians in the West.  Instead, because he is so 
disappointed with Caesar, Caelius has driven plebs and populus from Caesar 
to the camp of Cicero with his promise of debt relief (Cic. Fam. 8.17).  This 
                                                 
442  For definition, see OLD conventus 3. 
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letter reveals that he had the support of a diverse group of citizens, both 
plebs and populus, not just the multitudo claimed by Caesar. 
 
Dio adds a different perspective to that of Caesar, more favourable to 
Caelius.  According to Dio, Caelius gained a considerable following by 
offering to help debtors and by waiving rent for tenants.  This he did in 
competition with Trebonius.  In Caesar’s version, no one wanted his help.  
With this following Caelius attacked Trebonius (Dio 42.22).  Servilius tried 
to propose a measure dealing with the debt laws, the details of which are 
lost as Dio does not elucidate.  But nothing came of Servilius’ proposal as it 
was vetoed by the tribunes.  The consul did succeed in getting Caelius’ 
tablets removed, only to have Caelius attack his assistants and himself 
directly.  Then Servilius barred Caelius from the senate, dragged him from 
the rostra and smashed his chair – violence on the part of the consul omitted 
from Caesar’s account (42.23).  Caelius decided to set out for Campania 
where Milo was beginning a rebellion so that together they could 
undermine Caesar.  But Dio justifies Milo’s conspiracy; alone of the exiles 
Milo had not been restored by Caesar.  Caelius seems to have delayed 
leaving Rome. Dio says he was being watched and adds that he did not 
want to leave by stealth as he still thought there was some benefit to be had 
from his praetor’s office.  This confidence in the legality of his own position 
is not mentioned by Caesar, nor is the fact that Servilius granted Caelius 
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leave of absence after his relentless appeals.  Caelius pretended that he was 
going to visit Caesar (42.24).   
 
But by the time Caelius found Milo he had been defeated.  Shortly after this, 
the consul declared war on Milo and ordered Caelius to stay in the suburbs 
to prevent him from stirring up trouble.  But Caelius escaped, fled to Milo 
only to hear that he was dead.  Caelius was killed at Bruttium by supporters 
of Caesar (Dio 42.25).  Dio locates his death at a different place and does not 
include the cavalry as Caesar does, and in so doing makes Caesar appear 
more responsible for his death.  Indeed, one source even has Caelius killed 
by order of the (very partisan) senate (Vell. Pat. 2.68.2).  Having changed 
sides from pro-senatorial Pompeian to Caesarian, and securing for himself a 
praetorship in the process, he died when he betrayed Caesar: he tried to get 
Italy to revolt against Caesar.  Yet in Caesar’s commentary, Caelius 
maintained to the end that he was working for Caesar, or at least trying to 
reach him, but was cut short when Caesar’s Gallic and Spanish horsemen 
garrisoned at Thurii killed him. (Caes. BC 3.22).  An ambiguous end for a 
Roman of shifting loyalties. 
 
Caelius’ experience provides evidence for conservative resistance to debt 
reform, and the difficulty for the reformer in first securing, then maintaining 
support.  Yes, the people were fickle, but the competition for dignitas and 
246 
popularity cannot be underestimated.  Caesar, Trebonius, Servilius and 
Caelius were all competing for the same thing: popular support.  Without 
that, their prestige and power was nothing.  The people demonstrated their 
support by attacking Trebonius.  The citizens of Capua demonstrated their 
support for another man by killing Caelius.  These incidents highlight how 
passionately desperate debtors felt about debt relief.  The issue was beyond 
factional politics: they backed the politician who looked most likely to 
achieve reform. 
 
As in the case of Catiline, Caesar learnt from Caelius’ mistakes and was soon 
to successfully introduce measures to improve the lot of many citizens.  
Although it cost Caesar his life also, at least his reforms survived and 
influenced later Roman law.443   
 
 
CASE STUDY: AGRARIAN REFORM  
 
Since the early days of the Republic, citizens demanded land from which to 
earn a livelihood.  They applied pressure on the senate for the redistribution 
of land in the form of both individual viritane allotments and substantial 
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colonies of thousands.  More than twenty agrarian bills for both viritane 
distributions and colonies are recorded between 486 and 367, at which point 
veteran colonies become the predominant form of land allocation.  While the 
historicity of the early distributions to urban poor is doubted because the 
need would have been for defensive colonies of veterans, not relief from 
urban population pressure, they nevertheless shed light on the late 
Republic.  For, as noted in Chapter Three above, Livy and Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, our main sources, are well known for peppering their 
accounts of the earlier Republic with the late Republican phenomena with 
which they were more familiar.  They used the constitutional workings of 
the late Republic to add detail to the first 200 years of Republican history 
because they did not have reliable sources until the third century, when 
Romans started writing history and stopped relying on legend and the 
annual lists of consuls.  We can therefore use these measures as evidence for 
the method of reformers, and their opponents, in the late Republic. 
 
With the notable exception of Flaminius’ land bill in 232, all other agrarian 
laws from 366 to 173 were for the establishment of veteran colonies.  These 
were defensive settlements, designed to protect newly annexed territory 
from encroachment by former inhabitants.  When, however, Rome stopped 
acquiring land in Italy and was reluctant to send colonies overseas, these 
colonies ceased to be established.  Therefore, pressure for the redistribution 
248 
of Campanian land built up, culminating in the lex Sempronia of 133.  There 
were too many people trying to live off too little land,444 hence the need for 
redistribution of public land.  In the last generation of the Republic, the 
demand for land continued.  After several failed attempts by tribunes, this 
demand was finally satisfied by a lex Julia in 59. 
 
There is disagreement over whether land redistribution was driven by a 
shortage of men eligible for army recruitment, or by a population increase in 
the countryside contributing to pressure on Rome.  Plutarch believed there 
was a military motivation to finding land: “The poor, when they found 
themselves forced off the land, became more and more unwilling to 
volunteer for military service or even to raise a family” (Ti. Gracc. 8).  Until 
recently, scholars believed a shortage of manpower drove the need to find 
land for the landless.  But now the need for viritane allotments to increase 
the amount of men eligible for military service in the late second century has 
been questioned.  Nathan Rosenstein has challenged the long held tradition 
that land grants were needed to “relieve military pressures.” 445  Instead, he 
claims that “year round warfare had become the norm by the later fourth 
century.”446  He constructs a coherent and convincing argument against the 
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446 Rosenstein (2004: 52). 
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notion that the practice of long campaigns was introduced in the late third 
or early second century and caused the rise in landlessness to which 
Plutarch alludes.  De Ligt has added to the debate by suggesting that there 
was not a decline in population numbers but an increase, as fertility rates 
rose and rural families became too large for the practice of dividing land 
amongst sons to be sustainable.447  His analysis of the census figures is 
convincing: there were more Romans sharing less land. 
 
In this section, then, we will examine how these landless citizens secured 
land allotments.  In the earliest period, obstruction of the levy dominates, 
with occasional mutinies, as we saw in Chapter Three where the plebs used 
the same methods to gain reform in the areas of debt bondage and patrician 
domination of office.  Tribunes pressured the senate for agrarian reform by 
preventing the collection of war-tax.  There is also some evidence that plebs 
occupied land to get the attention of the senate.  In later periods the landless 
and their champions bypassed the senate as tribunes took rogationes straight 
to the people to vote into law. 
 
Some have queried the existence of leges agrariae in the early Republic, 
alleging that records of such laws are nothing more than accretions from the 
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late Republic.448  But these researchers are too pessimistic and would have 
us believe none of Livy if the slightest repetition or theme can be identified.  
Patterns are of course going to develop in an examination of agrarian 
reform.  We cannot pass off all accounts of agrarian proposals between 486 
and 367 as inspired by the times of the Gracchi; similarly we cannot assume 
frequent lack of successful reform or redistribution translates into agrarian 
proposals not being reported.449  Cornell further emphasises the historicity 
of the Licinio-Sextian reforms, stating that we can see the sources struggling 
to account for features which had become obsolete by the time of writing.  
We do need, however, to be wary of the adoption of late Republican 
political vocabulary and characteristics of leaders of the same period, most 
notably the Gracchi and Saturninus.450 
 
The first recorded attempt to distribute land was that of the consul Sp. 
Cassius in 486 BC: his proposal that land confiscated from the conquered 
Hernici be divided amongst Latins and plebs was vetoed by his colleague 
with the support of the senate and some of the plebs on the grounds that the 
land should only be shared out amongst citizens; for they did not want to 
share the benefits with allies (Livy, 2.41; Dion. Hal. 8.69-71).  Two thirds of 
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449 Cornell (1995: 268-271). 
 
450 Cornell (1995: 327 f.).  For more on the technique of the sources see Cornell (1986: 52-76). 
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the land confiscated from the Herninici (now allies) was to be divided 
amongst Latins and plebs and a third restored to the Hernici (Livy 2.41.3).  
Dionysius records that the land for division was not that of the Hernici but 
“he determined to divide among the people a certain large tract of land 
belonging to the state which had been neglected and was then in the 
possession of the richest men” (8.69.3) and the land was to be assigned not 
only to Latins, but the recently enfranchised Hernici too (8.69.4).  Cassius 
failed despite calling the Latins and Hernici into Rome to vote (Dion. Hal. 
8.72.4).  
 
Modern scholars, however, have been suspicious of the ancient sources 
because they appear to have derived elements of their account of the first lex 
agraria from that of Ti. Gracchus (such as senatorial reluctance to 
redistribute land held by the wealthy) and also from C. Gracchus’ proposal 
to extend citizenship to the Italians (the opposition of C. Fannius the 
model).451  But there is no reason to doubt that the Hernician land needed 
settling to shore up defences against the surrounding Aequi and Volsci, and 
at the same time to encourage the Romanisation of the new citizens by 
sending settlers from the city and environs, though Cornell disagrees.  
Cornell believes the confusion can be attributed to the sources combining 
                                                 
451 See Forsythe (2005: 193-195). 
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the agrarian reform with the terms of the Hernician treaty concluded in the 
same year, but stresses that this does not render the proposal a fiction; 
rather the bill might have come to resemble the provisions of the treaty due 
to confusion or “willful manipulation”.452   
 
E. T. Salmon criticises the accounts in Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
asserting that their reports of disagreement in the early Republic over the 
desirability of sending out a colony must be anachronistic, reflecting first 
century dissensions, because there was definitely a need to defend Rome 
from agressors at the time.453  While his suggestion is logical, he need not 
completely deny the existence of reform just because he disagrees with the 
detail.  We should follow the lead of Cornell, who adopts his 
characteristically positive stance and postulates a genuine core of the 
tradition, in this case that Sp. Cassius proposed an agrarian law.454  Indeed, 
the plebs’ refusal to share land with the allies reminds us of the same 
reluctance Tiberius Gracchus experienced in 133, when he had to modify his 
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original proposal to share public land between citizens and Italians when 
the bill proved unpopular with the voters (App. BC 1.9.35f.; 1.11.44f.).455  
 
The idea of a lex agraria remained attractive to the plebs, but a series of 
conservative magistrates prevented its passage (Livy 2.42).  Finally, in 481, 
the tribune Sp. Licinius tried to enforce land distribution by obstructing the 
levy, but he incurred the odium of the plebs for misuse of his tribunician 
power and was opposed by his fellow tribunes who helped the consuls 
complete the enrolment (Livy 2.43.3-4; 44.1; Dion. Hal. 9.1.3-2.2).  Again 
more recent historians are unhappy with our primary sources – Ogilvie calls 
Livy to task for applying anachronistic material from the late to the early 
Republic, specifically the repeated allusion to the use of the tribunician veto 
which some believe was not used until the time of Ti. Gracchus.456  In 480 
another tribune, Ti. Pontificius, proposed an agrarian law and again 
impeded the levy but was overcome by men of consular rank who used 
their gratia and auctoritas to convince the other tribunes to oppose him (Livy 
2.44; Dion. Hal. 9.5.1).  These repeated incidents of use of the levy for 
leverage in the early Republic tell us that the practice persisted into the later 
                                                 
455 Appian implies the inclusion of the Italians, while Plutarch makes no mention of them.  
Despite the best efforts of Bernstein (1978) to amalgamate accounts, Badian (1979: 455f.) has 
argued that the only conclusion we can make is that the Italians got nothing from the 
provisions of the lex Sempronia. 
 
456 Ogilvie (1965: 352). Forsythe (2005: 171) and Badian (1972: 697-700) agree that the veto 
was seldom used before the Gracchi.  See also Dion. Hal. 9.1.3-2.2. 
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Republic – Livy used examples from his own period to illustrate previous 
periods, and with his later books lost he cannot tell us that there was 
resistance in the later Republic.  This material may not have captured the 
imagination of his epitimator and so has not survived. 
 
Popular pressure for land persisted.  In 479 the consul Caeso Fabius 
suggested to the senate that concordia be secured between patricians and 
plebs by preempting any tribunician proposal for land distribution by 
senators proposing it themselves, claiming it only fair to distribute territory 
taken in war to those whose sweat and blood had won it.  The patricians 
rebuffed him (Livy 2.48).  Despite Caeso’s failure, we see here a theme that 
develops in the late Republic, only with a change in protagonists.  As 
patrician families died out, conservative senators replaced patricians in the 
competition with popularis politicians to win the people’s support by 
proposing bills in their interest. 
 
The popular interest would be frustrated once more before the passage of 
the first successful land bill, again due to clashes between tribunes and 
senators.  The tribunes Q. Considius and T. Genucius “began to stir up the 
plebs with their customary poisonous brew: an agrarian law” in 476 and 
responded to senatorial resistance by attacking individuals, including 
Menenius, the consul of the previous year, whom they impeached for failing 
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to come to the aid of the Fabii at Cremera (Livy 2.52).  The condemnation of 
Menenius stirred up resentment amongst the patricians so that they refused 
land allotment (Dion. Hal. 9.27.4). The status of the land bill is clarified by 
Dionysius.457  In 473 the tribune Cn. Genucius tried to convince the consuls 
to carry out the senatorial decree on the distribution of land drafted in 485 to 
weaken the influence of Sp. Cassius, but the consuls refused, claiming the 
senate had given the job of drawing up the decree to the consuls of 485 
(immediately following the consulship of Cassius and Verginius: 8.76.2), an 
argument which the tribune denied by replying that senatorial decrees were 
only valid for a year (9.37.2). 
 
The first lex agraria was finally passed in 467 BC after nearly twenty years of 
failed attempts.  In 470 the consul Aemilius had advocated giving land to 
the plebs; now in his second consulship, he had the backing of the tribunes.  
The senators who stood to lose land through its proposal criticised the 
consul for acting like a tribune (Livy 3.1.6).  A lex or plebiscitum was passed 
instructing the praetor to hold elections for the triumviri agro dando who 
assigned land to colonists at Antium, thus appeasing those who had stood 
to be disadvantaged by the redistribution of public land in their 
                                                 
457 Broughton (1951: 29) seems to have got it wrong here when he says Genucius “accused 
the Consuls of 474 of ignoring the agrarian law of Cassius,” for the law was never passed as 
we can see from Livy and Dionysius. 
 
256 
possession.458 As some plebs did not want to become farmers, colonists from 
Italian towns (Volsci according to Livy; Latins and Herenici to Dionysius) 
were also added to make up the numbers because “the rest of the multitude 
preferred to demand land at Rome than to accept it elsewhere” (Livy 3.1.7).  
 
There is very brief mention made by the usually long-winded Dionysius 
(9.69.1), but omitted by Livy, of an agrarian bill, proposed by the tribune 
Sex. Titius in 462 BC, being deferred to “more suitable times” (both consuls 
were out of the city in command of armies, one attacking the Volsci, the 
other defending the allied Hernici: Livy 3.8). 
 
The absence of consuls and soldiers did not stop another tribune from 
taking the opportunity in the same year to introduce a different bill in the 
people’s interest.  The tribune C. Terentilius Harsa was not won over by the 
same argument as his colleague to wait until Rome enjoyed peace when he 
proposed a board of five be appointed to codify the laws which regulated 
consular imperium.  Instead he put it to the plebs that the consuls were 
victimising the people by directing laws against them.  It will pay to 
examine the ensuing battle between tribunes and magistrates to shed light 
on the tactics used in the late Republic, for they were likely similar given 
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Livy is the source.  Popular pressure eventually paid off, even if in an 
unexpected way. 
 
Threats to boycott the levy were pitted against religious obstructions.  
Initially, the praefectus urbi intervened, summoned the senate and talked 
against Terentilius’ bill, so that the other tribunes were able to convince their 
colleague to postpone the matter (Livy 3.9).  The whole college of tribunes 
picked up the bill the next year and, in the face of staunch opposition, they 
alleged that omens and threats from the Volsci, Aequi and even the colony 
and loyal neighbour Antium were being invented to distract citizens from 
the need for limiting consular imperium (Livy 3.10).  The tribunes resolved 
unanimously to obstruct the levy: for were it held, they alleged, citizens 
would have been sent out to fight a fabricated enemy when they ought to 
have been in the city attending to the bill on consular imperium (Livy 3.11).  
Opposition to the bill persisted, due especially to the efforts of the patrician 
Quinctius Caeso (Livy 3.11-13) and then the diversionary tactics of the 
patricians in general (Livy 3.14).  The bill was still a topic of political interest 
in 460, so that when the Sabine Ap. Hordeonius seized the Capitol the 
tribunes again claimed it was a patrician ruse to distract the plebeians from 
the law and summoned the populus to put down their arms and vote the law 
in via a concilium plebis  (Livy 3.16.6).  Their hopes were dashed when the 
relatively conciliatory consul Valerius was killed reclaiming the Capitol and 
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the man elected suffect was none other than the father of Quinctius Caeso 
(Livy 3.15-20).   
 
Compromise was finally reached so that the tribunes would postpone the 
vote on their bill and the consuls would not lead the army out of the city 
(Livy 3.21). Livy reports that the danger of attacks from the Aequi and 
Volsci in 459 made the tribunes let the war take precedence over their 
proposal (3.22).  Re-elected again in 459 (for the third time) Verginius and 
Volscius faced consular obstruction of the passage of their law (the consuls 
obtained a two month delay in summoning the assembly to vote as they 
planned to use the period to convince the people that it bore secret lies 
(3.25).  The tribunes tried, as usual (suo more, Livy 3.25.9) to prevent the levy, 
but the plebeians obligingly armed themselves because of a massive Sabine 
onslaught (two large armies were levied, Livy 3.26).  Once the Sabine threat 
had been reduced by Cincinnatus in 458, the tribunes again tried to get their 
measure on consular imperium passed, but the senate put them off again 
(Livy 3.29).  The tribunes were elected for a fifth time in 457 and managed to 
carry a law increasing the number of tribunes to ten, with the senate 
providing that no tribune be elected to the post in successive years.  They 
failed yet again to pass the measure on consular imperium due to a fresh 
Sabine incursion which made it necessary for them to cease interfering with 
the levy (Livy 3.30).  
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The six years of wrangling finally paid off, but not as expected.  In 456 the 
new tribunes kept up the effort to pass the law limiting consular imperium 
but instead one of their number, L. Icilius, carried a plebiscite given very 
brief notice in Livy “de Aventino publicando” (3.31.1;  the Icilian law was a 
lex sacrata, i.e. an oath taken by the plebs, 3.32.7).  Forsythe believes Livy 
here depicts the type of land law that really belonged to the early Republic 
(rather than all the others which he considers retrojected from the late 
Republic).  He suggests it “somehow concerned the status of landholdings 
on the Aventine”, perhaps distinguishing the sacred land of shrines from 
the surrounding public and private ground – hence the bronze pillar 
inscribed with the law in the temple of Diana (Dion. Hal. 10.32.4).  But late 
annalists not only turned this into a late Republican-style law to distribute 
land to plebs but also linked the name of the rogator, Icilius, to a family of 
reforming Icilii.459  Indeed Dionysius fleshes out Livy’s sparse notice in just 
such a way: Icilius proposed  
 
that the region called the Aventine be divided among the plebeians for the 
building of houses. This is a hill of moderate height, not less than twelve 
stades in circuit, and is included within the city; not all of it was then 
inhabited, but it was public land and thickly wooded… All the parcels of 
land held by private citizens, if justly acquired, should remain in the 
possession of the owners, but such parcels as had been taken by force or 
                                                 
 
459 Forsythe (2005: 207 f.).  Icillius was also the first tribune to experiment with convening 
and addressing the senate (Dion. Hal. 10.31.1-2). 
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fraud by any persons and built upon should be turned over to the 
populace and the present occupants reimbursed for their expenditures 
according to the appraisal of the arbitrators; all the remainder, belonging 
to the public, the populace should receive free of cost and divide up 
among themselves. (Dion. Hal. 10.31.2, 32.2) 
 
The redistribution provision does indeed resemble Tiberius Gracchus’ lex 
agraria.  Cornell has a different interpretation of the law: following de 
Sanctis he believes it was a “unilateral decision of the plebs to occupy public 
land on the Aventine, and to protect individual settlers against eviction, if 
necessary by force.”460  Cornell holds that this was the nature of all 
plebiscites from the early fifth century, before the legal recognition of the 
leges sacratae.  If Cornell is correct, then we have discovered another form of 
popular demonstration: land occupation. 
 
The tribune Poetilius used the familiar tactic of obstructing the levy when he 
was elected on a platform of agrarian reform in 441.  He tried to gain 
popular support, by what methods we do not know.  Livy only tells us that 
his efforts were fruitless.  Poetilius was no radical, however: he followed 
tradition and tried to get the consuls to bring the question before the senate.  
At this point, Livy includes the curious detail: “After a great struggle he 
succeeded so far that the senate should be consulted as to whether the next 
elections should be held for consuls or for consular tribunes. They ordered 
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consuls to be elected.”  It appears Poetilius had failed to convince the 
consuls to discuss his land redistribution measure, but succeeded in getting 
them to talk about consular tribunes.  Poetilius, frustrated by the obstruction 
of the consuls, then threatened to impede the levy if land was not 
redistributed.  Livy portrays his threat as pointless because Rome was not 
then at war or preparing to go to war (4.12.3-5). 
 
The next agrarian proposal again resembled those of the late Republic with 
its provision to redistribute to individuals land annexed from the enemy (in 
effect ager publicus), which would involve confiscation of land that had fallen 
into the hands of the wealthy.  The bill was put forward in 416 by the 
tribunes S. Maecilius and (M.) Metilius, but their fellow tribunes vetoed it.  
Certainly those who stood to lose land opposed the bill: there was name-
calling in the senate (Livy 4.48.1-16).  There is no record of the involvement 
of the populus Romanus or what motivated the tribunes. 
 
Two years later land was again the focus of popular demonstrations: in 414 
the tribune M. Sextius proposed to send a colony to Bolae, which had been 
captured from the Aequi, against the wishes of the violent and abusive 
consular tribune Postumius.  The tribune argued that “those who had 
captured Bolae deserved that the city and its territory should belong to 
them,” to which Postumius exclaimed, “It will be a bad thing for my soldiers 
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if they do not keep quiet.”  His soldiers responded by taking matters into 
their own hands: they mutinied and killed him (Livy 4.49-50).  Although the 
final victory lay with the senate, since an interrex was appointed after the 
tribunes vetoed the election of consuls, the action of the soldiers served to 
remind the senate of the danger of frustrating the will of the people.   
 
The year after the soldiers expressed their dissatisfaction with Postumius, 
the consuls alienated the urban plebs.  These poor city folk were not so 
naïve as to fail to notice the speed with which the consuls executed members 
of their order involved in the mutiny, yet refused to advance measures 
brought forward in their own interests.  Livy suggests that had the senators 
shared out the vacant territory captured from the Aequi they might have 
saved themselves from plebeian resentment and the pressure to redistribute 
the publici agri they had unjustly occupied (Livy 4.51.2-6).  The plebs came 
close to having the issue resolved in 412 when the tribune L. Icilius began to 
agitate amongst the city dwellers and announced proposals to deal with the 
land problem, only to lose momentum when the city was hit by an outbreak 
of pestilence.  Although disease brought death to many, Livy reports that it 
was not considered as worrisome as the proposed land bill.  Clearly he 
reflects the senators’ view (Livy 4.52.1-3).  After a quiet year, due to disease 
and famine, agitation for agrarian laws was revived by the tribune M. 
Menenius.  In 410 he pressured the senate to support his bill after gaining 
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popular support to obstruct the levy (no one would take the oath, Livy 
4.53.3).  Menenius lost this support, however, after the enemy captured 
Carventum, and so his movement lost its impetus especially as those who 
had refused the oath were brought before the consul Valerius (Livy 4.53.9).   
 
Nine years then lapsed before Livy records another attempted land 
distribution: in 401 the tribunes proposed an agrarian law and at the same 
time prevented the collection of war-tax, thus saving the money of those not 
serving in the army, but simultaneously the shortfall of cash prevented 
soldiers from being paid.  The combination of threatened agrarian reform 
and actual witholding of tributum did bring success for the plebeians, 
although not in the form of an agrarian law.  Instead, for the first time a 
plebeian was elected consular tribune (Livy 5.12.3-9).  Once more, the 
interests of the elite plebeians triumphed over those of the poor.461 
 
It was not long, however, before the plebs received land.  The vote was close 
in 393 when suffect-consul Lucretius advocated that members of the plebs 
settled Veii, in response to the unattractive proposal that Rome be moved to 
Veii, which had been defeated by a majority of one tribe.  The senate was so 
pleased that Rome was staying put that the next day it passed a decree that 
                                                 
461 See Chapter Three for further instances, such as elite plebeians using the numerical 
superiority of their poorer brothers to compel the patricians to share office. 
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seven iugera of the Veientine territory should be allotted to each plebeian 
(Livy 5.30.8; cf. Diod. 14.102.4).  This tactic, of introducing an extreme 
proposal (moving Rome to Veii), in order to achieve a more modest one is 
reminiscent of the technique used in the late Republic by Pompey’s 
supporters to secure for him command against the pirates. 
 
The desire for conquered land to be given to the people was still strong in 
387 when the tribune L. Sicinius proposed a bill to distribute Pomptine land 
to plebs: “the people (populus) attended the assembly in greater numbers 
and showed a more eager desire for land than they had done” (Livy 6.6.1).  
Here Livy uses the term populus rather than his usual plebs, which may 
indicate the widespread appeal of the bill to citizens from all social groups: 
all Romans stood to gain from this new distribution of land. 
 
The final piece of land reform in this period occurred in 367 as part of the 
famous Licinio-Sextian rogations.  The tribunes Licinus and Sextius 
proposed relief from debt and the institution of land limits, along with 
redistribution of political power.462  They set maximum amounts of public 
land to be possessed at 500 iugera, the provision Ti. Gracchus revived in 133 
BC (Livy 6.35.4-10; Dion. Hal. 14.12 .22; Plut. Cam. 39).   
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Following this reform, our sources record no further calls for land laws for 
more than seventy years.  And then, once they reappear they are for veteran 
colonies (except for the lex Flaminia in 232) until 173, when pressure for the 
redistribution of Campanian land built up.  This may be evidence for the 
success of 119 years of popular pressure culminating in the Licinio-Sextian 
reform: the redistribution of public land held in excess of the legal limit had 
relieved the land shortage problem.  Or we may just be missing some piece 
of evidence that would prove otherwise.  Yet we must base our conclusions 
on the evidence in our possession.  Therefore, going on what we have, we 
can conclude that 367 was a watershed year that saw a significant popular 
victory in the area of land reform. 
 
In 296 land distribution resumed, but this time the people wanted 
magistrates to send out colonists to defend newly conquered territory.  
Volunteers were not forthcoming as the purpose of the colony was military, 
not agricultural.  The citizens legislated for the praetor P. Sempronius to 
take a vote to elect triumviri to found colonies at Minturnae and Sinuessa 
(Livy 10.21.4-10; Vell. Pat. 1.14).  Livy’s record reveals how the vote was 
organised:  
 
It was arranged that the tribunes of the plebs should get a plebiscite 
passed requiring P. Sempronius, the praetor, to appoint commissioners for 
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the founding of colonies in those spots. But it was not easy to find people 
to be sent to what was practically a permanent outpost in a dangerously 
hostile country, instead of having fields allotted to them for cultivation. 
(10.21.9-10)  
 
The senate persuaded the tribuni plebis to bring a bill to the people, 
proposing that the praetor choose commissioners to establish colonies.  The 
senate decided the need for the territory to be garrisoned, and the people 
acknowledged the desirability when they voted the bill into law, although 
the colonies themselves were not a popular lifestyle choice.  The refusal of 
citizens, rural or urban, to take up the offer to go and live in a dangerous 
outpost illustrates their freedom to choose. 
 
Following this incident, it appears there were further calls for distribution.  
The nature of the demand, however, is unclear.  All we know is that in 290 
the consul Curius “refused more than the regular assignment of land” (Val. 
Max. 4.3.5).  There was pressure for more land distribution than the consul 
was prepared to offer.  It is odd, then, that there is another significant hiatus 
in our souces at this point.  Perhaps Curius’ land allocation satisfied the 
need, although this seems unlikely given the implication in Valerius that 
demand exceeded supply. 
 
A lengthy 58 years passed before the next lex agraria during the infamous 
tribunate of C. Flaminius in 232.  It has been suggested that Flaminius’ 
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“brilliant career had demonstrated the theoretical sovereignty of Roman 
People.”463  He took an agrarian bill to the people despite senatorial 
opposition.  The law distributed land in the north, the ager Gallicus and 
Picenus, in viritane allotments to Roman citizens in the north (Polyb. 2.21.7-
8; Cic. Brut. 57).  Flaminius’ ability to pass his agrarian law even though he 
lacked senatorial support shows that he had tapped into voters outside the 
senate who were wealthy enough to have votes which counted.  As we saw 
in Chapter Two, men from all walks of life had clout in legislative 
assemblies due to the migration to Rome of many rural tribesmen who 
remained enrolled on rural lists during the period in which no censors 
carried out their duty.  Their residence in Rome, and probable under-
employment, gave them the chance to vote and so challenge the vote of their 
wealthy tribesmen, still resident in the countryside who could afford the 
time and expense to travel to Rome.  I suggest Flaminius tapped into this 
new group.464  His success depended on the urban drift of rural tribules 
following the first Punic war. 
 
Flaminius challenged senatorial authority in order to promote the interests 
of disgruntled veterans of the war against Carthage and send them out to 
garrison newly annexed territory in the north.  It was a happy coincidence 
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464 Mouritsen (2001) thinks he mobilised lower classes. 
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to the homo novus that he might gain some new supporters in the process.  So 
keen was he to have his land bill passed that he took his proposal straight to 
the assembly without first consulting the senate – a move at least in part due 
to senatorial opposition.465  Ninety nine years later Ti. Gracchus likewise 
bypassed the senate when he sought agrarian reform.  While the sources do 
not record them, there were four reasons for Flaminius’ bold and 
unprecedented action.  First, he and those who supported his bill gained a 
new group of clients, although it would have been difficult for the majority 
of the settlers to make the journey to Rome to exercise their right to vote – 
nonetheless, these men may once have been other men’s clients, but were 
now Flaminius’.466  Second, the initiative was no doubt a defensive one for 
the area once populated by Senones had been conquered and subsequently 
abandoned 50 years earlier.  Moreover the Latin colony of Ariminum, 
founded in 268, was struggling under pressure from Celtic tribes, so 
Flaminius’ settlement programme would safeguard Rome’s defensive buffer 
                                                 
 
465 Senatorial opposition arose from the political implications of individual allotments of 
land for Roman citizens at a significant distance from Rome.  Usually citizenship was 
renounced and such colonies became Latin, but with the spread of municipalities oligarchs 
feared loss of power.  See Feig Vishnia (1996:26 f.). 
 
466 Eckstein (1987: 10).  He may have had some potent senatorial support in the form of L. 
Caecilius Metellus (ib. 11 with n. 25).  Pliny (NH 7.139-40) records that Metellus was 
appointed to a land commission and Flaminius’ law was the only one during this period to 
provide him with the opportunity.  Feig Vishnia (1996: 32-24) believes Flaminius also 
enjoyed the support of the prestigious Aemilii and Carvilius, the colleague of Fabius 
Maximus during his second consulship (confusion over the date is due to Cic. Sen. 11), who 
remained silent while Fabius Maximus opposed Flaminius because the latter helped him 
achieve the consulship after a messy divorce. Scipiones may have supported him). 
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on her north-eastern border.467  Third, he sought to placate a disgruntled 
proletariat, including veterans of the first Punic war who had lost land in 
Sicily, and reduce the suffering of the landless by providing them with 
allotments.468  In addition, the fertile land of the Po valley may have helped 
alleviate food shortages at Rome.  The success of the lex Flaminia illustrates 
the ability of the people to have bills passed in their favour once they have 
secured a friendly tribune. 
 
As noted above, attention turned from defensive colonies of veterans469 to 
sending settlers out to farm allotments individually.  This change of tack put 
pressure on the fertile land of Campania.  Consequently, in 173 the consul 
Postumius was sent to recover from private possessors public land there 
(Livy 42.1.6, 9.7.8).  In 165 also P. Cornelius Lentulus, urban praetor, was 
requested by the senate to reclaim Campanian public land (Cic. Leg. Agr. 
2.82).  More defensive settlements, nonetheless, were still being sent out: 
decemvirs were elected to divide unoccupied land in Liguria and Gaul 
                                                 
467 Eckstein (1987:11). 
 
468 Feig Vishnia (1996: 30 f.) 
 
469 Four further incidents have survived in the historical record.  First, three commissioners 
were sent out to assign land to colonists at Placentia and Cremona (Polyb. 3.40.5 and 9-10).  
Then in 201 M. Iunius Pennus, the urban praetor, held elections for a land commission to 
assign land in Samnium and Apulia to Scipio’s veterans (Livy 31.4.1-3, 49.5).  In 199 C. 
Sergius, promagistrate, had his command prorogued so he could assign land to veterans 
(Livy 32.1.6).  Finally, in 180 a commission of three was appointed to assess a Latin colony 
at Pisa (Livy 40.43.1). 
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between Roman and Latin settlers (Livy 42.4.3-4).  Popular pressure started 
to peak around 140, which was  probably the year the consul Laelius made 
his famous agrarian proposal, but withdrew it in the face of senatorial 
opposition (Plut. Ti. Gracc. 8.3-4). 
 
And then came Tiberius Gracchus.  During his tribunate in 133, Ti. Gracchus 
passed a measure setting up a commission of three men to redistribute 
public land held in excess of the legal maximum to the poor.  The tribune 
may also have limited the term of military service and reaffirmed the right 
of appeal to the people and made equestrians members of juries.  
 
As we explained above, Plutarch and Appian, and perhaps Ti. Gracchus too, 
misunderstood the cause of the land shortage.  They wrongly attributed the 
shortage to an increase in big estates, with land purchased by wealthy 
aristocrats off struggling peasants, which relied more on slave labour than 
did the assidui.  This factor, in tandem with the trend for men to spend long 
periods in military service overseas, resulted in citizens losing their farms.  
This interpretation is incorrect, but it is right to notice that there was a land 
shortage.  The aim of the law was to provide land for those who had none 
because there were “too many people attempting to start out in life with too 
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little land.”470   Colonisation ceased in 173 once there was no land left to 
distribute in Italy; for Rome was reluctant to send out overseas colonies.471  
 
The bulk of Tiberius’ supporters came from the countryside.  Many were 
land hungry veterans.  It appears that the senate was hesitant to take on 
these retired soldiers.  Obviously rural dwellers were important supporters 
to have as they helped fend off attacks from conservative politicians.  
Therefore, so as long as Tiberius had the support of rural plebs, the senate 
did not act directly (only through Octavius’ veto), but he was attacked once 
he lost their backing after the country folk (and seasonal workers from the 
city) returned to the harvest (App. BC 1.14).  Urban plebs did offer some 
protection too.  We find that without their support Gaius Gracchus and 
Saturninus were isolated and therefore easy pickings after the intransigence 
of the conservative bloc in the senate drove them to act illegally.   
 
Tiberius’ tribunate also raised the issue of the legitimate expression of the 
people’s will, which had been used to justify the repeated conflict between 
senators who acted as representatives of popular interests and those who 
                                                 
470 Rosenstein (2004: 155ff.) acknowledges other factors also contributed to the need for land 
reform, such as the need to get recent immigrants out of the city and on the land.  
 
471 Keaveney (2007: 17; cf. 42), noting that when Sulla sent out colonists as part of his 
reforms in 81, it was to land won not by conquest but through proscriptions, so great was 
the lack of land available for distribution. 
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sought to defend the status quo and senatorial domination in the public 
sphere.  Tiberius Gracchus used this argument for the peaceful deposition of 
Octavius (Plut. Ti. Gracc. 15).472   
 
The lex Sempronia was a success.  Many citizens benefitted from the 
redistribution of land held in excess of the legal maximum as set out in the 
lex Licinia Sextia.  But it did not take long for some of the old habits to creep 
back in, so that by 123, the tribunate of Tiberius’ brother C. Gracchus, the 
agrarian law needed to be re-enacted.  The following year the conservative 
senators reacted to the reformer.  They persuaded the tribune M. Livius 
Drusus to propose twelve colonies of poor, in so doing undermining C. 
Gracchus’ colonies (App. BC 1.23; Plut. C. Gracc. 9.2).   
 
In fewer than fifteen years, factional fighting within the senate combined 
with the influx of money to Rome from imperial expansion saw the end of 
land grants for the poor.  The Gracchan law was ignored and the condition 
of the poor deteriorated as the wealthy began to buy up land legally (after 
the introduction of a measure which permitted the holders to sell land about 
                                                 
472 Nippel (1995: 56), e.g. a vetoing tribune might be expelled justifiably if he contravened 
the will of the people.  Badian (1972: 7098ff.) agrees that the principle was not new: “the 
tribune is supposed to act as the champion of the people and in its interest” (709).  The 
tribune Gabinius threatened to depose his colleague Trebellius in 67 when the latter vetoed 
his proposal to give Pompey a special command to deal with the pirates (Plut. Pomp. 25; Dio 
36.30.1 ff.). 
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which they had quarrelled) or even found reasons to seize it by force.  
Ultimately, the tribune Sp. Thorius secured the passage of a bill bringing an 
end to the redistribution of public land.  Appian comments that the plebs 
had lost everything and were reduced to unemployment (BC 1.27). 
 
The plebs did not give up hope, however, as they continued to apply 
pressure and in so doing succeeded in stimulating further attempts to 
legislate in their interest.  Most notable were the efforts of Saturninus to 
provide for Marius’ veterans during his tribunates in 103 and 100 BC.473  The 
case of Saturninus illustrates the methods tribunes used during this period 
to encourage people to participate in legislative assemblies in Rome.  First 
he saw to it that the tribal assemblies supported his bill to allocate each 
Marian veteran 100 iugera of land in Africa (Asc. 80C; Auct. Vir. Ill. 73.1).  
We have more evidence on his second tribunate, during which Saturninus 
introduced measures on food and land distribution.  His technique was to 
send messengers to those citizens resident in the country districts to inform 
them of the comitia on the lex agraria that would divide amongst Marian 
veterans the land which the Cimbri had seized in Gaul.  Appian (BC 1.29) 
claims that the tribune could be sure of their support as they had served in 
the army under Marius.  These may have been the same soldiers Plutarch 
                                                 
473 See on Saturninus Badian (1962a: 21 -219). 
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states had joined with the needy rabble and secured the election of Marius 
and the defeat of Metellus (Mar. 28.5).  Saturninus had already in 103 gained 
the support of the equestrians, if he had not already won them over through 
his amicitia with Marius, by his lex de maiestate which delivered to an 
equestrian jury the power to try cases of maiestas.474  
 
But Saturninus’ plans unravelled when his rural supporters came to blows 
with the city dwellers who opposed the bill because the agrarian law stood 
to advantage Italians over the demos (BC 1.30). 475  The law was passed per 
vim after the ochlos announced they had heard thunder, and so no assembly 
could be held (App. BC 130; Livy. Ep. 69).  Saturninus and fellow tribunes 
attacked their opponents, forcing them from the rostra (App. BC 1.30).  This 
was a reasonable response as these men, unnamed by Appian, had acted 
illegally.  As private citizens, they had seized the rostra in an effort to 
prevent the passage of the laws using the pretext of bad omens.  But since 
Saturninus’ reforms were carried with violence and against the auspices, 
they would later be annulled.  Although the year of his second tribunate 
began well, with Marius and his veterans supporting Saturninus’ legislative 
programme, it turned sour, first with this scuffle in the Forum, then with 
                                                 
474 Auct. Ad Her. 2.17; Cic. De Or. 2.107, 109, 164, 197-201; Inv. 2.53; Part.Or. 105; Sall. Hist. 
1.62 M. 
 
475 By “Italians” Appian refers to the Marian veterans living in the Italian countryside, as 
Brunt (1988: 279) suggests. 
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further violence at consular elections midyear.  The senate passed the SCU.  
Saturninus was killed when the crowd pelted him and the other men 
sheltering alongside him in the senate house with roof tiles on the first day 
of what would have been his third term as tribune (App. BC 1.32-33; cf. Cic. 
Rab. Perd. 20, Val. Max. 3.2.18 Dio 37.26).  With Saturninus and Glaucia 
dead, and Marius’ influence in serious decline, the veterans lacked a leader 
to promote their interests: the land distributions were never carried out.476 
 
It is impossible to be sure of Saturninus’ aims.  Our task is complicated by 
the hostility of the ancient sources.  We ought to be wary of Appian’s 
portrayal of the popularis reformer, for he struggles to be objective in his 
account of Saturninus.  His attitude is best characterised in his words on the 
condition of Rome following the death of Saturninus and his allies:  
 
Freedom, democracy, laws, reputation, official position, were no 
longer of any use to anybody, since even the office of tribune, which 
had been devised for the restraint of wrong-doers and the protection of 
the plebeians, and was sacred and inviolable, now was guilty of such 
outrages and suffered such indignities (App. BC 1.33).   
 
Here Appian’s lack of sympathy for Saturninius and his modus operandi is 
made clear, but is understandable when we recall that history is written by 
                                                 
476 Keaveney (2007: 25); Badian (1958: 211 n. 2) and Evans (1994: 121); Brunt (1988: 278-280). 
The movement to find land for veterans continued, but with staunch opposition from men 
from the countryside, mobilised by magistrates from Rome.  Saturninus’ colleague Sex. 
Titius, one of Saturninus’ supporters, passed a land law in 99 only to have it annulled by a 
decree of the college of augurs (Cic. Leg. 2.14 and 31). 
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the winners, to justify their successes and vilify their opponents.  In 
addition, like his predecessor Tiberius Gracchus, Saturninus’ hands-on 
approach upset his opponents who excused their hostility by alleging he 
broke with tradition, only to do the same themselves by hypocritically doing 
away with the ancestors’ restraint and by repeated use of obnuntiation and 
veto.  As Appian himself states above, the tribunate had been violated by 
the actions of Saturninus’ opponents. 
 
The urban plebs were a selfish bunch, and on more than one occasion 
demonstrated jealous protection of their privileges.  Livius Drusus had his 
successful political career undone by his attempt to secure land distribution 
for Latins and Italians, so negative was the response from urban plebs.  In 91 
the consuls summoned Etruscans and Umbrians to Rome to protest against 
the tribune Livius Drusus’ law.  The consuls appealed to the instinct of self-
preservation in these men, suggesting that the proposed colonies would put 
their use of public land in jeopardy, and instilling fear in some that they 
would lose private holdings (App. BC 1.35; Auct. Ill. 66).  Worried by 
rumours about a plot on his life he worked from home, but was assassinated 
there one evening, despite his precautions (App. BC 1.36). 
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Cicero turned popularis to prevent the passage of Rullus’s land bill in 63 
BC.477  Sage believes Caesar and Rullus tried to set Cicero up by offering 
him the chance to participate in a piece of popular legislation.  They 
expected him to react as he did, and so show himself to be the supporter of 
the status quo, not the popularis he pretended to be in his speech to the 
people.478  Had Rullus chosen his moment in any year other than the one in 
which Cicero was determined to establish his position as senior statesman, 
his bill would have stood a better chance of success.  Against the skilled 
orator, the naïve tribune stood not a chance, despite the benefits to the state 
of his proposal.  Cicero’s victory illustrates the important role of persuasion 
in politics.  In the days before mass media, those with the power of 
persuasion prevailed. 
 
Three years later, Cicero was supporting a land bill in the face of stiff 
opposition from the conservative quarter of the senate, including the consul 
Metellus Celer.  The tribune L. Flavius had proposed that Pompey’s 
veterans be given land, some public, the rest purchased with Pompey’s new 
revenues.  Unlike Rullus’ bill, provisions were added to protect those 
currently in possession of land.  But the conservative senators won and 
                                                 
477 Leg. Agr.; Rab. Perd. 32; Att. 2.1.3; Sull. 65; Pis. 4; Pliny NH 7.117; 8.210; Plut. Cic. 12.2-5; 
Dio 37.25.4. 
 
478 Sage (1921: 230-236). 
 
278 
blocked the passage of Flavius’ agrarian bill (Cic. Att. 1.18.6, 19.4; 2.1.6-8; 
Dio 37.49f.).  The refusal of these senators to compromise was 
understandable from the perspective of competition amongst senators for 
auctoritas.  The Pompeians would have won a great deal of prestige had they 
provided land for the veterans.  The intransigence of the senators backfired, 
however, when Pompey, Caesar and Crassus joined forces and formed the 
first triumvirate in order to get what they wanted. 
 
One of their first achievements was the election of Caesar to the consulship.  
From this position he proposed legislation, the passage of which was 
obstructed by his consular colleague Bibulus.  Caesar nonetheless passed an 
agrarian law early in the year, and added another to distribute Campanian 
land to indigent citizens who had families.479 
 
 
CONCLUSION: WHAT KIND OF DEMOCRACY?   
 
Popular pressure forced the senate to respond to food crises.  The senate 
received added impetus from the threat of individual reformers, and the 
more conservative senators struggled to cope with the emergence of the 
popularis politicians and their new ways of operating based on winning 
                                                 
479 MRR 2: 187 f. 
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popular support from the senate.  The old guard sought to provide 
subsidised food in order to maintain stability and preserve the status quo.  
In this way, then, the people had political power. 
 
The prestige that the people’s support brought with it persuaded popularis 
politicians to restore tribunician power.  Pompey saw that the popular 
backing derived from the restoration would help secure his position and 
election to the consulship.  Those ambitious politicians who lacked the 
traditional forms of support needed the favour of the people to take on the 
more established nobiles in the competition for dignitas and auctoritas.   
 
Conservative senators resisted debt reform, making it an uphill task for 
reformers to secure and maintain popular support.  Again, competition for 
dignitas and popularity caused problems, such that Caesar, Trebonius, 
Servilius and Caelius fought for the people’s favour.  In the end, the people 
brought political success to those who promised them the most. 
 
Democratic elements did exist in the late Roman Republic.  The demos or 
populus Romanus made demands and these were met, eventually, during this 
period, with more success than in earlier periods.  The achievements were 
due to the popular power that exerted itself in the form of resistance to 
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senatorial commands and demonstrations of support for those who would 
pass measures that improved conditions for the needy. 
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CHAPTER 5: DEMONSTRATIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION III: 
CONTIONES, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES, TRIALS, LUDI ET 
GLADIATORES, TRIUMPHS, CHAMPIONS, FUNERALS, ELECTIONS  
AND SENATORIAL RESPONSES 
 
The investigation so far reveals that citizens who belonged to the senatorial 
and equestrian orders had relatively more control over decision-making 
through formal mechanisms such as the voting assemblies, while the rest of 
the populus Romanus, that is, the plebs, exercised more power through 
demonstrations, secessions and riots.480  We continue with the analysis of 
demonstrations of displeasure and good will at contiones, legislative 
assemblies, elections, trials, games, triumphs, funerals, including 
miscellaneous expressions of favour towards popular champions.  These 
were the venues for popular demonstrations during which the will of the 
plebs became manifest through cheers and jeers, and other forms of 
collective demonstration.  The theatre witnessed occasional outbursts of 
hissing and jeering, applause and cheering as spectators showed their 
support of favourites and protested the presence of those whose policy or 
person they opposed.  Cicero may have believed that shows were a good 
place to assess a man’s popularity because the crowd was less easily 
                                                 
480 Finley (1983: 91) suggests this in his chapter on popular participation. 
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manipulated than in comitia and contiones (Sest. 115), but his self-serving 
examples are from the eve of his recall from exile in 57 BC, and conceal the 
usefulness of contiones.  These informal meetings offered senators the best 
opportunity to assess the people’s opinion on issues about to be put to the 
vote, and to assess their chances of a successful candidature at election time.   
 
 
CASE STUDY: CONTIONES 
 
It is often maintained that the people played only a passive part at contiones, 
for the presiding magistrate and those invited to speak by him (usually 
other senators) alone enjoyed the right to address those assembled, with the 
result that the meeting was more a stage-managed political demonstration 
than a free discussion of the issue at hand.481  For a contio to count as 
democratic, there is a belief that the meeting should influence political 
decision-making.  But, since the speakers were mostly members of the top 
property classis, some hold that the meeting could not possibly be 
considered democratic: a humble Roman could not simply stand up and put 
forward his view.  The debate in the contio was limited to those men the 
                                                 
481 Lintott (1999b: 196); the contio was “the essential instrument in the hands of members of 
the elite seeking to create and objectify a “verdict of the Roman People” in the view of 
Morstein-Marx (2004: 158).  The contio was “an instrument with which to create a symbolic 
manifestation of the Popular Will and to exert the pressure of an ostensible communal 
consensus.” (ib. 172). 
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presiding magistrate allowed to address the meeting; opposition was often 
excluded.  “The contio was essentially an official platform for politicians to 
present themselves and their views to small, presumably influential 
audiences.”482  
 
But this argument presupposes only one kind of participation at the contio 
itself, namely that of addressing the audience, followed by one kind of 
participation at the assembly, voting.  Moreover, the implication is that 
those in attendance were wealthy members of rural tribes – the traditional 
“influential” element.  As we saw in Chapter Two above, however, there is 
good reason to believe citizens with lower property qualifications had 
moved to Rome and their votes now formed the majority in many rural 
tribes, so that the extremely wealthy no longer dominated the legislative 
assemblies.  Contrary to Vanderbroeck’s suggestion that the audience at a 
contio was made up predominantly of artisans and shopkeepers,483 the 
nature of the issues debated in contiones indicate that a variable and mixed 
group of citizens was in attendence, mostly urban dwellers, including recent 
arrivals from the countryside.484  The populus that made up the forum crowd 
                                                 
482 Mouritsen (2002:46). 
 
483 Vanderbroeck (1987). 
 
484 Cicero (Leg. agr. 2.70) appeals to an urban audience, reluctant to give up the benefits of 
the city for a life of drudgery in the countryside.  Gruen (1974: 387-404); Mouritsen (2001: 
39-46); Morstein-Marx (2004: 130). 
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included citizens from all walks of life: those who elected Cicero consul (i.e. 
members of centuries influential in the comitia centuriata, Leg. agr. 2.3); the 
plebs urbana (ib. 2.70); and the diverse members of candidates’ and 
magistrates’ entourages (adsectati), there to show support for their patrons 
(Comm. Pet. 34, 37-38).485  Also taking their ease in the forum were 
unemployed layabouts and busier folk such as freedmen (Comm. Pet. 29), 
shoppers and shopkeepers (themselves often freedmen).486 
 
Another argument that reduces the popular influence at contiones suggests 
that elite manipulation and control over contional “debates” meant that, 
despite the “ingratiating rhetoric of popular power”, the senate was firmly 
in control: 
the contio served better as a communal arena in which the hierarchies 
both within the political elite and in the Commonwealth as a whole 
could be established, perpetuated, and validated than as a democratic 
forum for bringing to light, clarifying and pursuing the real interests of 
the voting citizens.487 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 
485 As noted above in Chapter One, Morstein-Marx (1998: 260f.) has successfully defended 
the reliability of the Comment. Pet.  While this pamphlet provides advice for electioneering, 
magistrates also maintained retinues once elected, both to stress their popularity in the 
competitive environment of Roman politics, and to protect themselves from physical 
intimidation. 
 
486 Vanderbroeck (1987) emphasises the attendance of shopkeepers and artisans at the 
expense of the rest of the populace. 
 
487 Morstein-Marx (2004: 285 f.). 
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This argument rests on a perceived lack of success on the part of the people 
at achieving significant reform in its interest – the late Republic saw only 
limited relief in the areas of food supply and land redistribution, and none 
in relation to reform of the political system to make it more responsive to 
popular pressure, save for the introduction of the secret ballot in the 130s 
and the restoration of tribunician powers in 70.  While the pressing urgency 
of these small victories is acknowleged, they are downgraded to fit the 
thesis: Morstein-Marx disagrees with Millar’s democratic interpretation of 
the political system, so puts a strong case against Millar’s theory.  Morstein-
Marx’s effort to state his own case results in his underemphasis of some 
significant democratic elements.  In response to Millar’s model of 
persuasion which claims that the elite had to appeal to popular ideology 
and meet fairly specific demands, Morstein-Marx suggests this ideology 
could be created and so controlled by orators.488  He in fact suggests that 
contiones were used more to mobilise than persuade, as illustrated by the 
case of the series of contiones held regarding the consular bill to establish a 
special court to try Clodius following the Bona Dea sacrilege.  Here speakers 
mobilized support against the opposing faction. 489  But is this not just 
semantics?  A speaker still has to persuade someone to support them before 
                                                 
488 Millar (1998: 217); Morstein-Marx (2004: 14-18). See Connolly (2007: Ch. 1) on persuasion, 
etc. 
 
489 Morstein-Marx (2004: 186-89). 
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mobilisation occurs.  And this process was likely often repeated with a 
different crowd each time. 
 
As for the role of contional audiences, this is often described as rowdy 
support or disapproval of proposed laws and prospective magisterial 
candidates.  Yet approval or disapproval of speakers did have an impact on 
decision-making, as witnessed by the effort put in by orators to secure the 
support of the audience. Cicero emphasises the importance of the popular 
element in the process of deciding land reform, when he challenges, then 
summons, Rullus to a contio and declares:  “I wish to use the populus 
Romanus as arbitrator” (Leg. agr. 1.23).  
 
A study of contiones reveals their importance and the role of popular 
approval of issues raised there: magistrates had to persuade the people that 
their policy or candidacy was worthy of support.  It was in this environment 
that the citizens had the best opportunity to communicate with 
magistrates.490    
 
                                                 
490 See Pina Polo (1995; 1996) for the political role and significance of contiones. 
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Contiones gave rogatores491 the chance to test the water and ensure they had 
the support needed to pass their bill into law and so avoid the humiliation 
of failure.492  Contiones also provided a unique opportunity for those in 
Rome on the day of these informal public meetings to witness the debate, 
and show their support, or lack thereof, by cheering or booing.493  They were 
“a tool with which to create public opinion and popular pressure.”494  These 
meetings offered a chance for citizens to express a kind of freedom of 
speech, just as Rome was a kind of democracy. 
 
Freedom of speech was a key component of men’s libertas.495  Commoners 
were de iure permitted to address contiones but only if invited; in fact, they 
seldom did.  Livy records one instance in 171 when the ex-centurion Sp. 
Ligustinus was invited by the consul and tribunes to talk about his military 
service (42.34).  But the rarity of taking such an active role does not rule out 
                                                 
491 The term contionator “the speaker in a contio” is rarely used by Latin authors, and usually 
means “demagogue” (e.g. Cic. Cat. 4.9).  Hence my use of rogator here, based on the usual 
practice of contiones being summoned by the magistrate or tribune proposer of the bill to be 
debated.  Others also called contiones together, such as Cicero, to celebrate his election to the 
consulship, which happily handed him the opportunity to talk in opposition to Rullus’ land 
bill. 
 
492 Morstein-Marx (2004: 123-128, 160). 
 
493 On the role of popular acclamation during the Empire, see Aldrete (1999). 
 
494 Pina Polo (1995: 216). 
 
495 See Chrissanthos (2004); Brunt (1988: 313-317, 327-329). 
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the possibility of popular participation of another kind in these informal 
public meetings. 
 
It is clear from our ancient sources that the members of the audience at 
contiones were able to communicate their opinion to the speakers.  The 
tribunus plebis Macer expected an interjection in his speech urging the people 
to take action against the Sullan aristocracy when he said, “’What, therefore, 
do you propose?’ one of you might interject” (Sall. Hist. 3.48.14M).  Cicero 
acknowledges interaction with audience in the speech he delivered against 
the tribune Rullus in 63: “I see someone who confirms that the will was 
made” (2.41).  Similarly, the crowd murmurs a response after Cicero roused 
those present with references to Rullus selling off land won by ancestors: “It 
seems to me your feelings are moved a little” (2.49).  Again we see him 
trying to assess popular opinion via the contio in the third speech delivered 
against Rullus: “I see that certain of you indicate I don’t know what by your 
rumbling” (strepitu, 3.2). One further example will suffice to illustrate the 
practice of orators fishing for a reaction from their audience at contiones.  In 
his speech in defense of Sestius, Cicero attacks the praetor, Clodius’ brother 
Ap. Claudius Pulcher, regarding the technique of putting questions to the 
contional audience in order to elicit a response (Sest. 126).  There is no 
question that this technique was widely used to establish the will of the 
audience, despite Cicero’s efforts to reduce Appius’ case to the meaningless 
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response of “half-dead hirelings” (ib.).496  We need to be wary of Cicero’s 
criticism of the praetor’s technique for two reasons: first he criticises Appius 
for putting the question of Cicero’s return to a contio rather than to the 
traditional comitia, then he accuses him of loading the meeting with 
mercennarii. We must question the basis of these complaints: the centuriate 
assembly would vote on Cicero’s recall, but he is playing with his audience 
when he claims the comitia was the ancestors’ venue for debate; the contio 
had long been used for this purpose.  As for pin-pointing the source of the 
outcry to hirelings – such precision would have been impossible without 
modern surveillance equipment.  Cicero understandably targeted Appius 
because he opposed the exile’s recall.  The orator provides additional 
evidence himself to make us question his reliability as a source for the 
nature of contiones: he hypocritically denigrates these informal assemblies as 
being at the beck and call of masters loathed by the populus Romanus (Sest. 
127), yet, as we have seen above, he himself had been dominus when he 
addressed a contio in 63 and successfully deterred the people from voting in 
favour of Rullus’ land bill. 
 
Despite clear efforts to register the response of audiences, it has been held 
that Cicero shuns such interaction, that “actual audience responses are 
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mentioned only as something to be avoided”.497  This belief is based on a 
misinterpretation of a passage from Cicero’s treatise de Oratore (2.339), in 
which he advises orators to avoid hostile responses caused by error 
(peccatum), annoyance (offensio) or dislike (invidia), unpopular subjects or an 
agitated audience.  The problem is the substitution of hostile for all 
responses, including secunda.  The scholar in question may have overlooked 
adversa as the avoidance of all responses reinforces his theory that “in 
Cicero’s ideal model of contional speech, communicative influence goes 
only one way, from elite speaker to mass.”498 To the contrary, Cicero’s orator 
responds to acclamatio (shouts).  What Cicero suggests is how to deal with 
hostile shouts (acclamatio adversa), and in so doing he implies not that they 
were to be avoided, but were inevitable given the preconditions he listed.  
Also, Cicero says nothing on the topic of acclamatio secunda – something to 
be sought out perhaps?  Indeed Morstein-Marx acknowledges Cicero’s 
double standards: the consummate orator himself does not practice what he 
preaches when he adopts the techniques of populares to stir up the crowd 
(when his theory recommends calming) and use of the call-and-response 
technique.499   
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Morstein-Marx further argues that orators were ventriloquists who made 
the crowd say something useful: “favourable audience responses are almost 
always prompted by the politicians themselves”500  No true crowd response 
was recorded: any response from the crowd contained in Cicero’s speeches 
was elicited by Cicero using cunning rhetorical techniques (e.g. claptraps to 
elicit applause, the tricolon, and antithesis).501  This strikes me as an 
ingenuous line to take as it negates the possibility that members of the 
contional crowd expressed their own opinion.  Morstein-Marx creates a law 
binding on all occasions, and so portrays the people as incapable of 
independent action.  It is not in the interest of objectivity to take such an 
absolute approach to an area of social history in which the sources are so 
partisan.  But we can see why he has not supported (or even examined?) the 
other side of the argument: not only is the evidence slim regarding the 
existence of independent crowd participation in informal assemblies, but by 
taking the line that senators like Cicero manipulated opinion he supports his 
own overarching thesis that the governing elite manipulated the people.  
Still, he ought at least to deal with the very real possibility that Cicero was 
not responsible for every shout or clap, and that the orator was in fact 
recording audience response as it happened.  Morstein-Marx only goes so 
far as to acknowledge that sources other than Cicero hint at such a reality in 
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the form of contradictory crowd responses – he finds himself in the 
precarious position of dealing with evidence that contradicts his neat theory 
that speakers controlled their audience.  How can this be if the crowd’s 
reactions differ?  He puts the phenomenon down to “the natural variations 
of responsiveness within a crowd”502 – but where does he make it cohere 
with his other claim that politicians prompted the shouts?  Are there then 
several puppet masters motivating crowd behaviour and reactions? 
 
Cicero used contiones to gauge popular opinion, as he makes clear in a letter 
to Atticus written March 15, 60 BC:  
 
Tribune Flavius is vigorously pushing his agrarian law with Pompey’s 
backing.  There is nothing popular about it except its mover.  With the 
approval of the contio I advocated the deletion from the bill of all 
provisions detrimental to private interests (Att. 1.19.4). 
 
How did he evaluate the popular will?  As above, he directed questions at 
the audience and measured the level of support from their response.  The 
orator also utilised his considerable powers of persuasion, demanding “the 
plebes Romana at least be able to consider what its interest is (quid intersit 
sua), what is to its advantage (quid expediat), and how much confidence it 
thinks ought to be given to you in the purchase and sale of things” (Leg. agr. 
2.66).  His tactic of siding with his audience was not novel – others had 
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painted themselves in popularis colours to win the support of the people, 
which means there was at least this ideal that the senate ought to defend the 
popular interest.  And the contio was one of the most important venues for 
assessing the commoda plebis. 
 
Cicero had summoned the contio himself, so no doubt he was preaching to 
the converted, although it must be remembered that the forum was a public 
space, so other interested parties could attend these meetings.  He sought to 
“manipulate public opinion in those quarters which mattered to Cicero, that 
is the boni or propertied classes, alerting them to the ominious threats of 
Rullus’ seemingly moderate bill.”503  He may also have been targeting 
tribunes with his words of doom, as it was they who were able to use their 
veto to block their fellow tribune’s proposal.  It is likely that he valued the 
views of the lower strata of society also, a reflection of the competitive 
nature of Roman politics as one politician had to compete with the rest to 
win support from every level of society in order to enhance his auctoritas, a 
competition made even more difficult by the lack of political parties.  The 
effort to win the support of these more humble members of society indicates 
the voting clout of the plebs: their backing was crucial to get bills passed 
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into law.504  The use of the contio as an index of popular support would have 
been redundant if the people’s support did not translate into votes. 
 
Another method employed by contional audiences to communicate with 
speakers was the shouting of slogans.  We have evidence that Clodius used 
claquers to abuse Hortensius and Curio with slogans at a contio on the topic 
of Cicero’s exile (Dio 38.16.5).  This has been viewed as a deterioration of 
discipline typical of the late Republic505  – but vocalisation of opinions was 
surely a common method in an oral society with few other communication 
options.  The positive publicity generated by a successful contional speech 
went a long way: soundbites, slogans and published speeches circulated far 
and wide, reaching the municipales.506  Morstein-Marx has referred to this as 
the “bandwagon effect”:  a successful contio deterred opponents from 
voting, so that only a favourable populus assembled.507  There does not, 
however, seem to be anything preventing the organisation of a rival contio, 
especially when we take into account the small number of voters needed to 
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be mobilised by opponents.508  Moreover, Morstein-Marx discounts as 
inconsequential the debate that did arise at the contiones preceding the vote 
on the Gabinian, Manilian and Trebonian laws, on which see below. 
 
Contiones offered the orator the opportunity to measure the mood of the 
multitudo.  In 63, Caesar persuaded the tribune Labienus to prosecute 
Rabirius for his involvement in the murder of Saturninus following the SCU 
in 100.  The case was tried before the centuriate assembly but the vote was 
never taken.509  A criminal conviction might have resulted had the praetor 
Q. Metellus Celer not raised a red flag on the Janiculum and so dispersed 
the preliminary contio.  For Cicero’s inflammatory remarks (he called 
Saturninus a hostis populi Romani) resulted in public protest in the form of 
shouting at the contio (Rab. Perd. 18).  Thus we see fear of popular reaction 
influencing the actions of the aristocracy.  
 
It will pay to analyse the findings of Vanderbroeck’s study.  Vanderbroeck 
investigates 24 possible and confirmed incidents of collective action at 
contiones between the activities of the tribune Quinctius following the 
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conviction of Oppianicus in 74 and the tribune Ateius summoning a group 
of people to prevent Crassus’ departure for Parthia in 55 BC.510 
 
We examined the tribunate of Quinctius in Chapter Four above, in relation 
to his efforts to restore tribunician powers.  While he was unsuccessful in 
this aim, he did succeed in organising daily contiones at which he roused his 
audience with claims of senatorial injustice.  Cicero criticises the tribune for 
his attacks on the senatorial court and, in particular, the presiding 
magistrate Junius for accepting bribes after the trial  of Oppianicus in 74 BC 
(Cluent. 77, 89 ff.).  Cicero is particularly unimpressed by Quinctius’ use of 
public space and creation of uproar and noise:  
 
How come my case is being heard in such deep silence now, whereas 
Junius then was deprived even of the chance of defending himself?  
The reason is that then the case was wholly at the mercy of prejudice, 
misunderstanding, suspicion, and the spirit of lawlessness and tumult 
which daily animated the mass meetings (invidiam, errorem, 
suspicionem, contiones cotidianas seditiose ac populariter concitatas).  The 
accuser was a tribune of the people: whether on the platform or before 
the people, a tribune still (idem in contionibus, idem ad subsellia); and he 
came into court straight from his mass meeting – or rather, he brought 
it with him (ad iudicium non modo de contione, sed etiam cum ipsa contione 
veniebat).  The Aurelian steps over there – they were new then – might 
have been built to serve as an auditorium for the case: and when the 
accuser had filled them with an excited crowd (concitatis hominibus), 
there was no possibility of speaking for the accused; nor even of rising 
to speak (Cluent. 93). 
 
                                                 
 
510 Contiones in fact constitute the largest single category of collective action in 
Vanderbroeck’s (1987) study. 
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Cicero contrasts his serene audience with that of Quinctius eight years 
earlier, omitting to mention that times had changed: no longer were tribunes 
operating on reduced powers, nor was senatorial corruption the problem it 
was in the 70s.  For not only did Quinctius adopt a different style of oratory 
to Cicero, simultaneously praised as gravis and condemned as vehemens 
(Cluent. 77),511 the tribune also had a far more passionate audience, fired up 
to bring an end to senatorial dominance of juries.512  Their enthusiasm is 
attested by their attendance at daily contiones.  The constitution of this great 
crowd that filled the Aurelian steps is left undefined – all we know is that 
they were excited (concitati homines).  We do not know whether Quinctius 
attracted plebs, freedmen, equestrians, or senators.  Although we do know 
at least one senator was present: Cicero. 
 
The populus Romanus gathered at a contio greeted Pompey’s promise as 
consul-designate to restore tribunician powers with strepitus et grata 
admurmuratio and his assurance to deal with the law courts “non cum strepitu 
sed maximo clamore” (Cic. Verr. 1.45).  In this way Pompey knew he had the 
backing of a wide cross section of the people, not just humble poor folk, for 
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Quinctius. 
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Cicero was always quick to use derogatory terminology to describe a crowd 
of citizens if the opportunity presented itself. 
 
The tribune Gabinius used a contio to make sure he had popular support for 
his proposal to appoint an ex-consul to lead a force against the pirates who 
were causing havoc with the grain supply.  Morstein-Marx sees this as an 
example of elite manipulation in action: in the process of ascertaining the 
public will, the elite could also fashion it.513  And yet he concedes that 
“oratorical control over the audience and communication-situation may well 
be in part a hegemonic fiction shared by the political elite”, with invidia 
(which he translates as “popular indignation”) checking senatorial 
predominance.514   
 
The response of the audience at Gabinius’ contio illustrates the power of 
invidia.  The tribune had first taken the bill to the senate, and when he 
experienced resistance there, Gabinius reported the result to the people.  
They took umbrage at the rejection of what was clearly marked out as a job 
for their champion Pompey, so attacked the senate house, forcing senators 
to flee (Dio 36.23-24; Plut. Pomp. 25.1-4; Cic. Imp. Pomp. 44).  Those of the 
people involved were, depending on the author, the universus populus 
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Romanus (Cic.), the more humble homilos  and polloi (Dio), and the demos and 
plethos (Plut.).  There seems to be a pattern developing here: when Cicero 
describes audiences associated with Pompey, they are not the plebs or 
multitudo but the more respectable populus.  Cicero’s choice of the word 
populus, the term that captures all Roman citizens unless opposed to 
senatus,515 may reflect Pompey’s widespread support by the various strata of 
society, or the word choice may be attributed to Ciceronian sycophancy in 
an effort to win over his hero Pompey. 
 
Gabinius’ first contio was followed some three weeks later by a second at 
which he invited Pompey to address the audience first (Dio 36.24.5-26).  
Gabinius spoke second and reinforced Pompey’s words to the Quirites, 
encouraging them to choose what would benefit the state (Dio 36.26.27-29).  
The tribune Trebellius tried to speak in opposition but was not granted 
permission to speak, so interposed his veto.  Gabinius responded by 
introducing a new motion that Trebellius be deposed as he was unfit to hold 
the office of tribune.  The popular will prevailed; for after seventeen tribes 
voted to depose him, Trebellius withdrew his veto (Dio 36.30.1-2; Asc. 72C). 
The plebs came very close to deposing yet another tribune for obstructing 
their will.  When a second tribune , Roscius, silently raised to fingers to 
indicate that two men should be appointed, the audience (homilos) disagreed 
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with such a great threatening shout that he desisted (Dio 36.30.3; Plut. Pomp. 
25).  With the opposing tribunes silenced hand and mouth, Gabinius invited 
the princeps senatus Catulus to speak (Dio 36.30.4-36; Plut. Pomp. 25).  The 
contio broke up into the voting units of the concilium plebis to decide the fate 
of the bill.  And so the law was passed with wide popular support (Dio 
36.37.1).  Again, without the testimony of Cicero, the Greek sources depict 
the participants at the contio as mean: demos, homilos (Dio), and ochlos (Plut.). 
 
The case of the lex Cornelia de legum solutionibus also illustrates the strength 
of popular invidia in the face of senatorial obstruction.  The tribune 
Cornelius promulgated a bill providing that senators could not grant office 
to anyone unless as prescribed by law, nor could they usurp the decision of 
the people in any other way.  The senate reacted against this reduction in its 
auctoritas and encouraged one of the other tribunes to use his veto.  This 
tribune, P. Servilius Globulus, also stopped the herald from reading the bill 
to the contio, at which point Cornelius read it himself. The populus greeted 
with a huge outcry the consul Piso’s protest that Cornelius was ignoring 
Globulus’ veto, and the consul’s fasces were smashed when he ordered his 
lictors to arrest those threatening him.  In the end a compromise was 
reached so that senatorial decrees granting dispensation could only be 
passed with a quorum of 200 senators present. (Asc. 58-59C; Dio 36.39.2-
40.1).  This case also hints that different elements made up the audience: 
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while those up the front were destroying Piso’s fasces, a group from the back 
were pelting him with stones (ex ultima contione, Asc. 59C).  Not everyone in 
the audience was involved in the violence.  Furthermore, there were clearly 
opposing sides, supporters of Cornelius versus those of Piso, which throws 
doubt on Morstein-Marx’s “bandwagon effect” theory, according to which 
rogatores ensured that there was no debate at the contio preceding the vote 
(Dio 36.39.4).  That the bandwagon effect failed is evidenced by the lack of 
consensus in this case.516 
 
During the tribunate of Clodius in 58 several contiones are recorded as being 
held.  Clodius further adapted the contio by using local organisations to 
arrange support for his proposals.  The ancient evidence suggests that “the 
post-Sullan era witnessed the development of new methods of organizing 
the plebs and articulating social protest.”517  What had changed?  Clodius 
was more effective in rallying support amongst the plebs urbana than any 
previous tribune had been: Vanderbroeck has him supplying the top 
leadership for some 25 incidents between 61 and 52 BC.  But was the success 
a result of innovative techniques such as using intermediate leaders518 or the 
altered political circumstances?  In the last generation Romans had 
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witnessed the rise of the military giant, an increasingly internecine nobility, 
and the expression of a new public clientele incorporating especially 
freedmen’s interests.  Clodius’ method was to set himself up as the 
champion of the people and to attack Cicero; Clodius defended the liberty of 
the Roman citizen, as when he dealt with the infringement upon the 
People’s liberty resulting from the ban on collegia.  Nippel states that this 
ban, along with that of the Compitalian Games celebrating the abolition of 
the boundary between slave and free (which had also been banned after 
disturbances), “aroused the plebs’s indignation”.519 Clodius harnessed this 
invidia  to gain support for the vote to repeal the ban on collegia – he 
certainly staged the games three days before the vote, assisted by a magister 
vicorum Sextus Clodius (Cic. Pis. 9). 
 
Clodius succeeded in forming such a strong alliance with the plebs urbana 
that following his death in 52 the men who took his place as leaders of the 
Clodian faction “were able to channel the spontaneous anger of the 
populace as well as deliberately mobilize parts of the plebs for organized 
demonstrations, [the result of] Clodius’ policy of organizing and, so to 
speak, training the plebs urbana.”520 
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During the last one hundred years of the Republic, the audience at contiones 
changed, as popularis politicians made increased efforts to invite their 
supporters to attend, thus altering the composition of the traditional 
contional crowd of boni.  With such ideologically opposed groups of 
supporters, debate in the forum resembled party politics, as one faction tried 
to appeal to the supporters of the other, as when Cicero played his popularis 
card.521  Those men addressing contiones naturally responded to their 
audiences, who participated in this important part of the decision-making 
process by shouting their approval or disapproval, and by more physical 
demonstrations of their opinion. 
 
 
CASE STUDY: LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES 
 
The populus Romanus had another avenue of communication with 
politicians: the people could also participate in the decision-making process 
via the legislative assemblies.522  The Roman populus is special in the history 
of the crowd, for its means of expression was not limited to demonstrations; 
the Roman people was the legislative body.  The only other well 
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documented instance of such direct democracy in antiquity, in terms of 
influence on decision-making, is that of fifth century Athens. 
 
Citizens in their capacity as voters indicated their support for a man and his 
treatment of the issue at hand by voting in favour of the bill.  In most cases it 
is difficult to distinguish whether the bill is voted into law due to the 
popularity of the rogator or the issue.  Patronage still counted to a certain 
degree: a patron could rely on his client to support or oppose a bill, if he 
shared the opinion of his patron either from personal conviction or from 
being won over by the patron.   But there was no method for a patron to 
confirm the way his client voted once the secret ballot was introduced for 
use in legislative assemblies in 131 BC.  Clients could vote as they pleased.  
Thus patronage had less influence on decision-making than traditionally put 
forward by old school classicists.523 
 
I have examined the nature of formal popular participation in legislative 
assemblies above in Chapter Two.  These assemblies also gave the populus 
Romanus, plethos, demos, operae, manus, senators, equestrians, soldiers, libertini 
and servi the opportunity to have an informal influence on decision-making 
through demonstrations.   
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Legislation involved the conflicting interests of many groups.  These 
different  factions clashed in the forum, Campus Martius and streets of 
Rome.  Negotiation and concession sometimes prevented the groups from 
coming to blows.  At other times, violence was avoided by a superior show 
of strength, sufficient to scare off the opposition. 
 
In the first case, we see the interests of three clash: divisores, agents officially 
charged with the duty of distributing largess by tribe, came into conflict 
with a reforming tribune and a conservative consul.  In 67 BC the tribune 
Cornelius proposed a lex de ambitu in an attempt to curb electoral 
corruption.  The homilos adopted the bill (Dio 36.38.4).  According to 
Asconius (74C), the tribune convinced the populus Romanus that there was 
such dire need for the law that they clamoured for it.  But then the senate 
worried that the severe punishments would deter people from accusing 
those who broke the law due to the “desperate danger” this would place the 
accused in.  The opposing senators then broke two laws in an effort to 
reform Cornelius’ law: they voted to introduce the law in the period before 
the elections during which no law was to be enacted, and they usurped the 
people’s right to pass measures legally binding on all Romans.  The consuls 
Acilius and Piso redrafted the bill to mitigate the severe penalties of 
Cornelius’ measure so that those found guilty de ambitu were fined, banned 
from holding office and ejected from the senate (Dio 36.38.1).  But this time 
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they included penalties for divisores.  At this, a multitudo divisorum attacked 
the assembly.  Piso countered the violence of these agents with a greater 
armed gang (maior manus) of his own, and in this way he secured the 
passage of the law (Asc. 75-76C).  In the end, the conservative element 
triumphed but not before experiencing a fierce demonstration of popular 
opinion, in which divisores expressed their dissatisfaction at inclusion in the 
bill.  And not without adopting in response the methods of the populares in 
the form of reliance on a manus.  Cicero meanwhile exaggerates the extent of 
the people’s defeat: “They say that because of the recklessness of that 
tribunus plebis you can be induced to surrender all claim to that power” (Asc. 
76C).  They may have had a law they passed overturned by the senate, but 
the end of 67, the plebs were once more flexing their decision-making 
muscle. 
 
In the next example, the tribune Manilius’ lex de libertinorum suffragiis reads 
differently depending on the source.  From Dio (36.42.1-43.2), we get the 
impression Manilius backed a bad horse, misjudging the popular interest 
when on the last day of 67 BC, he summoned an assembly and persuaded 
tines ek tou homilou to support his proposal to enrol freedmen in rural tribes 
as well as urban, and so spread their vote over all tribes.  The majority of the 
plethos opposed the measure, however, and it was annuled by the senate the 
next day.  It was after this falling out with the freeborn citizens that Manilius 
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sought to rekindle their affection by proposing Pompey be given command 
against Mithridates.  Cicero paints a much bleaker picture, alleging Manilius 
organised a band (manus) of freedmen and slaves to support his bill (Asc. 
45C).  He deliberately besmirches the status of freedmen in the audience to 
exaggerate the tribune’s demagogic characteristics.  Freedmen naturally 
made up a significant proportion of all forum audiences as it was these men 
who owned and worked in the tabernae around the city centre.  Asconius 
(65C) notes that the law was proposed during the period of the Compitalian 
festival, organised by the collegia compitalicia.  Vanderbroeck suggests that 
Manilius took advantage of this event and sought the assistance of magistri 
vicorum, who presided over the collegia, to organise the manus.524 
  
In the previous example we saw a popularis politician charged with 
organising manus libertinorum et servorum (Asc. 45C).  In the following case 
involving Clodius, Piso and the Lex Pupia Valeria de incestu, the charge is 
more serious, the use of operae or “gangs” against a concursus of boni and 
optimates.  In 61 BC the optimates (dunatoi) forced the consul Pupius Piso to 
propose a bill to set up a criminal court to try Clodius for sacrilege following 
the Bona Dea scandal, and for committing incest with his sister (Cic. Att. 
1.13.3).  Cicero’s account describes the occasion in detail, picking out in the 
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assembly trouble-making barbatuli iuvenes and totus ille grex Catilinae under 
the leadership of Curio who begged the populus to vote against the bill.  The 
consul Piso also talked against the bill he had unwillingly proposed.  Then 
when it came time to vote, Cicero saw operae Clodianae occupying the 
bridges and reports that the tabellae handed out included no “ayes”.  Cato, 
Hortensius and other of the boni ran together to address the comitia (Att. 
1.14.5).  In the end the bill was passed, but only after deleting the clause 
stipulating the jury be appointed rather than the usual selection by lot (Cic. 
Att. 1.14.1-2; 1.16.2).  Clodius was acquitted after bribing the jury (Dio 
37.46.1-2).  In this case, Clodius enjoyed the widespread support of iuvenes, 
Catilinarians and his own supporters, termed operae by his enemy Cicero.  
We see also Curio pleading with the populus to vote against the bill that 
would have set up the special court to try Clodius.  The combination of 
Curio’s oratory convincing the voters to reject the bill and the brute force of 
the supporters who blocked the voting bridges resulted in the optimates 
dissolving the assembly and reworking the bill to give it more widespread 
appeal.  Popular opinion struck another blow against optimate domination, 
even if it reflected the will of popularis leaders. 
 
The people were again organised into gangs, or less pejoratively and more 
accurately bands, to give strength to their opinion on the Lex Julia agraria in 
59 BC.  Caesar had been compelled to form a private amicitia with Crassus 
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and Pompey after experiencing the intransigence of the conservative 
element of the senate under the leadership of Cato.  Appian provides the 
narrative, with details fleshed out by Plutarch, Cicero and Cassius Dio.  To 
ensure the passage of his bill, Caesar secretly organised a large band of men 
(cheir) to back him should he need, then took his proposal to the senate, 
where he found little support so abandoned the senate for the rest of the 
year and instead addressed the people from the rostra.  In one of these 
contiones he asked Pompey and Crassus if they supported his bill, and when 
they expressed approval the demos came to the voting place with concealed 
daggers (App. BC 2.10).  The senate convinced Caesar’s colleague Bibulus to 
oppose the bill, but he was attacked and his fasces broken when he 
interrupted Caesar’s contio.  Cato was also ejected also when he tried to 
make a speech criticising Caesar.  With the optimate opposition disposed of, 
the bill was passed into law (App. BC 2.11).  Pompey helped his ally by 
sending soldiers into the city to vote (Plut. Caes. 14.6).  The populares were 
well organised, so that the plebs occupied the forum the night before the 
legislative assembly (Dio 38.6.1-4) and Vatinius and C. Fibulus led them in 
an attack on the consul Bibulus when he tried to obstruct proceedings (Cic. 
Vat. 22 and 31).  Cicero appears outraged at this attack on the consul, yet his 
own rhetoric belies the illegal actions of Bibulus: he was not summoned to 
address Caesar’s contio so was rightly ejected to prevent his obstructionist 
tactics, and no one was permitted to enter the curia since Caesar did not 
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summon the senate for the rest of the year.  The Caesarians may have over-
stepped the mark, however, when they sent a lictor to drag him from his 
house, unless the implication was that Bibulus’ actions had made him a 
public enemy (hostis).  But Clodius had not yet passed his law rendering 
illegal obnunciation, so Bibulus ought to have been within his rights, though 
the legality of his obstruction is by no means clear in Dio (38.6.4-6).  Cato 
Minor also tried to get in the way, but was removed from the forum twice 
by the Caesarians (Dio 38.3).  The plebs were well within their rights to eject 
from the rostra those not invited to speak, in this case Bibulus and Cato, 
although it is not clear from the sources whether Cato was in fact 
summoned to address the contio.  He found no favour with the audience, 
however, and was twice made to leave.  In this way the plebs, variously 
termed plethos and demos in the Greek sources, made clear their intentions to 
vote in favour of a bill that served their interests. 
 
During his consulship in 63 BC, Cicero had broken the law and executed 
Roman citizens without a trial.  While he had his excuse that they were not 
citizens but hostes since they had attacked the state, his actions nonetheless 
supplied his own enemies with ammunition.  Moreover, if we lay partisan 
politics aside for a moment and consider the popular point of view on these 
executions, a picture emerges of a people fearful of the reassertion of the 
arbitrary use of magisterial power to repress the rights of the people, in this 
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case to a trial on capital charges.  Dio (37.38.1-2) portrays the reaction of the 
polloi in this way: they are angry at Cicero for causing the death of citizens 
and feel additional hatred for his taking liberties with the oath delivered on 
his final day of office, in which he praised himself for saving the state 
despite being forbidden to do so.  It is in this light that we ought to consider 
the following case, that of the Lex Clodia de exsilio Ciceronis. 
 
Dio (38.12.5-7) records Cicero’s unpopularity amongst the great numbers 
who were annoyed by his speeches (deemed too frank and condescending) 
and amongst the enemies he made by trying to outdo even the most 
powerful men.  Clodius hoped to win over senate, equestrians and homilos 
easily, and so crush the braggart.  With this purpose in mind he went about 
buttering up the needy with free corn, the freedmen and artisans with the 
revival of collegia and the elite with a ban on revision of membership to the 
senate by censors (Dio 38.13.1-2).525  Clodius first passed a lex de capite civis, 
which everyone understood to be directed against Cicero although it did not 
mention him by name.  Although all the senate shared the responsibility 
since they had charged the consuls with seeing to it that the state suffered 
no harm, it was Cicero who had exacted the penalty against the 
                                                 
525 It is not clear how any of these measures might have won over the equites.  Cicero may 
have enjoyed their support already as a member of that order and a homo novus – they 
certainly went into bat for him when they sent envoys to consuls and senate on his behalf 
(Dio 38.16.2). 
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Catilinarians, so he received most of the blame (Dio 38.14.4-6).  When Cicero 
lost his nerve after not receiving the support of Caesar and Pompey that he 
expected, he went into voluntary exile, at which point Clodius persuaded 
the people to pass a law exiling Cicero by name (Dio 38.17.7).  Cicero’s own 
account paints quite a different picture, as we might expect.  Clodius is not 
defending the rights of citizens, but targeting Cicero, robbing him, an ex-
consul, of his citizenship by the mere summoning of a concilium, and by 
gathering gangs of the needy (egentes) and servi (Cic. Dom. 79).  If we scrape 
away the bitter hostile bias, we can recognise some of those who 
participated in the vote to legalise Cicero’s exile from Dio’s account: the 
needy were those whom Clodius appealed to with his food bill, and the servi 
more likely libertini who benefitted for the revival of collegia.526  To be sure, 
Clodius’ desire to exile Cicero may have been motivated by personal malice, 
but equally Cicero had mistaken the will of the poor and the freedmen, and 
no doubt others from the lower orders who were wary of a consul who did 
not consult them before executing Roman citizens.  And for this oversight 
and insensitivity to popular opinion, he paid with seventeen months exile.  
Cicero’s rhetorical abilities were unable to persuade the people to spare him. 
 
                                                 
526 Vanderbroeck (1987: 243) suggests freedmen rather than slaves participated, but 
provides no reason for his theory. 
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In January 57 BC, the tribune Fabricius tried to pass a bill securing Cicero’s 
recall.  Despite occupying the rostra the night before the tribal assembly, his 
attempt failed when he came to blows with those who opposed Cicero’s 
recall.  This was no gang of ruffians as Cicero alleges, but powerful men 
including the consul Metellus Nepos, Clodius and his brother the praetor 
Ap. Claudius.  These certainly did not take on Fabricius and his gang alone, 
but brought along their armed clients, including slaves, to protect them – 
these armati homines et servi do not escape Cicero’s notice (Sest. 75) whereas 
he omits to mention that Fabricius relied also on armed supporters, which of 
course he did or else he would have stood no chance.  Cicero deliberately 
downplays any questionable behaviour by those on his own side.  The scene 
as portrayed by Cicero resembles a blood bath, with his supporters being 
driven off or slaughtered, the centre piece his own brother having to cover 
himself with the corpses of slaves and freedmen to save his life (Sest. 76).  
Dio, on the other hand, emphasises the responsibility of both sides (39.7.1).  
Fabricius’ bill failed thanks to popular support in favour of Clodius and his 
faction.   
 
This demonstration of popular strength forced Cicero’s side to put the 
matter of his recall to the comitia centuriata, reviving a seldom used practice 
of referring matters concerning a citizen’s life to the centuriate assembly – 
the assembly traditionally dominated by those who owned land.  Cicero 
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emphasises the efforts  of Pompey, who sent his men to mobilise the populus 
Romanus, especially the municipii and coloniae of the Italian countryside, to 
come to Rome to vote.  He also praises the consul Cornelius Lentulus 
Spinther, who summoned the assembly (Cic. Att. 4.1.4, Dom. 75 and 90, Mil. 
38f., Pis. 80; App. BC. 2.16; Liv. 104).  Cicero did not have the support of the 
masses, hence the decision to take the vote for his recall to the comitia 
centuriata – his backers had given up on winning popular support.  Dio is 
therefore mistaken when he claims the plethos backed Cicero’s recall (39.8.2-
3).  The exile’s supporters were ultimately compelled to move the vote to the 
comitia centuriata to avoid the wrath of the common people in the assembly 
weighted in their favour, the concilium plebis.  Clodius had won the plebs 
over as he better understood their needs.  The case of Cicero’s recall also 
emphasises the importance of having the plebs on side for the passage of 
bills via the concilium plebis.  Without the voting clout of the city’s 
inhabitants, a bill was unlikely to be passed into law. 
 
Yet Cicero’s is a special case.  When we reflect upon the typical forms of 
participation in legislative assemblies, popular demonstrations provide 
evidence for informal methods of influencing the decision-making process. 
 
 
CASE STUDY: TRIALS 
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At trials too the people had plenty of opportunity to have their opinions 
heard outside the formal role they had on juries.  Jury service was usually 
the prerogative of the wealthy senatorial and equestrian orders, but in 70 BC 
a lex Aurelia added jurors from another order.527  These were the tribuni 
aerarii, a mysterious group of men, nowhere in our ancient sources formally 
defined.  They may have been from the same order as equestrians, or a 
lower one.  Dio (43.25.2) refers to them as part of the plebs when he notes 
that Caesar deprived them of their role as iudices at quaestiones in 45 BC. 
 
Trials are sometimes criticised for being nothing more than stages on which 
the aristocracy worked out their differences,528 yet important issues such as 
the food supply and popular rights were also addressed at these trials; 
popular participation occurred when rights were challenged.529  Thus, trials 
were not only a competition over dignitas, although many involved charges 
of electoral corruption as members of the elite struggled to win office and so 
honor.  Ambitus was a charge levelled at candidates for curule offices who 
got carried away with canvassing, whereas the charge of maiestas was more 
often levelled at ex-tribunes who had taken on the conservative element in 
                                                 
527 Gruen (1974: 45 f.), Taylor (1960: 149); Scullard (1959: 95, 419); Wiseman (1970: 71 f., 79 f.). 
 
528 See, for instance, Lintott (2004: 62) on politically motivated prosecutors. 
 
529 See below on Milo’s trial in 56 BC and Cornelius’ in 66. 
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the senate, often in defense of popular rights.  Senators finding themselves 
charged with these offences looked to their supporters for assistance.  In the 
following cases the popular response is examined. 
 
The people’s involvement in the trial of P. Autronius Paetus was limited to a 
violent display of opposition to his being charged de ambitu.  Autronius was 
in 66 on trial for electoral corruption after securing his election to the 
consulship of 65.  Cicero, in his defence of Autronius’ colleague P. Cornelius 
Sulla, sought to paint Autronius in a dark light to emphasise the innocence 
of his client in comparison; for this reason he alleges Autronius first 
recruited gladiatores and fugitivi to disrupt his trial, then used unnamed men 
to throw stones and riot (Cic. Sull. 15).  It must be noted, however, that Sulla 
was also convicted (Sall. Cat. 18.2; Asc. 75 and 88 C; Dio 36.44.3, 37.25.3), 
even though he was a much more amicable man – Autronius had terrible 
temper and other negative traits which made him easy to dislike (Cic. Sull. 
71).530  His later involvement in the Catilinarian conspiracy (Suet. Jul. 9) 
implies Autronius was a man desperate to form amicitiae in the face of a 
hostile and entrenched aristocracy.  Due to these difficulties in winning the 
acceptance of the boni, he turned to those clients he could, and used hired 
gladiators and slaves.  But two points need to be made in relation to the 
                                                 
530 Gruen (1974: 441) calls him “bitter and explosive by nature” and notes that all Autronius 
achieved by organising such disruption was the hastening of his own conviction; Lintott 
(1968: 212) focuses briefly on the existence of violence during the proceedings. 
 
317 
constitution of the crowd who demonstrated their support for Autronius: 
others before him had relied on gladiators and slaves for protection; and 
Cicero omits the free citizen clients who without a doubt came to his aid, 
highlighting instead the servile element in order to undermine Autronius’ 
integrity and so bolster that of his client, Sulla.  With Cicero’s bias taken into 
account, and the use of slaves placed in context, we see the participation of 
Autronius’ supporters in a different light: these were men demonstrating 
their frustration at having their elected candidate removed from office.   
 
In the same year we see a very different group of the people take centre 
stage at a trial.  C. Cornelius was charged with treason (maiestas) following 
his conduct in defence of popular rights during assemblies while tribune in 
67,531 but the charge was dropped when noti operarum duces challenged the 
prosecutors, the brothers Cominii, as they stood on the tribunal (Asc. 59-
60C).  Cornelius had been a popular tribune, preventing his consular and 
conservative enemies from usurping the people’s right to decide who was 
granted office (Dio 36.39).532  The intervention of noti operarum duces 
provides an example of leadership originating from outside the aristocracy.  
The sources mention no link between Cornelius and these well-known 
leaders of bands of men, although the connection has been supposed by 
                                                 
531 On which see above, with Asc. 57-81C and Dio 36.38-40. 
 
532 Gruen (1974: 438); Lintott (1968: 212). 
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modern commentators.533  If there is no evidence that Cornelius organised 
the duces to intervene on his behalf, we might suggest that these unnamed 
noti duces acted on their own initiative to mobilise Cornelius’ supporters.  
Public demonstrations such as this one at Cornelius’ trial, then, present the 
possibility that there was a democratic element to popular protest at trials, 
whereby citizens outside the elite strata organised demonstrations. 
 
Duces operarum appear on the scene again in the following year.  Manilius 
was taken to court charged with treason and, like Cornelius before him, 
turned to operarum duces for assistance (Asc. 60 and 66C).534   The people 
(homilos or demos) showed Cicero not only that they were ardent supporters 
of Pompey and his adherents, but that they were familiar with the law 
when, at the end of his praetorship in 66, Cicero failed to give Manilius the 
statutory ten days to prepare his defense on a charge of extortion (Plut. Cic. 
9.4-6; Dio 36.44.1-2).  The praetor’s excuse was that he wanted to preside 
over Manilius’ trial himself before his office ended and a less friendly 
praetor took over.  The tribuni plebis were not convinced of his altruism and 
summoned Cicero to explain himself to the people at a contio.  Cicero did 
                                                 
533 Vanderbroeck (1987: 228), for instance, implies Cornelius organised them to come to his 
aid. 
 
534 Gruen (1974: 262, 441); Lintott (1968: 212).  Vanderbroeck (1987: 229) is critical of Gruen’s 
suggestion that Domitius Ahenobarbus brought the demonstration to an end because he 
bases his claim on the Scholia Bobbiensia, which he considers too unreliable as a source of 
evidence. 
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well to recover from his original misjudgement of popular opinion and, 
praising Pompey to the skies, in turn received popular praise, with the 
audience even going so far as to request that he defend Manilius (Asc. 66C).  
This is one of three occasions noted in the Commentariolum Petitionis as 
crucial for winning over the urbana multitudo and eorum studia qui contiones 
tenent.  The other two were Cicero’s promotion of Pompey and defence of 
Cornelius (Com. Pet. 51). 
 
It is perhaps timely at this juncture to reiterate a point made earlier, also 
noted by Erich Gruen in his study of continuity of tradition in the late 
Republic: public expression of support or opposition had long taken the 
form of shouting and demonstrating at assemblies, public meetings and 
other gatherings like shows and funerals.  Sometimes the participants would 
become violent, but this seldom happened and did not prevent the 
completion of normal judicial and other decision-making processes.535 
 
Bearing this caveat in mind, we come to one of the most notorious popularis 
politicians of the period, Clodius.  He was a master mobiliser of the plebs, 
with the help of his intermediate leaders, many recruited from the 
                                                 
535 Gruen (1974: 438f.) also notes that although at times volatile, the urban crowd was 
seldom irrational: their aims related to fixing food shortages and ensuring the senate did 
not usurp popular rights.  He notes in addition that the pattern of taking out frustration 
against those more well off was repeated often throughout history, with reference to 
Hobsbawm (1965: 108-125) and Rudé (1981). 
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neighbourhood vici, tribal headquarters and collegia.  Others no doubt came 
to him voluntarily when his popularis leanings became clear.  These 
supporters had many opportunities to demonstrate their loyalty.  One of the 
first was following Clodius’ misconduct at the Bona Dea festival in 62, 
which resulted in his facing the charges of sacrilege and incest in a specially 
constituted quaestio extraordinaria.536  He sought to oppose the establishment 
of this special court.  From this incident, we know he enjoyed the support of 
iuvenes, “Catilinarians”, senators like Curio and his own bands of clients.  
The same people demonstrated their support by gathering in huge numbers 
and so intimidating the jury that the iudices demanded the senate pass a 
decree granting them a bodyguard (Cic. Att. 1.16.5).  Plutarch suggests that 
the plebs supported Clodius in part because of their dislike of his 
aristocratic opponents (Caes. 10). Clodius was acquitted.  According to 
Cicero and Dio this was because he bribed the jury (Dio 37.46.1-2).  Yet as 
we have seen, the jury feared for their safety enough to demand the 
appointment of a bodyguard, so this incident may be interpreted as another 
case of the people exerting their influence through a demonstration of 
strength.  Vanderbroeck supposes Clodius organised the gathering of his 
supporters, suggesting he perhaps mobilised support via operae.537  Yet we 
need also to consider the possibility, mooted by Gruen in regard to another 
                                                 
536 For legislation establishing this special court, and the people’s response, see above. 
 
537 Vanderbroeck (1987: 236). 
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defendant,538 that they acted out of spontaneous support for their patron or, 
depending on their relationship, amicus, and genuine enthusiasm for 
Clodius encouraged them to act in a threatening fashion towards the iudices. 
 
Defence of the popular interest motivated those of the audience who 
expressed their opinion at Milo’s trial in 56.  The exact nature of the court is, 
in fact, unclear. There are two options according to modern commentators: 
Gruen suggests he was tried before a quaestio de vi, while Alexander says it 
was a iudicium populi, based on Cicero (Q. Fr. 2.3).539  Whatever the type of 
court, the prosecution was attacking Milo’s conduct as tribune in 57 when 
he organised bands of men to take on those of Clodius in an effort to 
prevent Clodius’ election to the aedileship.  As Dio puts it, Clodius charged 
Milo with providing himself with gladiators (39.18).  Clodius used the 
opportunity of the trial to attack Pompey.  He put a barrage of questions to 
the crowd after Pompey had delivered his speech as witness.  Plutarch 
provides details of his technique, likening the plethos to a trained chorus:  
Clodius would shake his toga as if a prearranged signal to elicit a response 
from his supporters (Pomp. 48.7).  Yet it is possible that such toga-shaking 
was a traditional popularis technique, dating back to at least the days of 
Gaius Gracchus (Plut. Ti. Gracch. 2.2), and not a cynical sign of manipulation 
                                                 
538 Gruen (1974: 438) suggests spontaneity on the part of C. Cornelius’ supporters. 
 
539 Gruen (1974: 298 n. 139); Alexander (1990: 129 n. 2). 
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of the masses.  Gaius’ “innovative physical presence became the prototype 
for future politicians wishing to associate themselves with his style of 
antiestablishment politics.”540 
 
Cicero characterised the audience at Milo’s, or at least those who 
participated in the question and answer “session”, as operae Clodianae (Q. Fr. 
2.3.2).  We ought, however, to take into account his bias against Clodius, and 
so interpret this designation with a grain of salt.  There was a food shortage 
at the time, and the nature of the questions reveals the real issue for the 
people gathered was their empty stomachs, not partisan politicking. 
 
The ex-tribune Vatinius found support for his case amongst Caesar’s milites.  
He had been charged with violation of the lex Licinia Junia for irregular 
legislative activities during his tribunate of 59 (Cic. Vat. 33; he failed to 
observe the trinundium, Schol. Bob. 140 St.).  Soldiers and Clodius disrupted 
his trial.  Vatinius chose to return to Rome to face the charges, as he had 
already set out to serve as Caesar’s legate in Gaul.  It appears Caesar sent 
soldiers to support the man who had secured for him command in Gaul – 
Cicero states that Clodius “put himself at the head of your soldiers as their 
leader” (Cic. Vat. 33).  Gruen interprets this trial as symptomatic of the 
                                                 
540 Corbeill (2002: 188). 
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utilisation of the courts as a weapon in the propaganda campaign against 
the triumvirate.541  It is unusual to see milites taking part in activities in the 
forum as soldiers were not permitted within the pomerium except to 
celebrate their general’s triumph.  Cicero may have been denigrating the 
men’s status for rhetorical effect, portraying them as soldiers when they 
may have been nothing more than the clients of Vatinius and Clodius – this 
speech is after all out and out invective against a man who was a witness 
against Sestius, whom Cicero was defending. 
 
The universus populus demonstrated their displeasure at Aulus Gabinius.  As 
tribune in 67 he had enjoyed popularity when he acted as rogator of the bill 
that gave Pompey command against the pirates.  But he lost favour in all 
quarters, and won for himself a date in court twice in 54 BC, for his 
intervention in the so-called “Egyptian Question.”  He faced a charge de 
maiestate for restoring Ptolemy Auletes in contravention of a senatorial 
decree.542  Cicero reports that not only were the senate offended, but also the 
people: on the day of the trial, Gabinius was nearly crushed by a huge, 
hostile gathering of the whole people (concursu magno et odio universi populi 
paene adflictus est, Q. Fr. 3.1.24).  Similarly Dio (39.62.2) reports the reaction 
of “practically the whole demos” as they tried to tear him to pieces, after 
                                                 
541 Gruen (1974: 292).  On the incident see Cic. Vat. 33f.; Sest. 135; Schol. Bob. 140, 150 St. 
 
542 Although he had been unwilling to act on the question of who should reinstate Ptolemy, 
he had been encouraged to do so by Pompey (Dio 39.55.3) and Antony (Plut. Ant. 3).   
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being stirred up by Cicero.  Gabinius desperately needed to cash in on his 
alliance with Pompey.  Despite the best efforts of his opponents, especially 
Domitius and Appius Claudius (the latter hoped to please the plebs, Dio 
39.60.3-4), he was acquitted after Pompey made his wishes clear: vehemens in 
iudicibus rogandis (Q. Fr. 3.3.3) – an illustration of the strength of Pompey’s 
influence over the jury.  But as the following episode reveals, he failed to 
convince the plebs that Gabinius was worth saving. 
 
Gabinius was not so lucky at his second trial in 54.  This case shows how 
popular pressure could bring criminal conviction: the threat of being 
expelled from the senate whether by censor or by jury as a result of criminal 
conviction was real.  If members of the elite influenced the decisions of 
censor and juror, so too did citizens outside the ranks of the extremely 
wealthy.  Gabinius underwent a second trial at the same time for extortion 
(de repetundis), alleged to have occurred when he accepted the mission to 
reinstate Ptolemy.543  His involvement in the restoration of Ptolemy had 
greatly upset the plebs (Dio 39.61.3-4), whose superstition convinced them 
that Gabinius had caused the Tiber to flood when he went against the 
Sybilline Oracle which forbade anyone to enter Egypt with an army (Dio 
39.15.2). 
                                                 
543 See Fantham (1975) for the details. 
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Dio (39.60-63) and Cicero (Q. Fr. 3.1.15) reduce the incident to a case of 
factional politics.  He tells us that Gabinius’ opponents were the consuls 
Domitius and Ap. Claudius, opposed to the faction of Pompey for what they 
could gain personally from the pressure they applied to Gabinius.  They 
used the superstition of the demos and plethos to convince them that the Tiber 
had flooded because Gabinius had led an army to Egypt against the 
recommendation of the Sybilline Oracle.  Yet if we put this factional politics 
aside, we see popular power at work.  When the jury acquitted Gabinius of 
the first charge, the people threatened to execute the jury, but then focused 
on the remaining charges, of which Gabinius was found guilty and so exiled 
(Dio 39.63.5). 
 
Cicero and Dio are our main sources on Gabinius’ trials.  Yet we have good 
reason to treat Cicero’s evidence with care.  He fell out with Gabinius as 
early as 58 when Gabinius benefitted from the exile of Cicero (Q. Fr. 3.1.15), 
and again in 56 we find Cicero carping about Gabinius in his capacity as 
governor of Syria where he struggled to deal with pirates and did not get on 
well with publicani (Cic. Sest. 71; Prov. Cons. 9-13). 
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52 BC witnessed the final two trials to be considered here.  The first was that 
of Milo; this time the charge was the murder of Clodius.544  The second was 
the trial of Scaurus, who had been in the thick of the troubles in 53.  He was 
prosecuted for electoral corruption and violence.  In both, private citizens 
clashed with the soldiers Pompey had stationed around the forum to keep 
the peace in a turbulent year that saw him appointed sole consul by 
senatorial decree.  His appointment itself was the result of popular pressure 
that saw the growth of a rumour suggesting Pompey be created dictator 
(Asc. 35-36C). 
 
Milo’s trial pitted the quasi-official military forces of Pompey against the 
surviving friends of Clodius, termed populus, Clodiana multitudo and by 
implication included tabernarii as on the last day Plancus ordered shops 
closed to allow their participation (Asc. 52C).  Although Pompey claimed he 
was only interested in fighting the Clodian protesters as part of his new role 
as sole consul and protector of the state, factional politics may also have 
played some part in his actions.  So too concern for his own personal safety 
may have influenced his decisions.  On the first day, the crowd response 
came from the Clodian side, when the Clodiana multitudo caused a tumult.  
When we analyse their motivation, we see that the Clodians sought to show 
their support for one of their own, C. Causinius Schola, as he underwent 
                                                 
544 Gruen (1974: 338-343). 
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cross-examination as a witness in the trial (Asc. 40C).  Their ardour was 
calmed for the next two days of the trial, when Pompey appeared with a 
body guard (praesidium) in attendance (Asc. 40, 50-51C), in response to an 
appeal from Domitius to provide protection, and after the sole consul 
expressed at a contio his fears that Milo wanted him killed. 
 
When the trial was adjourned on the last day, the tribune T. Munatius 
Plancus appealed to the populus at a contio to refuse to let Milo escape (Asc. 
40, 52C).  Pompey posted soldiers on the hills around the forum, as an 
unofficial police force to protect Milo’s defence team – or at least that is how 
Cicero chose to explain their presence in the speech he later published of the 
defence he was unable to deliver through fear at the time (Cic. Mil. 3; Asc. 
41C; Plut. Cic. 35).  The soldiers found cause to act when some of the citizens 
assembled raised an outcry at the military presence, but the soldiers silenced 
these objectors with a slap of the sword, and when their protest persisted, 
some were slain (Dio 40.53.3).  The same happened when the people tried to 
intervene on behalf of Scaurus during his trial for electoral corruption in 52.  
They were stymied and some killed when Pompey again lent the support of 
his forces to peace keeping.  (App. BC 2.24).  
 
But what was the nature of the relationship between defendant and 
supporters?  How did they ensure the support would arrive at the forum?  
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How were supporters organised?  Senators charged with maiestas, typically 
after holding the tribunate, used collegia and operae to defend themselves (as 
we saw in the cases of Cornelius and Manilius above).  The ex-tribune 
Vatinius used milites and Clodius to disrupt his trial for his activities during 
his tribunate of 58 (Cic. Vat. 33f.; Sest. 135).  Pompey used his soldiers to 
keep the peace during trials on several occasions, and on the two instances 
examined above sent his soldiers against the people when they 
demonstrated support, in the first example for the prosecution, and in the 
second for the defence.  As Rome had no police force, this is not as illegal as 
it sounds.  Pompey had been charged with the duty of restoring order when 
he was appointed sole consul in 52 BC.  He was merely doing his job, albeit 
along partisan lines. 
 
Criminal trials in the late Republic reveal levels of popular participation 
beyond the short-lived jury service of tribuni aerarii.  Ex-magistrates relied 
on the support of their clients to extricate themselves from trials based on 
trumped up charges.  Popular demonstrations ranged from shouting to 
more violent expressions of support, especially once Pompey’s soldiers 
became involved.  Popular motivation was based not only on loyalty to 
senatorial patrons on trial, but also took into account issues behind the case, 
including the citizens’ right to elect candidates and not have them removed 
from office, the right to enact laws without having the senate annul them, 
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and what became a de facto right after years of reforms: access to subsidised 
food. 
 
 
CASE STUDY: LUDI ET GLADIATORES 
 
As we saw in the introduction to this chapter, Cicero purported that ludi 
offered a better gauge of a man’s popularity than comitia and contiones (Sest. 
115).  He also suggested that shows (ludi et gladiatores) were a good place to 
assess one’s popularity apud sordem urbis et faecem – a new experience for 
him now the misera ac ieiuna plebecula had begun to greet him with ovations 
after recognising that he was a favourite of Pompey (Att. 1.16.11).  It is 
difficult to confirm the status of these participants, as Cicero exaggerated the 
lowly rank of those who applauded his presence because Pompey had 
disappointed him and these were Pompey’s clients.  The extremely poor he 
describes should not have been able to afford the ticket price to gain 
entrance to ludi, but as we see below, popular patrons distributed tickets via 
collegia and vici, thus opening up participation at ludi to those who might 
otherwise have been excluded. 
 
The evidence for participation at ludi is scant but nonetheless enlightening, 
revealing as it does a snapshot of Roman social life, which in turn illustrates 
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interaction between orders.  Plutarch records an incident that occurred in 63 
in the temple of Bellona where spectators had gathered to watch a show.  
This was the first performance at which a law passed by the tribune Roscius 
in 67 was applied, segregating equites from the rest of the audience in the 
theatre.  According to Plutarch (Cic. 13.2-4), the other spectators (polloi) 
objected to the equestrians receiving special seats and hissed at him, at 
which point the equites (politai) applauded him.  Vanderbroeck interpreted 
this incident as an anti-popularis demonstration, claiming Roscius was 
popularis when he proposed the law to benefit equestrians because currying 
the favour of the equestrians was a typical popularis ploy in their battle 
against the optimates.545  There is another way to read this though.  Plutarch 
says it is the polloi who are outraged; that is, the majority.  They are angry at 
Roscius not for any ideological reason, but because favour was shown to an 
order not their own.  The second explanation seems more likely: in the 
following example we also that access to ludi was jealously guarded by 
many citizens, from all orders. 
 
The equites were busy again in 59.  At the ludi Apollinares members of the 
equestrian order cheered Curio for his opposition to the triumvirate, while 
Pompey was pilloried by the actor Diphilus for his unsporting amicitia, and 
                                                 
545 Vanderbroeck (1987: 230). 
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Caesar was greeted with a hostile silence (Att. 2.19.3).  Cicero interpreted 
their action as a reflection of the populi sensus (ib.).  This was shortly after the 
boni had applauded Curio in the forum, but hissed and shouted at the 
praetor Fufius, a well-known adherent of Caesar (Cic. Att. 2.18.1).  The 
absence of any reference to the plebs suggests they were not present, or at 
least did not join boni and equites in this demonstration against the extra-
legal triumvirate. 
 
An actor had a leading role in 57 BC too, when at his bidding the populus 
Romanus indicated their support for the senaorial decree in favour of 
Cicero’s recall.  The people had gathered to watch a show when the news 
was announced in the theater, and as they entered, individual senators were 
applauded, especially the consul Lentulus Spinther.  When Clodius entered, 
however, the crowd turned against him, hissing and threatening him.  When 
the actor mentioned Cicero, the audience cheered him (Cic. Sest. 116-123).  
Jeff Tatum has argued against Vanderbroeck who suggests that audiences 
usually displayed an anti-popularis attitude.546  Tatum shows that Cicero, our 
main source, was using the term popularis ironically when he used it of 
Clodius.  Rather, Cicero believed Clodius was no true popularis.  Therefore, 
Tatum rightly concludes, the spectators usually applauded “true” popularis 
politicians. 
                                                 
546 Tatum (1990); Vanderbroeck (1987: 77 ff.). 
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Shortly after this event, another pair of opponents pitted themselves against 
one another, this time before a more diverse audience than the above 
examples: omne genus hominum (Cic. Sest. 124-126).  According to Cicero, at 
gladiatorial games hosted by Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos in the forum, the 
universus populus Romanus applauded the arrival of P. Sestius, but when 
Clodius’ brother Ap. Claudius showed himself he was hissed.  In his 
capacity as Sestius’ defence counsel, Cicero’s words must be taken in 
context.  The evidence for this case is from the speech Cicero wrote in 
defense of Sestius.  He sought to paint a glowing picture of the defendant 
and so was recalling past postive incidents, and putting an extra gloss on 
them by denigrating opponents, namely Ap. Claudius, additionally tainted 
for being the brother of Cicero’s foe, Clodius.  Moreover, Sestius had been 
active during his tribunate on behalf of Cicero in securing his recall from 
exile, so Cicero poured on the praise to repay his benefactor. 
 
Upon his return to Italy, Cicero was similarly excessive in his description 
when he reported that Clodius and his supporters forced their way into the 
theatre at the Megalesian games, painting the incident as an attack on the 
equites and boni: “vis enim innumerabilis incitata ex omnibus vicis conlecta 
servorum ab hoc aedile religioso repente <e> fornicibus ostiisque omnibus 
in scaenam signo dato inmissa inrupit” (Cic. Har. Resp. 22).  It is not clear 
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what motivated the Clodians, other than that they did not have tickets to the 
show.  It has been suggested that Clodius may not have had time to 
distribute tickets to the urban plebs,547 but such a theory seems unlikely 
when we consider what we know about Clodius’ networks.  He had 
lieutenants in the collegia and vici to ensure efficient dispersal of tickets.  In 
terms of participants, as Vanderbroeck notes, Cicero often alleged Clodius’ 
supporters were slaves.  Some slaves no doubt numbered amongst his 
supporters, but so too did members of many other groups.  Cicero himself 
mentions that the slaves were gathered from all the neigbourhoods (vici), so 
it could be expected that they would have rallied other adherents, free and 
freed, on the way, either by meeting them on the streets or as word 
spread.548  In this way, we get a more accurate picture of this episode: 
Clodius and his supporters, both slaves and freed members of the plebs 
urbana forced their way into the games because their access had been 
denied.  They merely sought to participate in Roman public life, not topple 
the state as Cicero would have us believe. 
 
A final example of popular participation in the theater: the people 
applauded Milo in 54 BC (Cic. Q. Fr. 3.1.13).  We know no other details of 
                                                 
547 Vanderbroeck (1987: 253). 
 
548 Vanderbroeck (1987: 253f.) suggests the Clodians included shopkeepers along with 
slaves in their number, but others were clearly involved too. 
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the event, other than Caesar’s opinion of the applause.  The emphasis is on 
the existance of the applause not the participants.   
 
Ludi et gladiatores were an integral part of Roman public life.  Those 
excluded sought entrance by any means so that they too could participate.  
In addition ludi were, as Cicero claims, an important venue for the testing of 
public opinion, expressed verbally and, sometimes, violently.  We must not 
follow in his footsteps and negate the validity of some demonstrations by 
demeaning the status of the participants to that of the most humble.  All 
orders of society were involved in demonstrations in the theatre at different 
times, ranging from showing their support for popular champions, to 
expressing their frustration at favouritism shown by magistrates to orders 
other than their own. 
 
 
CASE STUDY: TRIUMPHS  
 
Triumphs offered the senate the opportunity to show their gratitude to a 
conquering magistrate by voting to grant him the right to hold a triumph 
(Liv. 3.63; Polyb. 6.15).  At the same time, the populus Romanus was given the 
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chance to display loyalty to their victorious leader.549  For this reason, 
triumphs were jealously guarded by the political elite as a means of accruing 
dignitas and auctoritas, so much so that during the reign of Augustus the 
triumph became the prerogative of the imperial family.  Three triumphs will 
illustrate the nature of the collective behaviour typically shown at these 
events: the triumph of Pompey in 61 celebrating his victory over the pirates 
and Mithridates, the unofficial triumph of Cato the younger upon his return 
from Cyprus in 56, and the triumph of Pomptinus for his victory over the 
Gauls in 54.  While the first two examples were celebrations of Rome’s 
success and no disturbances are recorded, the last experienced some violent 
opposition as the supporters of the imperator fought with those opposing the 
granting of a triumph. 
 
In the first case, the victorious general Pompey put on such a great show for 
the plebs that the procession and ritual lasted two days. (Flor. 2.13.9; Plut. 
Pomp. 45; Vell. Pat. 2.40.3-5).  The plebs responded by naming him Magnus 
in a contio: “Pompeius de liberis Mithridatis et Tigrane, Tigranis filio, 
triumphauit Magnusque a tota contione consalutatus est” (Livy 103).  A 
short notice, this summary nonetheless shows that a general could confirm 
for himself his standing in the hearts of the people (here undefined) by 
staging his own show in the form of a triumph, where he could receive 
                                                 
549 On the people’s interpretation of the triumph, see Beard (2007: Ch. 2). 
336 
feedback, as it were.  The triumph also allowed him to communicate his 
achievements to his fellow citizens.550 
 
This next case features Cato the Younger who stage-managed his own 
return from Cyprus to resemble a triumph.  So successful was his display, 
and so impressive the amount of his booty, that the demos crowded the 
banks of the Tiber and the senate honoured him with an extraordinary 
praetorship, which he declined.  Both our sources comment on the lack of 
respect he showed his fans by not disembarking until he reached his 
destination (Plut. Cat. Min. 39; Vell. Pat. 2.45.5).  Senate and people alike 
approved of a good show to celebrate the state’s successful acquisition of 
new lands and new riches. 
 
When Pomptinus wanted to celebrate a triumph for his victory over the 
Allobroges in 62-61, the senate did not initially grant him permission.  He 
did not gain senatorial permission until 54BC.  Dio relates that Pomptinus’ 
friends tried to gather more supporters: the praetor Servius Sulpicius Galba 
illegally and secretly granted citizenship to some men before dawn on the 
day of the assembly to vote on the triumph, so that they could participate in 
                                                 
 
550 See Gregory (1994: 84) on the importance of the triumph as a means of visual 
communication in a largely illiterate society, building on Nicolet’s (1976: 355) suggestion 
that triumphs focused on public display dating from the second Punic war, when generals 
instead of gods began to take credit for saving citizens from slavery. 
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the vote (Dio 39.65).551 Tribunes who had been excluded from the assembly 
took exception and fought in the triumph causing bloodshed.  Dio is the 
only source of evidence for popular involvement in this case,552 and has 
misunderstood his source regarding the motivation for the tribunes’ run in 
with, presumably, supporters of Pomptinus.  Dio says they were angry at 
being excluded from the assembly, although there was no exclusive 
assembly to vote on the triumph.  He may have mistaken the meeting at 
which Sulpicius Galba granted citizenship for that at which the people 
voted for the triumph.  Despite the confusion, Pomptinus’ triumph provides 
evidence that tempers could run hot at such events, where men and their 
supporters competed for pre-eminence over opponents. 
 
Triumphs were hard won but worth the effort for the amount of kudos 
accrued, as we see especially in the case of Pompey.  Cato’s shows the 
positive effect of even a mock triumph on a man’s dignitas.  In both of these 
cases, the imperator is nothing without the adulation of the masses.  Yet 
again we see the importance of popular participation in confirming the 
auctoritas of an individual.  Pomptinus’ case illustrates the difficulty of 
achieving a triumph in the competitive environment of the late Republic.   
                                                 
551 On the procedure for securing a triumph, see Beard (2007: 200-205). 
 
552 Cicero (Att. 4.18.4) mentions that Pomptinus’ desire to celebrate a triumph is opposed by 
Cato, Servilius and Q. Mucius because no law was ever carried granting him imperium, but 
gives no details of the popular involvement.  He also tells his brother of his own intention 
to support Pomptinus (Q. Fr. 3.4.6). 
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CASE STUDY: POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS TO HONOUR 
CHAMPIONS  
 
Staying with the theme from the previous section, we here examine popular 
responses in honour of those who have championed the popular cause or 
otherwise found themselves in good favour with the people.  Romans 
demonstrated support or opposition in a number of ways. 
 
This group of  popular demonstrations illustrates intermediate leadership, 
and so provides additional evidence for organisers outside the elite.  That 
urban and rural plebs sought to honour these popular champions also 
emphasises the existence of popular causes that needed addressing. 
 
It is well known that Caesar enjoyed a considerable popular following.  But 
the effort he put into this cannot be underestimated.  He was one of the most 
successful organisers and propagandists when it came to rallying the plebs 
to demonstrate their support.  Below we see him use the funeral of his aunt 
daughter to do so.  And here he uses his Marian connections to cement his 
popularity.  In 65 BC, during his aedileship, he secretly ordered the 
restoration of statues to commemorate Marius’ victories over Jugurtha, the 
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Cimbri, and the Teutoni, and these he had set up during the night, in the 
teeth of the opposition of the optimates (Vell. Pat. 2.43.4; Suet. Jul. 11).  He 
had mixed results.  Some claimed that by violating laws he was aiming to 
set himself up to usurp sole power, but that his organisation was superior to 
these rumours and mobilised “the partisans of Marius who arrived 
suddenly and filled the Capitol with their applause” (Plut. Caes. 6.3).553  In 
63 the plethos demanded the senate release Caesar from the curia after an 
unusually long meeting at which he was to clear himself of charges of 
involvement in the Catilinarian conspiracy (Plut. Caes. 8.3f.).  Again, in 62, 
the multitudo demanded Caesar’s restoration to the praetorship after the 
senate removed him from office for backing the laws of Caecilius Metellus.  
The senate praised Caesar for withdrawing to his house in order to pacify 
the people and so prevent violent clashes (Suet. Jul. 16).554  The plebs were 
quick to show their support by coming to the aid of Caesar. 
 
Pompey vied with Caesar for popular support.  When Pompey returned 
from the East in 62 the people of Italy escorted him to Rome, so relieved 
were they to see him disband his army (Plut. Pomp. 43.3).  So little is known 
about this case that we do not know who mobilised the people.  The 
demonstration may have been spontaneous as news spread that the people’s 
                                                 
553 Gruen (1974: 76). 
 
554 Gelzer (1968: 51f.). 
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hero was returning peacefully.  The incident foreshadows the glorious 
return of Cicero in 57, and makes one wonder whether Cicero modelled his 
on Pompey’s. 
 
In 50 BC Pompey became ill while at Naples, perhaps with malaria.555  
Festivals followed his recovery as all the cities of Italy had been so worried 
about Pompey’s health that they had vowed public sacrifices for his safety 
(Dio 41.6.3f.; Vell. Pat. 2.48.2).  In June, Cicero wrote to Atticus concerned 
about Pompey’s bad health and the potential for the balance of power to tip 
should he not recover (Att. 6.3.4); but his attitude had become hysterical by 
March 49 when he claimed the popular demonstrations were a sham (Att. 
8.16.1; 9.5.4).  Cicero was clearly venting his frustration at Pompey’s 
popularis stance by implying Pompeians orchestrated the vows of the Italian 
cities.  According to Plutarch, this display of popularity started with a 
certain Praxagoras, and was then imitated by towns in the neighbourhood 
until the thanksgiving spread throughout all Italy to become one of the main 
causes of his war against Caesar as Pompey became over-confident (Plut. 
Pomp. 57).  We have no further information on Praxagoras, so must make an 
educated guess as to his relationship with Pompey: he was likely a client.  In 
                                                 
555 Seager (2002:145).  Juvenal (10.283-285) says that the public vows of many cities 
overcame the fevers Pompey received from Campania.  Pompey was not, however, so sick 
that he could not write a letter to the senate emphasising his own fairness and stirring up 
prejudice against Caesar (App. BC 2.28). 
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this case then, we see clients organising demonstrations to honour their 
patrons. 
 
Cicero had his share of popular adulation too, thanks to the hard work of 
amici such as Atticus (Cic. Att. 4.1.1) and Sestius, while Cicero was suffering 
in exile.  Sestius was tribune at the time, and used his position to mobilise 
support for Cicero’s recall.  Cicero’s gratitude to him is a feature of his 
speech made in Sestius’ defence.  When the decision was finally made, the 
populus Romanus applauded the announcement of the senate’s decision to 
recall Cicero (Sest. 116-123).556  The legislation was passed with the support 
of citizens from the towns and municipalities of the peninsula (Cic. Dom. 
75), with “incredibili concursu Italiae” (Cic. Att. 4.1.4).  Intermediate 
leadership was also involved.  In anticipation of Cicero’s return from exile, 
his nomenclator organised individuals to greet him; the infima plebes filled the 
steps of the temples at the Porta Capena and congratulated him with 
magnificent applause (Cic. Att. 4.1.5).  The populus Romanus honoured 
Cicero by escorting him, in immense numbers rejoicing (Cic. Dom. 76)  A 
whole day was spent welcoming him home (App. BC 2.16).  Cicero was 
desperate to convince men from all orders that he had recovered his dignitas 
and auctoritas so badly damaged by Clodius’ legislation.  Therefore we need 
                                                 
556 Tatum (1999: 181 f.); Vanderbroeck (1987: 246). 
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to beware of exaggeration in his accounts of the degree of support and 
adulation he received, despite Plutarch’s claim that “so great was the joy of 
the cities and the eagerness of men to meet him that what was said by 
Cicero afterwards fell short of the truth” (Cic. 33.8).  Cicero’s desperate need 
to have people believe his exile had not effected his political standing is 
highlighted by his comment to Atticus: “I have resumed what I thought 
there would be the utmost difficulty in recovering—my brilliant standing at 
the bar, my auctoritas in the senate, and a popularity with the boni even 
greater than I desired” (Cic. Att. 4.1.3).   
 
Cicero was deliberately obscuring the fact that he was not without 
opposition, transferring Clodius’ hostility towards his person to his house 
(Cic. Att. 4.1.3).  The rural plebs, present in Rome to celebrate the ludi 
Romani, cheered him all the way home.  But food supplies, already under 
pressure, could not cope with the influx of visitors.  Clodius took the 
opportunity of the food shortage caused by the massive influx to stir up the 
plebs, blaming the scarcity on Cicero (Cic. Att. 4.1.6).557   
 
Clodius also enjoyed popular demonstrations in his favour, as we have seen 
above.  Another example serves to illustrate why he enjoyed such support 
                                                 
557 See Chapter Four on food shortages. 
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amongst residents of Rome.  When in 57 armati homines drove builders from 
the site of Cicero’s house (Cic. Att. 4.3.2), Clodius was doing more than 
drive a thorn into Cicero’s side.  He had destroyed the house of Cicero, the 
man who had compromised the liberty of Roman citizens by executing 
Catilinarians without a trial, and built a shrine to Libertas on the site.  Cicero 
destroyed liberty, Clodius, defender of the interests of the plebs, restored 
it.558 
 
The degree of ardent support explains his importance to Pompey as a man 
favoured by the plebs for his promotion of their interests.  He addressed the 
people on behalf of Pompey in 56 when, following the conference at Luca, 
Pompey and Crassus had made a deal to stand together for the consulship 
of 55 but were experiencing senatorial obstruction to their request to 
postpone elections until their return.  The plebs (plethos, homilos, polloi 
according to Dio 39.27.3-29.3) or the universus populus (Val. Max. 6.2.6) leapt 
to Clodius’ defence when his entrance to the curia was barred by a group of 
equestrians sent by hostile senators to kill him.  The people knew where 
their interests lay. 
 
 
                                                 
558 Allen Jr. (1984). 
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CASE STUDY: FUNERALS 
 
Funerals offered the people of Rome another chance to participate 
informally in political life by demonstrating their support of individuals and 
their factions.  Like triumphs, they were surrounded by fierce competition 
for popular favour, as politicians fought to outdo each other.  A successful 
funeral was like winning a triumph: an excellent opportunity to celebrate 
(and therefore increase) auctoritas and dignitas, and flaunt popularity and 
connections.  Here we investigate the funerals of Sulla, Lucullus, Julia, and 
Clodius. 
 
Sulla’s funeral procession in 78 was disrupted when one of the consuls, 
Lepidus, tried to prevent it, but Catulus and Pompey joined with Sullan 
soldiers and veterans who had come in from the countryside to ensure Sulla 
was properly honoured (Plut. Pomp. 15.3).  An unprecedented crowd from 
the plebs (plethos) flocked together (App. BC 105).  Senate, equestrians, and 
all the legions that had served under Sulla rushed to join in the procession.  
Loud cries of farewell were raised by senate, equestrians, soldiers and 
finally by the plebeians.  Some lamented his death because they longed for 
Sulla, but others were afraid of his army and the spirit of Sulla (App. BC 
105f.).  Members of every order thus demonstrated their respect for the 
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deceased senator, even if some worried that the excesses of his regime were 
not yet over. 
 
The demos reacted spontaneously to the body of L. Licinius Lucullus being 
carried into the Forum, when he died in 57 BC.  The plebs requested he be 
buried in the Campus Martius, but his brother Marcus managed to persuade 
them to allow the family to lay him to rest in their estate in Tusculum (Plut. 
Luc. 43.2-3).  The city plebs wanted to show him this one final honour as a 
mark of respect for his deeds as a general and statesman (Plut. ib.). 
 
When Pompey’s wife Julia died in 54, the people (populus, Livy 106; demos or 
plethos in Plutarch Caes. 23.7; Pomp. 53.4f) seized her body and honoured her 
memory by burying her in the Campus Martius.  Unnamed friends (philoi) 
of Pompey and Caesar motivated the action (Dio 39.64).  Who were these 
friends?  Vanderbroeck suggests they were intermediate leaders,559 but 
offers nothing more than that.  It is likely they were connected to the collegia 
or vici, due to the amount of people they were able to mobilise. 
  
The populus made the ultimate demonstration of their admiration when they 
made the curia Clodius’ funeral pyre in 52 BC (Asc. 32-33C).  The 
participants at Clodius’ “funeral” included a diverse range of Romans: 
                                                 
559 Vanderbroeck (1987: 259). 
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infimaeque plebis et servorum maxima multitudo surrounded his corpse when it 
lay in the atrium of his house, then next morning an even bigger crowd 
eiusdem generis gathered, this time including complures noti homines plus the 
tribuni plebis T. Munatius Plancus and Q. Pompeius Rufus (Asc. 32C).  At 
this point Asconius ceases to use neutral terminology and calls the those 
who bear Clodius’ body to the forum vulgus imperitum (33C).  He may be 
under the influence of Cicero here. 
 
 
CASE STUDY: ELECTIONS 
 
We will examine five instances of informal popular participation at elections 
held between 63 and 53 BC.  Out of all our case studies, these were most 
violent due to the passion of the rival supporters, a reflection of the 
increasingly competitive nature of Roman politics.  Candidates fought more 
keenly for more lucrative magistracies, and this competition was transferred 
to the electoral assemblies.  The thermostat went up as the value of the prize 
increased. 
 
People flooded into Rome to vote for Cato in 63 when he stood for the 
tribunate.  He had at last decided to stand for the tribunate after years of 
declining the office.  His motivation: he had heard that the Pompeian 
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Metellus planned to put himself forward as a candidate.  Cato wanted to 
have the chance to veto any Pompeian measures that Metellus might put 
forward (Plut. Cat. Min. 20).  Plutarch records that, once his purpose became 
known, so many polloi came crowding in to encourage him that he was 
almost crushed (Cat. Min. 21).  Plutarch’s explanation of their support, 
however, is doubtless confused: these plebs were supporting a member of 
the optimates because he promised to increase the number of grain 
recipients (Plut. Caes. 8.6), not because they wanted him to check the moves 
of Metellus. 
 
On the eve of the consular elections in 56 rival supporters (Crassus’ soldiers 
and Domitius’ slaves) clashed on the Campus Martius.  According to Dio 
(39.31) Lucius Domitius withdrew his candidature after a slave 
accompanying him to the elections was killed – Crassus had brought 
stratiotai to Rome to make sure there was no opposition to the election of 
Crassus and Pompey.  Appian relates the same details: when the candidates 
were making their way to the assembly they came to blows, and finally 
somebody attacked Domitius’ torchbearer with a sword (BC 2.17).  
Plutarch’s version is more dramatic, painting Cato as the hero of the hour: 
Cato, Domitius’ brother-in-law, stopped Domitius from fleeing with the 
others when they were attacked, but “exhorted him to stand his ground, and 
not to abandon, while they had breath, the struggle in behalf of liberty 
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which they were waging against the tyrants” (Cat. Min. 41.5).  Cato refers 
here to the liberty of members of the senatorial order to compete as equals 
for curule office.  This of course in the context of the conference at Luca.  
Soldiers beat the slaves into submission, then Pompey and Crassus had their 
opponents shut up in their homes, and so they were elected (Plut. Crass. 
15.4-5).  Domitius did not, in the end, stand for election.  This case illustrates 
the superiority of brute military strength over a fighting force of slaves, and 
explains why soldiers were barred from the city.  The soldiers stood to gain 
by supporting their commander, both by getting their man elected (and so 
the promise of future benefits such as land on demobilisation), and by 
donatives received from the general.  The plebs participated in a public 
meeting; for when the deal made between the triumvirs became known, and 
the optimates were angry, Marcellinus questioned Pompey and Crassus 
regarding their intentions to stand for the consulship.  The majority of the 
people demanded they answer, to which Pompey equivocated that perhaps 
he would stand, and perhaps he would not.  Crassus on the other hand 
provided a craftier answer: he would take which ever course he thought 
would advantage the commonwealth (Plut. Pomp. 51.4f.).  And so the war to 
win over the people continued. 
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At the praetorian elections in 55 the triumvirs used force and obnuntiatio to 
get Vatinius elected.560  When the first tribe voted for Cato, he announced he 
had heard thunder, and so dissolved the assembly by this technique of 
obnuntiatio (Plut. Cat. Min. 42.3).  Pompey then resorted to extensive bribery, 
ejected the beltistoi (optimates) from the Campus Martius and secured the 
election of Vatinius (ib. 42.4).  Those who had been bribed slunk home 
guiltily for casting illegal votes, while the rest of the people (plethos) 
gathered together to express their indignation.  Cato addressed these 
citizens in a contio summoned by a tribune, at which he cast Pompey and 
Caesar in a bad light.  At the end of the day, he was escorted home by a 
crowd bigger than that which accompanied the elected praetors (ib 42.5).  
Doubtless these Romans had not forgotten Cato’s own bribe in 62, when he 
offered the poor grain at heavily subsidised prices. 
 
Dissatisfaction at exclusion from participation, given added impetus from 
candidates’ rivalry, finally came to a head in 53 BC.  Defeat was admitted 
and elections cancelled after Clodius and Milo caused a ruckus at the 
consular elections.  Clodius had used the same tactic when excluded from 
the Megalesian games in 57 (Cic. Har. Resp. 22).  Then, they forced entrance 
                                                 
560 Dio (39.32.1-2) records violence only at the aedilician elections. .  This was a more violent 
affair than the praetorian elections: Pompey’s toga was spattered in blood because so many 
people near him had been slain (Plut. Pomp. 53.3).  The record is too slight, however, to 
provided us even with the name of an organiser, or the status of participants.  
Vanderbroeck (1987: 257) suggests Pompey was responsible, I assume on the basis of his 
role in arranging for Vatinius’ successful candidature. 
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to the games; now he used his supporters to force entrance to the saepta and 
ordered his men to draw swords and hurl stones during the consular 
elections in 53 BC (Cic. Mil 41).  Clodius was backing Hypseus and Scipio as 
candidates against Milo.  Asconius (30C) relates how the factiones of Clodius 
and Milo clashed: they fought often in Rome, and although both were 
equally ruthless (audacia), Milo stood for the meliores partes – elections were 
impossible to complete because of the reckless hostility of the candidates.  It 
must be reiterated: both factions armed their supporters.  Clodius used his 
to gain entrance to events from which he was excluded; Milo to bar the 
entrance of the Clodians.   
 
Popular participation in elections took the bloody form of fighting to 
support favourite candidates.  The stronger the force of supporters, the more 
likely a candidate was to cow opposition, to the extent even of deterring 
them from standing for office.  Popular motivation rested on both public 
interest, such as support of Cato for his promised grain reform, and factional 
politics, especially in the case of clashes between the supporters of Clodius 
and Milo where we see Milo’s side using obstructionist tactics to prevent his 
opponent from gaining the upper hand. 
 
 
SENATORIAL RESPONSES 
351 
 
The senatorial response to popular pressure provides evidence of the 
strength of popular power: the Roman government’s response to popular 
demonstrations reveals that citizens were able to wring concessions and 
reform out of the conservative core of the senate by expressing their opinion 
in the forum, Campus Martius and other public meeting areas on some 
occasions – witness the land, food and debt reform in the people’s favour – 
but on others the senate responded to block popular efforts to secure their 
aims.  
 
Hostile responses to popular discontent included constitutional change (e.g. 
Sulla seriously decreased the powers of the tribunes), legislation de vi, 
policing, and senatorial decrees, especially the senatus consultum ultimum 
(SCU).561  The SCU was an emergency declaration, giving consuls the power 
to protect the state by whatever means necessary, though the details were 
specific and varied.  This decree was first used against Gaius Gracchus, 
although it was not given this name.562  It was also modified for use in civil 
wars against Sulla in 83, Lepidus in 77, and the Catilinarians in 63, so that 
the decree allowed magistrates to take military precautions.  Magistrates 
                                                 
561 Nippel (1984; 1995); Vanderbroeck (1987: 153 ff.). 
 
562 “SCU” is a modern term, and derives from Caes. BC. 1.5.3 (OCD s.v. “SCU” (A. 
Momigliano and A. Lintott)). 
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and tribunes whose vetoes went against the dominant state faction also 
found themselves the object of the SCU in 100, 62, 53, 52, 49, 48 and 43.563  In 
short, the SCU not only permitted the senate to levy troops, but it also 
directly identified public enemies.564 
 
While higher magistrates and censors could intervene in certain matters, 
there was in fact little if any state intervention.  In addition, the army was 
excluded from crossing the pomerium and entering the urbs Romana.  When 
they did intervene, magistrates used coercitio and censorial punishment to 
make examples of the elite.  Riotous public meetings were not usually a 
cause for concern, though authorities would react if disturbances were 
serious enough.  The senate and curule magistrates issued special mandates 
to aediles and tresviri capitales (best described as police magistrates) to deal 
with searches and arrests.  The tresviri originally supervised the jail and 
executions therein, and later organised the vigiles.  They could arrest and 
punish runaway slaves.565  
 
                                                 
563 See Nippel (1995: 63ff.) and Lintott (1999a: Chapter 11). 
  
564 Public interest was the best excuse to destroy personal/political enemies, and so a new 
charge was created, that of being a hostis, which meant death with impunity (Nippel 1995: 
66).  The people could and did protest against some hostis decisions by, e.g. refusing to 
plunder (Val. Max. 4.3.14). 
 
565 Nippel (1995: ch. 1). 
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When senators disagreed with a tribune’s bill, they could hinder the 
legislation in three ways: intercessio, obnuntiatio, and filibuster.  Cicero 
provides us with an example of all three techniques (Att. 4.3).  Piso shows 
how to respond when a veto is ignored: he forbade the herald to continue 
reading Cornelius’ bill in 67 in violation of Globulus’ veto (see above).  
Bibulus illustrates the use of obnuntiatio, the reporting of omens that 
cancelled assemblies, when in 59 he obstructed Caesar’s legislation.  A third 
regular senatorial technique was filibuster, as when Metellus talked out the 
time to prevent the senate from making a decision. 
 
In 57, the tribune Sestius was attacked and seriously wounded by some of 
Clodius’ men when he tried to prevent a tribal assembly by obnuntiating, 
despite the fact that obnuntiatio had been outlawed in January of that year.  
Sestius went to the consuls at the temple of Castor to announce that the 
omens were unfavourable (Cic. Sest. 79f.; Mil. 38; Red. Sen. 7; Red. Pop. 14).  
He paid the price for acting in such a partisan and illegal manner.  This case 
illustrates precisely the tension between senatorial and popular powers that 
was a theme of the period.  Sestius considered himself immune to the law 
banning obnuntio, even though it had been passed by the populus Romanus in 
the tribal assembly and was therefore binding on all Romans. 
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CONCLUSION: WHAT KIND OF DEMOCRACY? 
 
Those members of the populus Romanus present in the Forum during a contio 
had the opportunity to take part in the decision-making process.  They 
could cheer and applaud in support, and shout out their opinion on the 
matter being debated, or make it known through more physical forms of 
expression.  Magistrates hesitated to take their bills to the voting assembly 
without first ensuring that they had popular backing for fear of losing face 
should the bills’ passage fail.  The same influence extended to the legislative 
assemblies themselves.  In this way we can see the power the people had 
over the elite. 
 
Just as they needed the populus to enact laws, the members of the aristocracy 
also needed popular support to protect themselves from criminal charges.  
Acquittal was more easily won with the backing of a passionate group of 
citizens.566 
  
Other events gave senators the chance to evaluate levels of support, and 
gave the people the opportunity to express their feelings.  Access to ludi et 
gladiatores was considered a right, as these were not only entertainment 
                                                 
566 Other factors also contributed to the likelihood of success, such as the strength of 
evidence against the accused, the skill of his defense team, and the ability of the jurors to 
make their decision with objectivity. 
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spectacles, but also an integral part of Roman public life at which politicians 
tested public opinion and flaunted their own popularity, if they had it.  
Similarly triumphs relied on popular participation to confirm the auctoritas 
of the victorious individual.  In a like manner, the involvement of the 
populus Romanus at funerals bolstered the auctoritas and dignitas of the 
deceased and their family. 
  
Roman citizens were able to take part in elections formally by voting.  They 
could also find themselves involved informally, fighting in support of 
favourite candidates or in defence of the public interest.  Popular political 
participation was not always conducted in an organised and seemly fashion, 
especially when enthusiastic protection of popular champions boiled over as 
a result of frustration at an insensitive, selfish and obdurate conservative 
clique in the senate. 
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CONCLUSION: WHAT KIND OF DEMOCRACY? 
 
The populus Romanus had an important role to play in the decision-making 
process at Rome in the late Republic.  Their political power had both a 
formal and an informal dimension.  From the earliest days of the Republic 
the citizens had gathered in centuries to perform their official duty and elect 
the magistrates who would direct the state with the support of the electors.  
And since the lex Hortensia of 287 citizens had assembled in their tribes to 
enact laws binding on the whole population.  Informally, the people 
compelled magistrates and senate to compromise and propose bills in the 
popular interest.  Popular opinion and pressure had a great deal of influence 
at the decision-making level of Roman government. 
  
The balance of power had gradually shifted so that by the late Republic the 
members of the top census groups no longer dominated the assemblies.  
Rural tribules had been moving to Rome, bringing their rural registrations 
with them, which changed the balance in the tribal assemblies so that the 
ballot of the non-elite voter now counted.  When he cast his vote, although 
he was only contributing to the vote of his unit, it was now as a member of a 
group made up of a more diverse selection of citizens. 
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In addition to the legally prescribed avenues of participation, the people 
also had recourse to informal means of involvement in politics.  Time-
honoured methods throughout the Republic were secession, mutiny, and 
the refusal to enlist.  The risk these demonstrations of popular frustration 
posed to the security of the state compelled the senate to heed the 
protestors’ demands for debt relief, land reform and improved conditions of 
service.   
 
The people saw to it that the issue of insecurity of food supply was dealt 
with.  Rome had lacked the infrastructure to maintain a reliable food 
distribution, but popular pressure forced concessions out of the senate that 
resulted in marked improvements both to the security of supply and the 
provision of food subsidies for citizens.  In the process, politicians such as 
Pompey enhanced their dignitas beyond normal expectations.  Such prestige 
was treasured by the elite – without it they were nothing in the competitive 
world of Roman politics.  The prestige that the people’s support brought 
was a powerful motivating force in Roman politics, persuading, for 
example, popularis politicians to restore tribunician power.  
 
Contiones provided Romans with the opportunity to take part directly in 
politics through attendance at informal debates on legislative proposals in 
the Forum.  Rogatores were not keen to put their dignitas in danger and take 
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a bill to the vote until they were sure their proposal would be successful.  
Public opinion was tested when magistrates put questions to the people and 
listened for their response.  Otherwise, the speaker could use the volume of 
applause as a measure of approval.  The people had power over the elite 
because they had to be persuaded and cajoled to show their agreement and 
support magistrates’ proposals. 
 
Senators did not only need popular backing to enact laws, but also to protect 
themselves from guilty verdicts in court.  Bribery of the jury was one way to 
secure acquittal; better still was to utilise the support of the people to 
compel one’s opponents to withdraw charges, as seen in the case of 
Cornelius and the brothers Cominii. 
  
Politicians had numerous chances to evaluate levels of support, and the 
people a corresponding amount of opportunities to express their pleasure or 
disapproval at the politicians’ performance and policy choices.  Senators 
tested public opinion and flaunted their own popularity  at the 
performances of ludi et gladiatores.  Similarly triumphs needed the people’s 
involvement, otherwise there would be no audience to confirm the auctoritas 
of the triumphator.  Funerals likewise relied on the involvement of populus 
Romanus to celebrate the auctoritas and dignitas of the deceased and their 
family. 
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Roman citizens were not only able to take part in elections formally by 
voting, but also informally, fighting to defend favourite candidates or 
champions of popular causes.  Popular political participation did not always 
occur in a composed fashion, especially when enthusiastic protection of 
defenders of the people’s interest resulted in physical violence through 
frustration at an insensitive, selfish and obdurate conservative clique in the 
senate.  
 
Democratic elements did exist in the late Roman Republic.  The demos or 
populus Romanus made demands and these were met, eventually, with more 
success than in earlier periods.  These achievements were due to the popular 
power that exerted itself in the form of resistance to senatorial commands 
and demonstrations of support for those who would pass measures that 
improved the conditions for the needy. 
 
The research in this thesis supports the finding that popular political 
participation in the late Roman Republic resembled that of an emerging 
democracy.  Citizens outside the senatorial and equestrian orders took on an 
increasing role in the decision-making process, although their role was on 
occasion extra-legal and untraditional.  But the Romans had always taken 
pride in developing innovative new practices.  The last days of the Republic 
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were a preview of what was to come: the reining in of popular power as the 
people found themselves with increasingly few men willing to represent 
their cause.  Caesar began what his successors in the principate would 
complete, usurpation of power by one man, the princeps. 
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